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Editors’ Introduction1
In the last issue (10.2) GSP introduced a new State of the Field section aimed at providing
practitioners and researches in fields related to genocide studies to share their ongoing work
projects with GSP’s readership. This new section will supplement other new formats in order to
enrich scholarship and discussion around issues of the study and prevention of genocide and mass
atrocity. One such new format is that of Case Notes, which consist of updates on legal case law
developments relevant to these issues. Under this heading GSP will publish brief commentaries
on mass atrocity related court cases. It is our hope that this section will spur debate about such
cases, in a format that is accessible to legal and non-legal scholars alike. The first such contribution,
provided by Stoyan Panov, appears in this issue and discusses the 2015 European Court of Human
Rights case of Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania, in which the Grand Chamber considered whether the
petitioner’s genocide conviction in Lithuania pursuant to the country’s 1998 genocide law violated
the ban on retroactive criminal punishment set out in Article 7 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). While the Chamber found that there was a sufficiently clear legal basis
for the general existence of genocide as an international crime by 1953, it nonetheless found that
Lithuania’s 1998 definition of the crime of genocide was considerably broader in terms of the scope
of acts covered and as such, decided in favour of Vasiliauskas by nine to eight votes that there was
a violation of Article 7 of the ECHR.
The current issue also contains four full articles. In “Spatiality of the Stages of Genocide:
The Armenian Case,” Shelley Burleson and Alberto Giordano shed new light on the Armenian
Genocide by applying a historical geographical information systems (HGIS) approach to analyzing
information contained in the well-known manuscript compiled by journalist Haigazn Kazarian
during and shortly after the Genocide itself. By applying quantitative geographical approaches
to a qualitative manuscript, Burleson and Giordano are able to take a first step towards bridging
the quantitative-versus-qualitative divide within genocide studies, while providing mapped
visualizations of the various stages of the Armenian Genocide according to Kazarian’s observations.
The second full article in this issue also concerns the Armenian Genocide. That the author of
“’My Grandmother was an Armenian...’ Out of the Shadows: Integrating the Personal Narratives
of Armenian and Rum Survivors of Violent Turkification to History Writing” decided to publish
under a pseudonym is, in itself a strong statement regarding the political atmosphere in nationalistic
states. Unfortunately, it seems that such notions are on the rise again throughout geographical
spheres and political systems. In this article, the author draws from personal narratives in order
to address a desideratum in the research of mass violence: the violent acculturation of individuals
belonging to persecuted groups. The author focuses further on the role of literary accounts in these
practises, producing insights which may be used in research and memory work at the same time.
In “Punishing Genocide: A Comparative Empirical Analysis of Sentencing Laws and Practices
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Rwandan Domestic Courts and Gacaca
Courts,” Barbora Hola and Hollie Nyseth Brehm provide the first comparison of sentencing
practices across all three different levels—international, domestic, and local—that prosecuted
individuals suspected of participating in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. By visiting court archives
in Rwanda, Hola and Brehm create a first systematic look at the sentencing practices of domestic
Rwandan courts in relation to the Genocide. Their analysis demonstrates that sentencing varied
across the three levels—ranging from limited time in prison to death sentences, and that sentencing
at the domestic courts appears to have been comparatively more serious than sentencing at the
ICTR and at the Gacaca courts, calling into question the consistency of sentences across levels of
justice in the aftermath of mass atrocity.
The final full article in this issue also focuses on Rwanda. Using Rwanda as a case study, Kate
Temoney argues that genocide studies may focus more on what she refers to as the religious and
sexual aspects of such processes. She analyses religion not only as part of persecution processes
but also explores how religious institutions and the individuals connected to them may be useful
in the context of early warning systems. Temoney stresses that genocide studies and therefore
the scholars in the field should focus most attentively on research—be it of theoretical nature or
empirical—that helps to actually prevent genocide. This argument coincides with thoughts of
Christian Gudehus, Randle DeFalco, Melanie O’Brien, Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Brian Kritz, and JoAnn DiGiorgio-Lutz. “Editors’
Introduction” Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, 3 (2016): 1-2. ©2016 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.3.1463
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Kenneth Gergen who suggests reorganizing social scientific inquiry in a way that “social change is
indeed the primary goal.”
Christian Gudehus
Randle DeFalco
Melanie O’Brien
Douglas Irvin-Erickson
Brian Kritz
JoAnn DiGiorgio-Lutz
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The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence,
and the Future of Genocide Studies
Kate E. Temoney

Montclair State University
Montclair, New Jersey, USA

Abstract: In recent genocides and other conflicts—for example, the Sudan, Burma, and now Iraq—sexual violence
and religion have received increasing but modest systematic treatment in genocide studies. This essay contributes to
the nascent scholarship on the religious and sexual dimensions of genocide by providing a model for investigating
the intersections among religion, genocide, and sexual violence. I treat the Rwandan genocide as a case study using
secondary and primary sources and proffer the reinforcing typologies of “othering,” justification, and authorization
as an investigatory tool. I further nuance the influences of religion on forms of sexual violation by arguing that
religion indirectly (distally) and directly (proximately) furthers the aims of genocide by coding genocidal ideology
and violence as “religious.” Ultimately, I contend that studying the religious and sexual aspects of genocide deepens
our understanding of the complex dynamics of genocide and opens new lines of inquiry into genocide studies.
Keywords: Rwanda, genocide, sexual violence, religion
In the 1990s, sexual violence was recognized by international tribunals as a weapon of war.1
In recent genocides and other conflicts—such as those in the Sudan, Burma, and now Iraq—rape
as well as the religious aspects of these conflicts have received increasing but modest systematic
attention. As a contribution to the nascent scholarship in genocide studies on the religious and
sexual dimensions of genocide, I treat the Rwandan genocide as a case study. Although considerable
scholarship exists on the role of religion and rape in the Rwanda, most notably, Christianity and
Genocide in Rwanda (2009) by Timothy Longman, and Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of
1994 (2001) by Christopher C. Taylor, my goal is to examine the mutually reinforcing relationships
among genocide, religion, and sexual violence. In doing so, Longman’s work is augmented to include
not only how Christian beliefs, but also traditional Rwandan beliefs (as well as a syncretism of the
two) enabled the genocide. Further, Taylor’s work is extended to include how not only Rwandans
indigenous beliefs but Christian beliefs and leadership encouraged rather than discouraged rape.
Ultimately, the aim of this article is to build a generalizable schema that assists in clarifying the
intersections of genocide, religion, and sexual violence in the interest of genocide prevention as
well as prosecution efforts.
In 1994, the Hutu Power elite propagandists called for the immediate expulsion of all Tutsi
from Rwandan soil, a numerical and civilly oppressed minority. Ideologues convinced and
mobilized the Hutu citizenry that they had to defend themselves from Tutsi—an alien threat from
Ethiopia—who supposedly assassinated the Rwandan Hutu president, Juvénal Habyarimana,
and were in league with the invading Rwandan Patriotic Front (RFP) from the north in Uganda.
Using secondary literature and primary data in the form of public speeches and documents, victim
accounts, and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) transcripts, I delineate and
illustrate the intersections of genocide, religion, and sexual violence as a model for examining the
Rwandan genocide as well as other past and contemporary genocides. First, I propose nexuses of
religion and genocide via the typologies of othering, justification, and authorization, and second, I
explore the distal (indirect) and proximate (direct) influence of religion on genocidal sexual violence
guided by the three aforementioned typologies. Last, I review the implications of the study of the
Rwandan genocide, specifically, for future genocide studies as well as general recommendations
for genocide research and prevention.

1

In the 1996 ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Dusko Tadic was charged with rape and sexual violence as a crime against
humanity as well as a war crime. Tadic was not convicted of rape, but he was convicted of aiding and abetting crimes
of sexual nature. The landmark decision was official recognition by the United Nations Courts of rape as a war crime.
See Marlise Simons, “U.N. Court, for the First Time, Defines Rape as War Crime,” New York Times, June 28, 1996,
accessed August 18, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/28/world/un-court-for-first-time-defines-rape-as-warcrime.html

Kate E. Temoney, “The 1994 Rwandan Genocide: The Religion/Genocide Nexus, Sexual Violence, and the Future of Genocide
Studies” Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, 3 (2016): 3-24. ©2016 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.3.1351
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Religion and Genocide
Genocide is not aleatoric nor are its accounts monocausal, and although religious antagonism is
rarely the motivation for undertaking genocide, religious worldviews, rhetoric, and rituals are
often enlisted in the planning and execution of a genocidal conflict.2 It is typically accepted that
“religious violence seldom has its cause in purely religious conflicts; usually it occurs in the context
of a clash between secular social interests.”3 The religious nature of genocide resides in the “meaning
that actors ascribe to it…[and] the specific expectation[s] on the part of the actor[s] (emphasis
added).”4 Moreover, “given the function of religion as a means for understanding what appears to
be beyond the reach of understanding, the use of religious reservoirs of meaning and value may
seem to make eminent sense.”5 Hence, referring to Max Weber, David Little writes, “human beings
seem compelled to evaluate given political and economic arrangements in reference to sacred or
cosmic standards.6” Bruce Lincoln specifies these standards when he avers that “certain kinds
of religious discourse can assist in [morally justifying]…otherwise problematic acts as righteous
deeds, sacred duties, or the like, as when killing is defined as sacrifice, destruction as purification,
or war as Crusade.”7 Extending this logic to genocide, “those who commit genocide often endow
their actions with some sort of religious meaning, frequently putting forth the assertion that, in
destroying entire groups of people, they are doing God’s work.”8
Henry R. Huttenbach succinctly summarizes the intersection and consequence of religion and
genocide when he writes,
[R]eligion—meaning the faithful, the doctrine, the clergy and their institutions—can easily be
prompted to buttress genocidal thought and action in a wide array of capacities. The religiongenocide nexus…in particular, must be carefully monitored in times of social crisis… It is
the task of scholars to expose and explore it, and for policy makers to dismantle the religion-genocide
connection [emphasis added].9

Responding to Huttenbach’s admonishment entails not only examining religion as a tradition of the
faithful who ascribe to particular beliefs and practices and form institutions that propagate them
but also as a functional ideology, one that can make the unthinkable act of genocide thinkable by
styling extirpation as a moral obligation indispensible to reimagining a community that is divinely
ordained and cosmologically necessary. To be sure, in agreement with Scott Appleby’s position,
religion has the potential to further peacemaking, but religion has also “so often inspired, legitimated,
and exacerbated deadly conflicts,”10 and it is the latter capacity of religion that is our focus. A study
2

“Religion” is not being treated as a reified concept with its own agency, but as a worldview and ideology that is
expressed by believers, ecclesial actors, and institutions in the forms of religious rhetoric, appeals to the myths and
dogma, and ritual practices. My use of the term “genocide” refers to the 1948 United Nations Convention on the
Crime of Genocide: “Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

3

Hans G. Kippenberg, Violence as Worship: Religious Wars in the Age of Globalization (Stanford: Stanford University Press
2011), 13.

4

Ibid., 14.

5

Thomas Brudholm and Thomas Cushman, “Introduction: The Religious in Responses to Mass Atrocity” in The Religious
in Responses to Mass Atrocity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Thomas Brudholm and Thomas Cushman (Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 4.

6

David Little, “Studying ‘Religious Human Rights’: Methodological Foundations,” in Religious Human Rights in Global
Perspective, eds. Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte, Jr. (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996), xx.

7

Bruce Lincoln, Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 94.

8

David Patterson, “Getting Rid of the G-d of Abraham: A Prerequisite for Genocide,” in Confronting Genocide: Judaism,
Christianity, Islam, ed. Steven d Leonard Jacobs (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 210.

9

Steven Leonard Jacobs, “Introduction: Genocide in the Name of God: Thoughts on Religion and Genocide, in Confronting
Genocide: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, ed. Steven Leonard Jacobs (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), ix.

10

Scott R. Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield
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of the Rwandan genocide locates three possible nexuses of religion and genocide, in its destructive
capacity, in othering, justification, and authorization. These nexuses are not mutually exclusive,
as they overlap and reinforce each other in significant ways, but singling each of these nexuses
out for consideration as ideal types provides a starting point for investigating the complexity of
their interaction. These three nexuses were at play in Hutu propagandists mobilizing the civilian
population by revising and exploiting colonial inspired biblical myths as well as indigenous
cosmological beliefs in service to dehumanizing Tutsi by characterizing them as a radical, alien
other; justifying their elimination due to a threat they posed to the temporal and atemporal order;
and authorizing their extirpation as granted by the state as well as clergy and the institutional
churches. Clergy largely remained silent during the genocide or actively endorsed the genocide
by refusing to break alliances with the state apparatus that perpetrated genocide; at times, clergy
actively participated in the orchestration and killing of Tutsi. What an examination of religious
rhetoric and religious figures can do particularly well is demonstrate how the self-conferring
authority of religious language and officials presents genocide as instrumental to reconfiguring
communities based on divine sanction, otherworldly considerations, and a notion of a perceived
threat to a cosmic order. Religious discourse and symbols, reinforced by religious authorities,
can sustain perpetrator motivation by adhering to a religious rationality that resists critique
from those outside of the logic of a community’s religious ethos. Within this logic, the fulfillment
of an obligation to bring about a higher purpose would be a must, irrespective of the cost.
The Nexuses of Religion and Genocide
Othering
The social organization of pre-colonial Rwanda consisted of the statuses of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa
as dictated by one’s position in the political and economic community. The Tutsi (14% of the
populace) were the ruling group due to their wealth via cattle ownership; the Hutus (85%) were
mainly agriculturalists; and the Twa (1%) were hunter-gatherer potters (not incidentally, these
same percentages and vocations reflect the census data of the 1990s in Rwanda). According to
traditional Rwandan societal arrangements, a group’s status could change through the process of
icyihuture, the acquiring of cattle, which effectively changed one’s status to that of a Tutsi. Within this
stratified system existed a common language and religion, a governing arrangement of chieftaincies
designed to diffuse political power, and the frequent occurrence of intermarriage.11 After the
arrival of European colonials, the fluid statuses of Hutu/Tutsi/Twa became solidified, adversarial
racial identities. When the League of Nations stripped Germany of its colonies after World War I,
Belgium gained control of what was known then as Ruanda-Urundi, and the system of racialized,
fixed identities remained in place. The colonial influence of Germany and Belgium branded Tutsi
as superior to Hutus because of their affluent livestock ownership within a sophisticated political
system, slender features, and tall height—characteristics that Europeans attributed to Caucasian
influence. Informed by Victorian conceptualizations of race, missionaries went about accounting
for this influence by theorizing that Tutsi were not really Africans but settlers of Rwanda who
conquered the Hutus and were of Hamitic origin, possibly descendants of a lost tribe of Israel, and
the Hamitic myth was born.
The Hamitic myth derives its name from the Old Testament account of an incident involving
Noah and his sons, one of whom was named Ham. According to Genesis 5, Noah’s sons found him
inebriated and naked. While Noah’s two other sons, Japheth and Shem, respectfully averted their
eyes in the act of covering their father’s nakedness so as not to see his shame, Ham did not look
away. For this defiance, Noah cursed Ham’s son, Canaan, as well as Canaan’s descendants, who
were condemned to a life of servitude. In order to reconcile how the cursed, Negroid descendants
of Ham could produce the Caucasian-like ruling class of Tutsi, the Hamitic hypothesis underwent
revision in the nineteenth century. Ham’s son Canaan was cursed, but this was not the case
regarding Ham himself or his other sons, Cush, Mizrahim and Put. Therefore, Tutsi were Hamites
Publishers, 2000), 7.
11

Christopher C. Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror: The Rwandan Genocide of 1994 (New York: Berg Publishers, 1999), 145.
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but not Negroid and were black-skinned due to intermingling with the conquered Negroids of
Egypt.12 That Tutsi are from the land of Ham (Egypt) and thereby not indigenous to Rwanda is the
source of the belief that Tutsi are foreign to Rwanda, and it was at the core of the ideology of the
1994 genocide.
By 1959, after decades of indirect rule by German and Belgian colonials through the minority
Tutsi (who Europeans deemed as predisposed to rule because of the presumption that Tutsi retained
Caucasian attributes from their ancestor, Ham), Tutsis had become the sole ruling class. However,
those same colonizers then replaced Tutsi leaders with Hutu ones after Hutus began to resist,
a violent campaign against Tutsi known as the 1959 Hutu Revolution or Wind of Destruction.13
As a result, thousands of Tutsi fled to Uganda or were killed. The 1994 genocide was not simply
a mimesis of prior targeted killings, but a revelation of a cultural habitus. This habitus is most
transparently articulated in the frequent references by Hutu extremists in the days leading up
to the genocide that expressed a resentment of perceived Tutsi foreignness and their necessary
eradication. Genocide inciters often made explicit references to the Hamitic myth and its effect on
Rwandan culture to provide a gravity and framework for relaying the ultimate otherness of Tutsi
as alien to Rwanda. For example, the mythic Hamite lineage of Tutsi was invoked in a public speech
by Hutu genocide ideologue, Leon Mugesera,14 when he stated that Tutsi “should be ‘sent back
down the Nile,’”15 and extremists expressed their regret over their “failure to purify the country
entirely… [as] they had not gone far enough in 1959 … [in ridding] Rwanda of its polluting internal
other once and for all.”16
Despite decades of intermarriage, a common language, common culture, and religion (90%
of Rwandans identified as Christians prior to the genocide), historically colonial Belgian-issued
identity cards, a history of colonial powers politically backing Tutsi, and Hutu propaganda
fomented a resentment that led Tutsi and Hutus to see themselves as distinct from each other.17 The
case of Rwanda, then, provides us with an interesting example of how othering does not need to
be connected to alterity. Instead of, for example, religious difference functioning as a demarcation
of the enemy (as is commonly the case in situations of conflict), in Rwanda a common religious
system functioned as the basis for sustaining narratives of legitimacy and illegitimacy. The common
system exploited shared religious tropes as well as the potency of religious symbols. Sigmund
Freud encapsulated this phenomenon of volatility among similar peoples in his conceptualization
of the “narcissism of minor differences.”18 Anton Blok recounts Freud’s sentiment when he
writes that “people are separated from one another by a ‘taboo of personal isolation,’ and that
it is precisely the minor differences between people who are otherwise alike that form the basis
of feelings of strangeness and hostility between them.”19 Blok observes that Pierre Bourdieu in
his 1979 work, La Distinction, concurs with Freud (without an explicit reference to Freud), since
Bourdieu “emphasized the importance of minor differences for the formation and maintenance of

12

Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2001), 82–83.

13

Scott Peterson, Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan and Rwanda (London: Routledge, 2001), 247, quoted in
Alexandra A. Miller, “From the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to the International Criminal Court:
Expanding the Definition of Genocide to Include Rape,” Penn State Law Review 108, no. 1 (2003), 352.

14

In February of 2012, Mugesera was deported to Rwanda and charged after his attempts to avoid deportation were
denied by a Canadian Federal Court.

15

Timothy Longman, “Christian Churches and Genocide in Rwanda,” in In God’s Name: Genocide and Religion in the
Twentieth Century, eds. Omer Bartov and Phyllis Mack (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2001), 153.

16

Taylor, Sacrifice as Terror, 154.

17

Diane Marie Amann, “Prosecutor v. Akayesu. Case ICTR-96-4-T,” The American Journal of International Law 93, no. 1
(January 1999), 195-99. This distinction proved problematic for the Rwandan Tribunal because Hutus and Tutsi are
not, from an ethnographic perspective, different ethnicities. However, the Tribunal decided that it was enough that
the Hutu and Tutsi regarded each other as ethnically different. See Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (Case No. ICTR-964-T) Judgment, paras. 701–2, September 2, 1998.

18

Anton Blok, “The Narcissism of Minor Differences,” European Journal of Social Theory 1, no. 1 (1998), 33-56. This term
appears in such essays as the Taboo of Virginity (1917) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930).

19

Ibid., 34. Here, Blok is recounting Sigmund Freud’s summary of a study by Ernest Crawley.

©2016

Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.3

Rwanda: Genocide, Religion & Sexual Violence

7

identity and the threat to identity that comes from what is closest…‘Social identity lies in difference,
and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents the greatest threat.’”20 Applied
to Rwanda, the Hutu architects of the genocide exploited shared Rwandan religious symbols and
ideals, often perverting or inverting their multivalent meanings. This tactic reinforced the enmity
between the largely homogenous groups of Hutu and Tutsi based on a few but inflammatory (and
largely confabulated) dissimilarities.
Although there is no causal link between the Hamitic myth and the 1994 genocide, the myth
was certainly a significant and contributing factor in sowing enmity between Hutu and Tutsi that
culminated in conditions conducive to genocidal violence.
Moreover, these references built upon a recurrent component of genocide, the dehumanization
of fellow humans. The Hutu Power elite vilified Tutsi by likening them to animals and insects,
making them unrecognizably human and therefore not one of “us.” Hutu propagandists then
aligned this vilification with potent and familiar religious rhetoric. For example, Des Forges
writes that during an attack, one killer shouted, “You are snakes. Your god does not exist. We
will exterminate you,”21 and during a November 22, 1992 speech delivered to the ruling party,
the National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development or Mouvement républicain
national pour la démocratie et le dévelopement (MRND), Mugesera proclaimed that “He [Jesus] is God
born of God.” In the same way, they [Tutsi] are “Inyenzis [cockroaches] born of Inyenzis, who
speak for Inyenzis.”22 Both of these statements juxtapose dehumanizing language next to biblical
references—to snakes, which are commonly associated with Satan and the widely accepted belief
that Tutsi are cockroaches—creating a mental and moral space that encourages the massacre of the
other because they fall outside of the circle of human regard and divine consideration.
Perhaps one of the most charged examples of a message that othered Tutsi by likening them
to cockroaches and snakes was not in the form of a speech but in the written word. In Rwanda,
Kinyarwanda and French are the two most common languages. Kangura (translated wake others
up), a hate-mongering Rwandan magazine published by the ruling Hutu MRND party was founded
to oppose the similarly titled magazine, Kanguka (translated wake up), sponsored by the Tutsi-led
Rwandan Patriotic Front. The November 1991 issue of Kangura chillingly depicted on its cover
a picture of the second president of the First Republic, Grégoire Kayibanda, accompanied by a
machete (a common Rwandan farming tool). Kayibanda installed Hutu as the governing ethnicity
after the 1959 Wind of Destruction. The picture was accompanied by the words “Tutsi: Race of
God!?” and supplemented by a phrase that appears between the images of Kayibanda and the
machete: “Which weapons are we going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?”23 Allan Thompson
remarks on the irony of referring to Tutsi as the “race of God,” and cites an excerpt from an article
that appears on page seven of the issue, contending that the Hutu and Tutsi cannot co-exist because
Tutsi are “thieves, they are involved in intrigues, they are wicked, they are killers. And they are
people who have grudges just like serpents.”24 In one fell swoop, the cover appeals to a historical
grievance, Christian symbols, and dehumanizing vocabulary, all synergistically harnessed for the
purpose of imparting a singular message: the rightful obliteration of the dangerous Tutsi other.
A scene from the documentary film by Nick Andrews, Roger: Genocide Baby, further highlights
how appeals to religious concepts, even if not explicitly biblical, reinforce the idea of an other.
Miss JoJo, a popular Rwandan recording artist who memorializes the genocide in her music, relays
witnessing the shooting of her mother. She indicates that men entered the house and sorted the
inhabitants for execution: “Then they started saying ‘We want to see all those who have the sin to
go this side. And those who don’t have the sin to go this side….’”25 Similarly, a twelve-year-old boy
20

Ibid., 38.

21

Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 304, accessed
May 1, 2012, https://www.hrw.org/report/1999/03/01/leave-none-tell-story/genocide-rwanda.

22

“Translated 1992 speech of Leon Mugesera,” Rwanda Gateway, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.rwandagateway.
org/spip.php?article1340.

23

Allan Thompson, The Media and the Rwandan Genocide (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 335.

24

Ibid.

25

Roger: Genocide Baby, directed by Nick Andrews (London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011), DVD.
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who was manning a barrier that was part of a network of roadblocks designed to stop fleeing Tutsi
in the Maraba commune, when “asked why the Tutsi should be killed, replied with assurance,
‘Because they are evil.’”26 The use of the words “the sin” and “evil” are telling, as they seem to
convey that Tutsi are immanently wicked, marred in some deep way that only the religiously
inflected words sin and evil can communicate. Tutsi were indelibly marked by transgression, a
transgression that, in the view of the Hutu, necessitated their extermination.
Justification
Religious concepts, some specific to Rwandan colonial mythologies as well as to indigenous
cosmologies, provided a framework of meaning for communal genocidal violence and the
expectation of the amelioration of social and economic strife. Religious symbols and rituals shaped
genocidal thinking by casting the Tutsi other as the embodiment of a threat not only to temporal
Hutu survival but as a threat to the divine order itself, providing justifications for the elimination of
the Tutsi not only in the secular sense but in the cosmological sense. The symbolism and mythologies
that sustained Rwandan religious systems also sustained the mass killing, transforming criminal
deeds into a religious obligation of sacrifice. Georg Simmel explicitly connects religion, sacrifice,
and obligation when he writes, “as one can consider it as the specific accomplishment of religion
that it made people turn their own salvation into an obligation….one can derive from it the right to
the most terrible sacrifices—not only self-imposed, but also sacrifices imposed on others.”27 Three
illustrations of religious justifications and frameworks for justifying and sacralizing the genocide
include the cosmological notion of imaana and the disorderly flow of imaana in blocked bodies as
described by Christopher Taylor; what Jacques Sémelin refers to as the religious new logic that
transformed victims into necessary sacrifices, attended by the sacral accoutrements of churches
and ritual; and what I contend is the appropriation of religious rhetoric to justify and validate
extermination, largely by making biblical references. Let us examine each one in turn.
Not all the religious overtones of the genocide can be attributed to colonial influence.
As a review of pre-colonial Rwandan rituals and beliefs of the ancestral religion of Kubandwa
indicate, there is an indigenous ontological conviction in Imaana, “a supreme being, and in a more
generalized way [imaana refers] to a ‘diffuse, fecundating fluid’ of celestial origin whose activity
upon livestock, land, and people brought fertility and abundance.”28 Imaana includes a scheme of
physical flows and blockages, whereby the human body and geographical space are viewed as
conduits of this creative force, which guarantees the life and fecundity of the community. One of
the primary “ritual functions of the Rwandan sacred king” is the orderly flow of imaana, not to do
so makes the sacred king a “blocked being” or “wild sovereign” who is not an effective “conduit”
of the beneficence that passes from sky to earth—to the Rwandan kingdom.29 One justification for
genocide that is heavily informed by the import of this ontology relates to the restoration of the
prosperity that Rwandans enjoyed in the 1980s before the economic crisis that triggered a global
plunge in coffee prices in the 1990s. The sacred gravity of this restoration and its connection to the
1994 genocide is only possible and intelligible within the Rwandan cosmological context of imaana
and the embodiment of imaana—or the sacred king, to whom President Habyarimana was often
compared. President Habyarimana, whose very name translates to “It is God who gives life,” was
often portrayed as a sacred king in popular news magazines in the 1990s, both in flattering and
unflattering depictions and articles.30 A cartoon of President Habyarimana portrays him as a closed
conduit who recycles all the benefits of imaana within himself and does not allow beneficence to
flow to the people by depicting him on all fours and using a spoon, poised under his anus, to eat
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his own excrement.31 Taylor contends, “the cartoon evokes imagery of the inadequate king, the one
who blocks celestial flow,”32 which implies that “Habyarimana must be killed.”33 The symbolism
communicated in the cartoon discloses the “ritual and mythological component” that is “beneath
the surface of ideology and the avowed intentions of social actors in the genocide… [and] reveals
something about the deeper fears and desires of the génocidaires.”34 These deeper fears swelled
under Habyarimana’s regime and focused on Habyarimana as an ineffectual Hutu leader, but
after Habyarimana’s death, these fears found a new focus—Tutsi as a “credible” collective menace.
Taylor further argues that these deeper fears are what galvanized the religious imaginary’s
commitment to slaughter a perceived Tutsi threat, noting that the composition of this fear was
“thoroughly modern” in that it required applying the flow/blockage metaphor typically reserved
for individuals [Habyarimana] to an entire group [Tutsi]. Taylor’s summation of this reworking of
the metaphor is worthy of quoting in full:
[The]…contagion of ‘bare life’ did not stop with Habyarimana. With his externality made
visible [due to his being a ‘wild sovereign’ and ‘blocked conduit’], it was then possible for
Hutu extremists to insist on the externality of others, in this case, all Rwandan Tutsi, who
were tarred with the accusation that they were ‘invaders from Ethiopia.’ Reduced to ‘bare
life,’ Tutsi were a reminder that the lingering externalities within the polity threatened
its social and moral integrity. If a ‘sacred king’ could not get rid of them, then the people
must do it themselves. Tutsi had become the ‘blocked beings,’ and they were everywhere—
neighbors, colleagues, sometimes even wives and mistresses. No pity could be shown.35

An additional illustration of a reference to blocked beings is within a context of syncretism between
the Rwandan practice of impalement and the centrality of the crucified Christ in Christianity. A
cartoon depicting the imagined reinterpretation of the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, the first
President of Burundi to be democratically elected, styles him as an ineffectual conduit as indicated
by his anal impalement, yet he is also crucified—a specimen of the synthesis of “specifically
Rwandan symbols with deep historical and ontological roots…merged with those that are the
more recent product of Christian evangelization.”36 What Taylor makes clear is that by examining
the religious aspects of the circumstances and media leading up to the 1994 genocide, we can
more thoroughly appreciate the mindset and actions of the religious imaginary and gain a fuller
understanding of the motivations of genocide perpetrators.
Taylor also extends flow/blockage symbolism to the erection of roadblocks designed to trap
Tutsi. The excessive number of roadblocks outstripped their pragmatic effectiveness, signaling that
their use pointed to some additional purpose beyond their obvious one. Moreover, a religious
justification of the genocide also included the ritualized nature of the killing, which permitted the
synergy of sacred time and space to render Tutsi as necessary sacrifices in a cosmological battle in
order to preserve the sacred community. “Barriers were ritual and liminal spaces where obstructing
beings’ were to be obstructed in their turn and cast out of the nation. The roadblocks were the space
both of ritual and of transgression”,37 as were the rivers that were congested with the bodies of
Tutsi victims being sent back to their ancestral Egyptian home.
A second justification was informed by ritualistic behavior. Sémelin refers to a new logic that
religion can sustain in the interest of the practices of the collective for the sake of the “sacred
entity,” a term that captures how Hutu perpetrators could see themselves as victims in a battle for
31
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their own survival:
While institutional religion (through the Christian Church) was no longer…the spiritual
guarantor for the prohibition of murder, a new logic was tending to develop: one that put
the perpetration of murder at the centre of religion, or rather at the centre of another kind of
sacred entity—a sacred entity which, depending on the instance, assigned itself as a common
object of veneration, whether race, the nation or ethnicity. This sanctification of the ‘elected’
majority presupposes the building of a sacrificial altar on which to burn all those designated
at that ‘other.’… The relationship to violence has thus been completely reversed: murder is
no longer a taboo to be observed but becomes, on the contrary, a foundational practice—not
of a new religion, but of a different conception of collective transcendence, that draws on
instituted religious practices, or even recycles them.38

This logic, albeit an apparently self-justifying logic, relies upon familiar religious practices for its
validation. The actors and meaning of the genocide become religiously stylized, and events unfold
within familiar spaces and rituals. In this light, one of the most appalling features of the genocide—
that a vast number of Tutsi were killed in and around churches—is of particular significance and a
complex, even contradictory phenomena, as génocidaires simultaneously destroyed and embraced
religious symbolism.39 “Tabernacles, baptismal fonts, pulpits, vestments, crucifixes, statues,
altars, Bibles and prayer books—all the sacred symbols and icons of religion—were slashed and
damaged.”40 However, “there are many reports of screaming victims being physically dragged to
churches before being killed at the entrances,”41 as if to assign sacral, even sacrificial, meaning to
the act of killing in front of the church whose very sacred symbols were desecrated. A more explicit
ritual practice, one directly informed by Kubandwa, fused genocide with sacramental implications
when attackers donned the dress of warriors practicing kubohoza (translated “to help liberate”).
The ntore were the elite in the military system that existed before the arrival of the Europeans.
Kubandwa is a religion widely practiced in the central lakes region since the sixteenth
century. In its rituals, participants sometimes put kaolin, or chalk, on their faces.42
When people engaged in kubohoza, they sometimes covered their faces with chalk, wore
banana leaves, attacked at the signal of a whistle, marched to a drum and manned barriers along
the roads to catch their prey. During the genocide, some assailants did the same things.43
The attackers wore leaves. The women wore the leaves on their hips. The men wore them
crossed like an “X” across the chest, in the style of intore. They had chalk around the eyes, as
if for kubandwa, and they shouted “tuzabatsembatsemba!” [We have come to exterminate!].44

Religious rhetoric, connotations, and symbols gesture toward the unthinkable, the unknowable,
the unfamiliar, the remarkable, the contradictory, and in doing so renders experiences imbued
with religious language and references as familiar, thinkable, unremarkable, and coherent. In
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short, religious language provides a scheme for tolerating and articulating what would otherwise
seem exceedingly intolerable or unspeakable.
Third, the Rwandan genocide is replete with examples of Hutu genocide architects situating
the extermination of Tutsi within recognizable religious narratives and rhetoric, rhetoric that
conscripts divine approval and portrays the genocide as being of ontological proportions. The
primary conduits of genocide-inciting propaganda in Rwanda, were radio broadcasts and
newspapers, which appealed to divine authority and used biblical references. Des Forges confirms
this point with her observation that “propagandists used religion and the church to validate their
teachings. Umurava Magazine declared ‘It is God who has given Habyarimana the power to direct
the country, it is He who will show him the path to follow.’ Most propagandists did not go so
far, but they did frequently couch their ideas in religious language or refer to passages from the
Bible.” For example, “Mugesera exhorts his audience to ‘rise up...really rise up’ in self-defense. He
cites the Bible several times and declares that the MRND has a new version of the Biblical adage
to turn the other cheek: ‘If you are struck once on one cheek, you should strike back twice’”45 and
“We must do something ourselves to exterminate this rabble. I tell you in all truth, as it says in the
Gospel, ‘When you allow a serpent biting you to remain attached to you with your agreement,
you are the one who will suffer.’”46 An unabashed, and most likely well known, propagandist
appeal to the Bible is the infamous publication of the Hutu 10 Commandments, widely circulated
in December 1990, ordering Hutu to fulfill their moral obligation to utterly destroy societally unfit
Tutsi—coded though clearly understood, radio broadcasters urged Hutu to “do your work” and
“cut the tall trees.”47 Moreover, propagandists promoted the genocide as meeting with divine
approval. “Sindikubwabo finished a speech by assuring his listeners that God would help them
in confronting the ‘enemy.’ RTLM announcer Bemeriki maintained that the Virgin Mary, said to
appear from time to time at Kibeho church, had declared that ‘we will have the victory’. In the
same vein, the announcer Habimana said of the Tutsi, ‘Even God himself has dropped them.’”48 In
addition, a radio announcer jubilantly blared, “Let us rejoice friends. The cockroaches have been
exterminated. Let us rejoice friends. God is never wrong.”49 Des Forges succinctly pinpoints the
effectiveness of the propagandists’ religious rhetoric and biblical appeals when she avers that “in a
country where 90 percent of the people called themselves Christian and 62 percent were Catholic,50
these references to religion helped make the teachings of fear and hate more acceptable.”51
Authorization
Des Forges believes that “many Rwandans say that they killed because authorities told them to kill
… reflect[ing] less a national predisposition to obey orders, as is sometimes said, than a recognition
that the ‘moral authority’ of the state swayed them to commit crimes that would otherwise have
been unthinkable.”52 Contra Des Forges, many scholars do not weigh these two points against each
other as much as they discuss them as informing each other. Within the context of the Rwandan
genocide from this latter perspective, the moral authority of the state was buttressed by the teachings
of obedience by religious authorities who endorsed the political power structure. As Des Forges
herself writes, “Far from condemning the attempt to exterminate the Tutsi, Archbishop Augustin
Nshamihigo and Bishop Jonathan Ruhumuliza of the Anglican Church acted as spokesmen for
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the genocidal government at a press conference in Nairobi,”53 and many who did not actively
condone genocide at least tacitly did so by remaining silent. Churches were sites for the planning
and commission of genocides, clergy sacralized violence through ritual and religious mythologies,
and the most explicit authorization of genocide by church authorities was active participation,
killing, or aiding in the direct killing of victims. According to Mamdani, the church connections of
the radical Hutu movement are
…the clue as to why the violence was marked by greater fury in the Church than in any other
institution in Rwandan society. The Church was the original ethnographer of Rwanda. It was
the original author of the Hamitic hypothesis…, without the church, there would have been
no ‘racial’ census in Rwanda.54

It seems that Mamdani is contending that genocide perpetrators were bringing the eradication of
Tutsi full circle by killing the majority of Tutsi in the very places that nurtured the racial ideologies
that would eventually culminate in their demise.
The ICTR indicted several members of the clergy for their participation in genocide. Some
of the most notorious of the defendants were Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, who allegedly
turned over Tutsi refugees to Hutu militia and Rwandan armed forces to be killed and raped;
he was convicted in absentia in 2006, and the case was referred to a French Court, but the case
was dismissed in October 2015.55 Father Athanase Seromba was convicted in December 2006 for
allowing his church to be bulldozed with 2,000 Tutsi refugees inside.56 Elizaphan Ntakirutimana
(deceased) was a pastor and president of the West Rwanda Association of the Seventh Day
Adventist Church based in the Mugonero Complex, Gishyita commune, Kibuye prefecture. His
son, Dr. Gérard Ntakirutimana, was a medical doctor at the Seventh Day Adventist’s hospital at
Mugonero Complex, Gishyita commune. Pastor Ntakirutimana is the person whom several pastors
addressed in a letter containing the words that would be used as the title of an award-winning
book by Philip Gourvetich, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families:
Stories from Rwanda. Pastor Ntakirutimana’s response to this appeal was “Nothing can be done.”57
He was also the first clergyman to be found guilty by an international tribunal. Both men were
found guilty of leading Hutu attackers to Mugonero Adventist church and to a hospital complex in
Kibuye where unarmed Tutsi were seeking refuge.
In 2001, a Belgian court58 found two other religious figures, Sister Gertrude (née Consolata
Mukangano) and Sister Maria Kisito (nee Julienne Mukabutera), Benedictine nuns, guilty of
genocide for collaborating with Hutu militia by driving out Tutsi in the Sovu convent in Butare,
Rwanda, who were seeking safety, to a Hutu militia and their certain death. More recently, in
2010, Emmanuel Rukundo, a military chaplain for the Rwandan army, was convicted of genocide
for killing a Tutsi woman, abducting and causing bodily harm to several women, and sexually
assaulting a woman.59 These indictments are profound because of what seems to be a literal inversion
of the expectations society holds of clergy and of general church conduct. Given that clergy are
typically seen as moral paragons and that churches are, literally, sanctuaries, what is surprising and
disturbing, is that many clergy were directly involved in killing and raping victims Scores of Tutsi
lost their lives within and immediately outside church walls and mission compounds; the villages
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and cities that were sites of the deadliest massacres were Nyamata, Musha, Ntarama, Nyarubuye,
Cyahinda, Nyange, Saint Famille, and Karubamba.60 It is not unreasonable to expect that Rwandan
nuns, pastors, and chaplains should have vehemently objected to the slaughtering of innocent
men, women, and children. Instead, as Alison Des Forges keenly observes, “church authorities left
the way clear for officials, politicians, and propagandists to assert that the slaughter actually met
with God’s favor,”61—and indeed, believed to be sanctioned by divine fiat. Only referred to as “The
Witness” in an ICTR transcript, a victim testified that “later on while I was hiding I heard them
[a group of attackers under the Pastor’s direction] saying that Pastor Ntakirutimana had said that
God had ordered that the Tutsi should be killed and exterminated.”62
Longman sheds light on why he believes this moral inversion was possible in Rwanda.
“Christians could kill without obvious qualms of conscience, even in the church, because
Christianity as they had always known it had been a religion defined by struggles for power, and
ethnicity had always been at the base of those struggles.”63 Longman provides powerful imagery
to support his point when he writes,
…while churches were not the chief organizers of the Rwandan genocide, their long practice
of teaching obedience to authority and of engaging in ethnic politics made it possible for
Rwandans to ignore the principle of sanctuary and participate in the killing of Tutsi without
feeling that their actions were in conflict with church teachings. In fact, the organizers of the
death squads in many local communities included not only prominent lay church leaders
but sometimes priests, pastors. Catholic brothers, catechists, and other church employees,
and the fact that death squads attended mass before going out to kill or that killers paused
during the massacres to pray at the altar suggests that people felt their work was consistent
with church teachings. Far from being mere passive bystanders, Christian churches provided
essential support for the slaughter.64

As shocking as these events were, and although the relationship between religion and genocide
defies an easy explanation, Longman’s contextualization helps us better understand how these acts
were possible. Namely, how is it that so many perpetrators perceived no inconsistencies between
killing and church teachings? However, Longman’s point regarding obedience to authority also
provides some insight into how Hutu killed knowing that their actions were inconsistent with
church teachings: “Deep down we knew that Christ was not on our side in this situation, but since
he was not saying anything through the priests’ mouths, that suited us.”65 In other words, many
Hutu perpetrators were viscerally aware that their behavior was immoral, but this awareness
was undercut by a longstanding, cultural habituation to obey clerical authorities who, in effect,
condoned the killing of Tutsi through their lack of condemnation. Although many Hutu and Tutsi
clergy forfeited their lives to protect Tutsi refugees, out of fear of deadly retaliation, many clergy,
especially Tutsi clergy, were unable to exercise their ecclesiastical authority and mount a successful
counter campaign that effectively challenged the dominant genocidal ideology promulgated by
Hutu clergy. Collectively, it appears that the immediate influence of Hutu clergy, longstanding
practice of conditioning Rwandans to obey authority, and cooperative relationship between
churches and the state, severely undermined the overall ability of churches to effectively condemn
the killings. For example, another confessed génocidaire, Ignace, stated,
God kept silent, and the churches stank from abandoned bodies. Religion could not find its
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place in our activities. For a little while, we were no longer ordinary Christians... We had to
obey our leaders—and God only afterward, very long afterward, to make confession and
penance. When the job was done.66

A case in point is that prior to the 1994 genocide Archbishop Nsengiyumva severed his official
tie to Habyarimana’s ruling party, the MRND, but he still remained friends with members of the
regime and later arranged a papal visit to Rwanda—the latter was “a clear sign of a ‘blessing’ of
the Habyarimana regime in the eyes of the population.”67 The 1990 Le Christ, notre unité (In Christ
our unity)—a pastoral letter among a series of letters released by Catholic bishops before, during,
and after the genocide—rebuked ethnic enmity and various evils, but the archbishop’s relationship
with the regime proved disastrous and undermined the bishops’ condemnations, as “the church
had lost all its credibility in political matters.”68 Whether church teachings were consistent or
inconsistent with killing, the tendency to obey authority prevailed.
Genocide, Religion, and Sexual Violence
Given the excess of genocide, perhaps it is not surprising that totalizing religious language and
the ultimate violation of sexual violence so effectively potentiate genocidal ideology and behavior.
Within the context of genocide, sexual violence and religion combine when perpetrators target and
intimately violate the human body as a means of physically, symbolically, and even cosmologically,
reimaging and reconstructing the social and political order by destroying a perceived enemy.
These forms of destruction are not random: perpetrators act within a culture-specific logic that
religious language, mythoi and rituals provide, and génocidaires contort and exploit religious texts
and imagery as a basis for this language.
Sexual violence and religion are both largely understudied in genocide literature because,
until recently, scholars and legalists largely treated sexual violence as ancillary to warfare (rather
than as a weapon of war). Similarly, scholars marginalize religion in genocide because religion
is rarely the principal point of departure for genocide, as opposed to ethnic tensions or political
power grabs. Nonetheless, sexual violence and religion are both effective conduits of the power of
politics and other social struggles, as they can foment, potentiate, and actualize genocidal action.
Therefore, their study can deepen and nuance our understanding of the dynamics of genocide.
Sexual violence is one of the most effective and heinous demonstrations of power over another and
strategies for disrupting entire communities. Combined with religion—a meaning-making system
that includes transcendent referents and pertains to matters of ultimacy— sexual violence and
religion form a potent foundation for violent action. By examining the intersections of genocide,
religion, and sexual violence, the goal is to bring the complex components of genocide into greater
relief. Acts of sexual violence and the perversion of religion in genocide are tantamount to bringing
about a social and spiritual death that “mock[s] the possibility of any moral life,” and they severely
cripple a community’s ability to reconstitute itself.69
I contend that religion has both a distal (or indirect) and proximate (or direct) relationship
to physical acts of sexual violence. The distal influence of religion indirectly contributes to the
perpetration of sexual violence by contributing to conditions that are conducive to sexual violence
and rape, but this influence is so diffuse that it is difficult to pinpoint religious influence as a
primary cause or as reflecting any readily recognizable and particular religions belief, practice, or
ritual. Examples of this diffuse influence include the patriarchal beliefs and practices of religious
traditions that devalue the personhood of women yet value women as property. This longstanding
devaluation and objectification of women during peacetime makes women more susceptible to
sexual violence during wartime and particularly during genocides because of the biological and
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cultural role women play in perpetuating ethnic bloodlines. Functionally, religion distally or
indirectly plays the same role in laying the groundwork for sexual violence as it does in genocide—
through othering, justification, and authorization.
The actions and religious rhetoric of perpetrators and religious officials contribute to the
othering of the enemy, even to the extent of considering them evil and falling outside the circle
of moral regard. This contributes to the dehumanization of members of the enemy group, making
enemies an acceptable object of sexual violence. Moreover, religious othering and rape mutually
reinforce each other in the process of dehumanization. The force of religious rhetoric paints an
other as so radically different that they are susceptible to acts of violence, including rape, yet rape
can also so dehumanize an enemy that religiously inflected violence is not morally problematic.
Religious justifications, per the just war tradition, have a tendency of leading to total violence, and
one of, if not the most severe type, of violence a person can suffer is sexual violation. Religious
mythologies are able to justify the victimization of the enemy group because, as one scholar argues,
“religion is the only other entity [than state authority] that can give moral sanction for violence.”70
These mythologies can recast or reshape reality in a manner that transforms the profane into the
sacred, providing the moral and psychological space for religiously inflected sexual violence,
which sustains and maximizes the destruction of genocide. The authorization of sexual violence
is realized through the moral authority of religious officials and religious institutions that support
genocide or stand mute before it—in essence providing a blanket sanctioning of the government’s
aims and methods of genocide through an act of omission. This tacit sanctioning permits behavior
that is otherwise criminal, such as murder and rape, and indirectly (or distally) endorses and
sustains genocide. In addition, and in the aftermath of genocide, the actions of religious officials
actualize the aims of perpetrators by upholding and reinforcing the patriarchal and cultural
mores surrounding the chastity of women and patrilineal descent—rendering a raped woman
unmarriageable and a forcibly impregnated woman the mother of a child of the enemy group,
respectively. In both cases, the cultural practices and religious mores of the victim group are crucial
to the effectuation of the perpetrator group’s strategy to eliminate the target group.
Contrast this distal use of religion to its proximate or direct influence, where the ritual and
pattern of sexual cruelty is specifically evocative of the religious beliefs and practices of the
perpetrator and/or victim group. For example, perpetrators can use religious rhetoric while
sexually assaulting their victims, force victims to break religious taboos in order to intensity the
shame of their experience, or sexually violate victims in a ritualistic fashion after their deaths.
The proximate influence of religion to acts of sexual violence, although readily recognizable as
religiously inflected, is a secondary cause in the sense that acts of sexual violence that explicitly
reflect religious overtones are only possible after the more diffuse and distal or indirect influence of
religion and sexual violence has been established. The distinction between the distal and proximate
influences of religion on acts of sexual violence is instructive for prevention strategies because it
allows us to refocus the attention, away from the explicit (or proximate) instances of religiously inflected
acts of sexual violence that occur during genocide—which is symptomatic of the primary cause and,
therefore, a secondary cause—and toward the pernicious and diffuse influence of religion on sexual
violence (distal) prior to and after genocide. Addressing the primary and less visible connection
between religion and acts of sexual violence, in the forms of the negative influence of systemic
patriarchy on the personhood of women, greatly decreases the likelihood of religiously inflected acts of
sexual violence against women, a secondary cause, during genocide. The best strategy for dismantling
the connection among religion, sexual violence, and genocide is for religious leaders and the faithful
to actively resist and subvert the patriarchal treatment of women within their own communities as
well as the wider secular community in times of war but particularly during times of peace.
The Distal and Proximate Influence of Religion on Sexual Violence in Rwanda Guided by the
Typologies
Tutsi women and girls, as child bearers and sexual objects, were primarily targeted for sexual
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violence, but it should be noted that men and boys were sexually violated as well. As dictated by
the concept of imaana, Tutsi were characterized as blocked beings who endangered the welfare of
the nation. Torture techniques and methods of killing—such as the oblation of sexual organs—was
a bodily inscription of the imagined counter-fertility and flow of Tutsi. Torturers reportedly forced
Tutsi to commit incest, emasculated men as well as boys of non-reproductive age, and cut off
women’s breasts—assaults on the reproductive capacities of their victims and transforming them
into blocked beings.71
Othering
An exemplification of the distal relationship among religion, genocide, and sexual violence is the
colonial Hamitic hypothesis, the focal myth that sustained Tutsi otherness or their status as alien
settlers of Rwanda and superior to Hutu. Moreover, many religious traditions are patriarchal
and characterize women within their own faith communities as well as recognize in other faith
communities the status of women as inferior to men. “Violence is… embedded in social structures,
including those of religion. When religious language is used to justify… patriarchal structures
of oppression, which are inherently violent because they violate women’s human dignity, the
circle is complete.”72 The circle is complete, here, seems to refer to the formidable and mutually
reinforcing synergy between earthly and theological justifications for the subjugation of women,
which makes the violence of patriarchy extraordinarily difficult to dismantle because is presents
such patriarchy as the given state of our lives and spiritual realities. A distal conceptualization
of the influence of religion on genocide offers a translation of the aforementioned metaphorical
violence of violating women’s human dignity into physical violence during genocides by arguing
that patriarchal violence manifests itself under the acute conditions of warfare, which exacerbates
pre-conflict societal tensions and inequalities. Imagining the enemy as not just a physical threat but
as a cosmological or theological one creates a space for extreme violence for the sake of defending
ultimate aims. As an other, victims are not human, and sexual violence further dehumanizes the
victim. However, even if victims retain their humanity, their otherness forfeits their right to live or
to be safe from harm.
Patriarchal structures in religion view women as subordinate to men, as transactional property,
and as morally and spiritually problematic—making females who are members of the enemy
group particularly vulnerable to abuse. Taylor indicates how feminist scholarship, such as that
by Martha Reineke, enriches the account of the tendency to abuse women in patriarchal societies
when he writes, “feminist scholars influenced by psychoanalysis have shown that a propensity
exists on the part of some patriarchal social systems to seize upon women as sacrificial victims.”73
Taylor continues and highlights the additional characterization of women as people who straddle
cultures due to their reproductive capacities, and as a result are particular targets of violence, when
he writes, “they [feminist scholars] trace this proclivity to [sacrifice women to] the fact that women
are often socially situated at the limen between groups. Perceived as cultural gatekeepers, women
can be dangerous in the manner of ‘liminal’ beings.”74
The ramifications of patriarchy on genocide were explicitly referenced in Prosecutor v. Akayesu.
The ICTR chamber found:
In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the
father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births within a group is the case where,
during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately impregnated by a man of another
group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to
its mother’s group.75
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These patriarchal sentiments culminated into primarily valuing women for their chastity and roles
as wives and mothers. In addition, the Hamitic myth also distally influenced sexual violence:
[T]hough less overtly stated, extremists aimed at reclaiming the lost ground of patriarchy and
re-asserting a male dominance that had probably never existed in Rwanda’s actual history.
Tutsi women were pivotal enemies in the extremists’ struggle to reclaim both patriarchy
and the Hutu Revolution, because in many respects they were socially positioned at the
permeable boundary between the two ethnic groups [in their capacity to produce progeny
that were either Tutsi or Hutu as determined by the ethnicity of the father].76

Taylor ably argues that genocide in Rwanda cannot be properly understood without examining
the “gender issues [that] interacted with ethnic ones in complex ways involving the demarcation
of social boundaries and local notions of racial purity”; the destruction of Tutsi women was not
only physical but symbolic, as Tutsi women, even prior to the genocide, were objects of sexual
ambivalence.77 To Hutu men, Tutsi women were more desirable than Hutu women (per the Hamitic
myth and the practice of Europeans nearly always coupling with Tutsi rather than Hutu women).
Due to this intimate contact between Tutsi women and European men, Rwandans believed that
Tutsi women participated in abhorrent “non-procreative and therefore immoral” sexual behavior.78
Leading up to the genocide, Hutu extremists seized upon this perception to demonize the counterfertile sexual practices of Tutsi women—primarily in the form of explicit cartoons depicting
Tutsi women engaging in group sex, anal penetration, and oral sex with Europeans—much to
the disgust of most Rwandans. “Such value judgments,” Taylor writes, “may reflect Rwandan
acculturation to the sexual norms promulgated by the Catholic Church, but by now they have been
well internalized.”79 The violence Tutsi women suffered was an attempt by Hutu men to “purge”
this ambivalence in sexually symbolic ways, and this may partially explain why the rapes of Tutus
women were particularly brutal.80 Women were just as likely to die from the mortal injures of rape
as from the blow of a machete.
Justification
The fact that most victims died immediately or nearly immediately after their assaults, points to
a motive other than creating conditions designed to make rebuilding a Tutsi community difficult.
As one rape victim testified, “these rapes were designed to humiliate us,” a humiliation that nearly
always preceded death.81 The notion of blocked beings as circumscribed by the cosmological belief
in imaana directly informed ritualistic acts of sexual violence. Torture techniques and methods
of killing—such as the ablation of sexual organs—were a bodily inscription of the imagined
counter-fertility and flow of Tutsi. Torturers reportedly emasculated men as well as boys of nonreproductive age and cut off women’s breasts—assaults on the reproductive capacities of Tutsi,
which supposedly transformed them into blocked beings.82
Genocide perpetrators also forced Tutsi to commit incest in the full view of other family
members, and one court witness testified, “I… found a body, … the legs were apart and the body
of her child… was placed on her genitals, as if she was being forced to have sexual intercourse with
the mother.”83 In the aftermath of the genocide, in the town of Nyamata, the body of a woman was
discovered in a church with a spear lodged through her vagina that exited her chest.84 The fact that
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she was violated in a church only heightened the indignity of the act, since until that time Rwandans
reliably observed a policy of sanctuary during conflicts. Moreover, as supported by an abundance
of ICTR testimonies, ablation, impalement, as well as vaginally and anally assaulting Tutsi victims
with sticks, were widespread practices during the genocide. A member of the Interhawame relayed,
“I saw these two people rape a girl… I saw them rape her and after that they used a spear to pierce
her and they also pierced her sexual organs… I saw [them] cut off [her] breast … after cutting the
girl’s breast off he [Kajelie] sucked it.”85
As senseless as these barbarous acts may appear, they were committed within the logic of
the bountiful flow of imaana, which was either redirected, as in the case of incest “where blood
and semen … flow backward upon one another in a closed circuit,”86 or blocked, as in the case
of the removal of sexual organs and impalement. The counter-fertility of blocked beings, albeit
an indigenous Rwandan cosmological logic, was reinforced by the sexual norms of non-native
colonial Christianity. Taylor’s analysis offers us a nuanced analysis of Hutu attitudes and sexually
inflected genocidal behavior rounds out other scholarly observations of the genocide that do not
closely attend to Rwanda’s religious practices and cosmological framework. Case in point, Elisa
von Joeden-Forgey, in her work on the gendered aspects of genocides, argues that genocidal
rapists exploit social context and symbols to maximize damage in going “beyond compromising
the physical and psychological ability of women and girls to carry children. It seems to
puncture—to wound—that invisible space inside a woman’s body, the source of the group in the
first place.”87 Could that be the message transmitted by the perpetrators’ use of sharpened sticks to
rape and kill Tutsi women during the Rwandan Genocide in 1994?” Perhaps, but impalement may
have been operant on another level that is only apparent by attending to a more culture-specific
religious worldview, such as that of the cosmological view of imaana and blocked beings.88 Without
this data, a crucial local component of the message that von Joeden-Forgey speculates rapists
transmitted to their victim group in public acts of rape during the Rwandan genocide escapes
scrutiny.
Authorization
Neither church officials nor official statements from church bodies sufficiently denounced genocidal
rape during or after the genocide, illustrating the distal impact of religion on sexual violence (as
opposed to proximate) because these were acts of omission as opposed to commission. A failure to
consistently and publicly condemn violence against women cultivates a culture of impunity and
tacitly authorizes violence and sexual violence against others, especially given that many ICTR
witnesses claimed that church authorities failed to stop, orchestrated, or participated in the sexual
victimization of Tutsi. Moreover, organized churches did not leverage their authority to reduce the
stigma of raped survivors or to alleviate the social and financial burden endured by rape victims
and their children.89 The relationship between authorization and genocidal rape as intended to
interfere with the perpetuation of ethnic bloodlines is a curious one.
The stigmatization of rape survivors is also distally related to authoritative religious beliefs and
doctrine: for example, patriarchal beliefs about female chastity and the Catholic Church’s stance on
abortion destroyed the potential of women in Rwanda to become wives and mothers and led many
of the few surviving women to attempt to abort their own fetuses or commit infanticide. Although
the ICTR recognized the practice of forced impregnation during the Rwandan genocide, the
repercussions of genocidal rape as a means of preventing Tutsi from perpetuating their bloodline
was not a foundational aim of génocidaires. Hutu extremists primarily aimed to physically destroy
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Tutsi by killing them outright, not exploiting and depending on the effects of genocidal rape to thin
or displace the Tutsi population.
As the nexuses demonstrate, religious rhetoric, belief and practice—as promulgated by
institutionalized religion and religious individuals and coupled with the aims and organization
of the state apparatus—perniciously prepared the popular imagination for genocide by building
a reality where mass killing was thinkable and necessary. This process inverted moral values, or
in a Hegelian sense, held competing ideas in tension, resulting in the authorization of behavior
that would otherwise be criminal in the name of survival—both temporally and spiritually. This
dual capacity is a defining feature of religious belief, which makes religion particularly adept at
tolerating contentious and even contradictory ideas. Echoing the language of Rudolf Otto, R. Scott
Appleby and others refer to this capacity as the “ambivalence of the sacred,”90 or the constructive
and destructive potential of religion. Mythologies and rituals, by appealing to the potency of
religious symbols and tropes, provide the sacred space and means required to sustain and justify
genocidal action against a perceived ontological other by situating the genocide in a larger,
recognizable, religious drama (a drama that both perpetrators and victims often unreflectively
accept). Furthermore, the authorization of genocide by churches and prominent religious figures
drew its force from a history of obedience to authority that intimated divine approval and Church
sanctification.
Rather than being a haven, the sacred space of church became an altar of sacrifice; rather than
acting as a bulwark against violence, religious belief and practice became the center (literally and
figuratively) of violence; many parochial figures encouraged rather than intervened in the killings;
and Christ-like obedience was transformed into sacrificial killing. The events of genocide that
appear to be so extraordinarily inconsistent with generally accepted religious norms are possible
because of the capacity of myths to hold contradictory ideas in tension with one another, or to even
revise ideas and apprehensions in accordance with religious belief—as explained by Lévi-Strauss.
To wit, the logic of religion is analogous to the logic of genocide in that both are closed systems that
are not easily susceptible to external critique but must simultaneously establish cogency among
conflicting ideas on terms dictated by the system in order for the system to sustain itself. For
example, mass killing is considered abominable and in conflict with most religious convictions and
generally agreed-upon moral norms, but this conflict can be endured for the sake of defending the
cosmological order or ensuring the survival of a threatened group, respectively—thus, the system
remains intact. For instance, the seeming congruence of sexual violence and ritual incorporates
rape into a web of religious meaning that minimizes cognitive dissonance and sanctifies acts that
are otherwise criminal. As Burns reminds us, “it is an odd truth that when faced with circumstances
that contradict our constructed meaning systems, we are more likely to change our perceptions
of the events than to change our beliefs. Religious systems are remarkably stable in the face of
contradictory information.”91
The Future of Genocide Studies
As for possible avenues of the future study of genocide, many of these avenues are implicit in this
study. One is that the religious myths, beliefs, and practices of religious traditions as well as the
religious rhetoric that perpetrators use to trade on the authority of these traditions, should all be
a greater part of genocide studies discourse. Such a strategy would add to the strands of inquiry
dedicated to explaining and understanding genocide by providing, in Geertizan terminology,
a thick description of local culture that includes how religious practice and belief inform a
community’s worldview—a worldview that pre-exists and persists during genocides and informs
the particular logic of genocidal mentalities and behavior.
Another recommendation is to devote more study to the perspective of genocide perpetrators
and the profiles of religious actors who engage in rescue and resistance behavior.92 Studying what
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génocidaires believe motivates their actions, religious or otherwise, can yield invaluable insights into
genocide perpetration. This is not to say that all perpetrators of genocide are singularly motivated
or that a perpetrator’s motivation might not be multifaceted and change during the course of a
genocide.93 Moreover, early warning systems designed to detect genocide triggers may also benefit
from studies of sexual violence and religion. For example, Taylor’s observation that after the 1990
RPF invasion of Rwanda, in the year and months leading up to the 1994 genocide, rapes and other
crimes dramatically increased.94 In addition, the publication of sexually violent extremist literature
also increased;95 these trends, in conjunction with other conditions such as economic collapse, can
foreshadow genocidal violence.
A tandem approach to studying the perspective of génocidaires, one not explicitly addressed
in this essay, is to increase the examination of the psychological and social profiles of individuals
who engage in rescue behavior in order to isolate the variables that make it likely that a person
will resist genocidal ideology and actions. Some research, such as that of Ervin Staub, attempts to
outline factors in one’s childrearing and background experiences that foster altruistic behavior, and
still other research, by the likes of Julius Landwirth, ask whether rescue behavior can be taught or
not.96 Although rare, members of faith communities have engaged in rescue behavior. Analogous,
to Staub and Landwirth’s work, I believe that studying the training and experiences of religious
figures who have engaged in altruistic behavior during a genocide will allow us to identify qualities
and strategies that can inform parochial education. This approach may also increase the likelihood
of members of religious communities resisting genocide and rescuing victims or even engaging in
a kind of community building that makes it difficult for genocidal ideology to gain traction among
the faithful and wider citizenry. As genocide research continues to flourish, religious tensions
and antagonisms should be one of many features of genocide worthy of investigation, alongside
other commonly explored factors such as economic crisis, political tensions, and competition for
resources. Indeed, the nexus of genocide and religion is complex, but it is as necessary to understand
this dynamic as it is difficult to research. Religion and religious studies are fruitful avenues for
genocide study not only in identifying how genocides are legitimated and potentiated, but also in
how genocides can be prevented and mitigated.
Last, this investigation is of one particular genocide, but there is value in comparing genocides
in order to identify not only their differences but also their similarities. The result then is not an
identification of the pattern of genocide but rather a pattern of genocide, patterns that not only act
as points of departure for comparing similar cases but also expose the limitations of comparison
in highlighting where and how similarities break down. An element of this break down is
what fuels a recent criticism of genocide research—the failure to research cases of conflict that
exemplify a genocidal pattern but do not result in genocide.97 This consideration squarely affects
much less scholarship exists on individual and group rescue behavior of more recent genocides (such as in Bosnia,
Rwanda, and the Sudan), and less literature still that specifically focuses on the psychological and social factors that
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efforts to effectively forecast genocide. Moreover, definitional disagreements about genocide, the
interdisciplinary nature of genocide studies, and the widely varied historical, geographical, and
circumstantial contexts of genocides make meaningful comparisons across cases difficult. This
difficulty is partly allayed by viewing various avenues of inquiry as complementary to and not
necessarily in competition with each other; bringing together various approaches of research to
bear on single cases can lay the groundwork for more robust and productive comparisons across
cases.
Conclusion
Recognizing the potential of religion to prevent and mitigate genocide is to acknowledge the
capability of religious discourse, actors, and institutions to be positive rather than negative forces in
conflicts. The typologies of othering, justification, and authorization represent ways of teasing out
how religious rhetoric, myths, and actors promote genocide by providing recognizable narratives
of ultimacy and raising the stakes of conflict, as well as pointing toward a strategy for prioritizing
how religious traditions and church officials can act as a bulwark against genocide: for example,
by humanizing rather than demonizing the other, utilizing religious rhetoric to provide counternarratives to ostensibly justified violence, exercising the moral reach of the church to condemn
violence and promote reconciliation.
In addition to religious groups, institutions, and clergy assessing how their own religious
traditions and clergy contribute to genocidal ideology and behavior, they can also partner with
government and non-government organizations (NGOs) in reporting genocide triggers as part
of an early warning system. One author argues that “religious groups are usually among the
first people to learn of a religious persecution, especially against their own faith,”98 making the
cooperation with religious groups, who have intimate local knowledge of their communities, and
groups tasked with forecasting genocide particularly advantageous in preventing genocides.
A trigger identified by The UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (which
launched a project in February 2010) that may forecast genocide is incendiary speech. The project
indicates that “inflammatory speech often precedes mass atrocities, especially genocide…[and the
outcome of their work] will result in (1) a blueprint for monitoring dangerous speech in situations
at risk of genocide and mass atrocities, and (2) a methodology for gauging the dangerousness of
specific speech acts.”99 As our discussion of religious rhetoric makes clear, such rhetoric can certainly
constitute “dangerous speech.” Monitoring religious rhetoric (written and spoken) is particularly
integral to early warning systems because it is often “the first publicly available indication of a
group’s genocidal intentions…Rwandan ‘Hutu Power,’ and Serbian ultra-nationalism appeared
years before the genocides those ideologies spawned.”100 In addition, local church officials can
lend credibility as well as their local knowledge to NGOs in order to maximize the results of their
activities. To date, it does not appear that such a forged partnership exists. The recognition of the
capacity for religion to aid in genocide prevention, mitigation, and reconciliation is particularly
important given the ineffectual, and at times nonexistent, international response to genocide.
For all that religion can accomplish in predicting genocide, without the political will, early
warning systems can do nothing more than forecast potential genocide. Tragically, the Rwandan
genocide could have been prevented or at least greatly mitigated if the international community
had intervened. This makes it all the more imperative to bring to bear any and all resources,
especially local ones, that are formidable enough to stymie, ameliorate, or even halt genocide once it
commences. A critical part of these local resources are church officials and the institutional church;
for example, Longman contends that “the involvement or resistance of religious institutions in
genocide can have a profound impact on the success or failure of genocidal movements.”101
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Religion has and can continue to play a pivotal role in resisting genocide and in the healing
process of victims of genocide, most notably by public condemnation of genocide and through heroic
acts. This includes issuing official statements and engineering the sheltering or escape of victims
of genocide, and in the aftermath of genocide, providing aid and lending support to reconciliation
efforts. In this regard, one of the best known organizations is Catholic Relief Services (CRS). Yet
it is likely that the most advantageous role religion can play in genocide is not in forecasting its
perpetration, mitigating its effects, or assisting in post-genocide efforts, but in cultivating a cultural
environment that reduces the possibility of genocidal propaganda taking root in the first place.
Post genocide, the identification of the systematic use of rape can bolster criminal court cases
by adding any evidence presented to establish genocidal intent, acknowledging women’s suffering
in a legal context. Morally there is also a place for religion in affirming the dignity of women who
are victims of rape as well as rebuking perpetrators of rape—as a pastoral duty to bear witness.
Carol Rittner, noting that both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda had substantial Roman Catholic
populations and that the Vatican leadership often publicly comments on issues of sex and sexual
morality, expresses her utter disappointment with the Vatican for failing to provide comfort to
rape victims and women who were forcibly impregnated as well as for failing to unequivocally
condemn the men who engaged in sexual violence.102 As a Catholic and member of the MidAtlantic (USA) Community of the Sisters of Mercy, she laments that she is still awaiting the “great
voice… in Rome” to offer words of compassion to women of the world who have been violated,
infected with HIV/AIDS, and forcibly impregnated and left to care for the children of their genocide
perpetrators.103 She writes:
I can only conclude that the leadership of the Roman Catholic Church, the Pope, and his
cardinals, archbishops, and bishops, unlike the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in Exodus
3:7-10, failed to witness the affliction of God’s people (women) in Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
failed to hear the cry of complaint God’s people (women) uttered against the men who used
rape as a weapon of war and genocide in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and failed, failed utterly
to know well what God’s people (women) were suffering in the 1990s, and still suffer today.104

The public condemnation Rittner calls for is a moral imperative for the Church that is conducive to
the cultivation of a culture that does not tolerate rape in peace or wartime, and it could conceivably
assuage some of the guilt, shame, and ostracism that sexual assault victims endure from their
fellow coreligionists.
Regardless of the trajectory of genocide studies and whether a scholar’s work is primarily
theoretical or not, I contend that the overarching goal of all approaches to genocide studies should
ultimately have a pragmatic application: genocide detection, prevention, and mitigation. This is a
commitment that enjoys agreement among pioneer scholars, such as Charny, and new scholars,
such as Benita Sumita. Sumita argues that genocide studies should emphasize a “forward-looking
perspective, one that distinguishes between academic [which tend toward explanatory models
of genocide] and legal applications of the genocide framework [which tend toward models of
prosecution], and seeks to advance genocide studies in a proactive and preventive way, rather than
just as retrospectively.”105 This study is a contribution to this line of investigation. The typologies of
the nexuses of religion and genocide and genocidal rape are strategies for accomplishing two aims.
These tools are a first step to deciphering how religion and sexual violence buttress the intricate
components of genocidal perpetration in service to the subsequent application of the insights that
such an approach yields for genocide prevention, mitigation, and prosecution.
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“Her name was not Seher, it was Heranuş…” : Reading Narratives of Forced Turkification
in Twenty-First Century Turkey
T. Elal
Abstract: The process of Turkish state formation coincides with systematic large-scale massacres, persecution
and exclusion of certain groups - namely Armenians, Rums, Jews, Assyrians and Kurds. However, accounts of the
process of Turkish nation-building which deal with its destructive side often overlook the “Turkification” of many
non-Muslim women and children in the wake of the First World War. This study aims to fill this gap by drawing on
personal narratives and testimonies of forceful assimilation published in the last decade in Turkey. As any discussion
on the Armenian Genocide was one that was silenced until not so long ago in Turkey, and historians working on
the topic of the Armenian Genocide or mass persecution of Rums often discover that data is either inaccessible or
‘lost’, it is of even greater importance that the personal narrative of survivors be integrated into history writing.
Keywords: Turkification of non-Muslims, narrative as testimony, collective and redemptive memory
Introduction
In the period that stretches roughly from the 1890s through to the 1960s, the Ottoman Empire and
Turkish Republic espoused nationalist as well as discriminatory discourses that came to provide
the very myths and social imaginaries that construct Turkish identity, and organize and guide
social and political action in Turkey today. The process of Turkish state formation coincided
with the systematic persecution, exclusion and large-scale massacres of certain groups – namely
Armenians, Rums (Anatolian Greeks), Jews, Assyrians and Kurds. However, accounts of the process
of Turkish nation-building often focus on its constructive side or deal only with certain aspects of
its destructive side. Even when such destructive aspects are studied – such as the Armenian and
Assyrian massacres of the late nineteenth century, the Armenian Genocide of the World War I,
the population exchange following the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, or the 1928 Turkish language
campaign –, the impact of the forced “Turkification” of many non-Muslim women and children in
the wake of the First World War is often overlooked, constituting a forgotten chapter in the history
of Turkish nation-building. This oversight has meant that the slow motion destruction of ‘those
left behind’ has not been studied, and the ways in which the identity, autonomy and physical
security of Armenian, Rum and Assyrian women and children was undermined during the lifelong process that was forceful assimilation has not been fully understood.1
For example, accounts of how young Armenian and Assyrian girls were given the choice between
life and death; i.e. assuming a Turkish identity or facing forced deportations, are numerous. In one
such case, Yeghsa Khayadjanian from Harput, 15 years old in 1915, recalls how she and a group
of other young Armenians “were given the choice between conversion and death.” 2 Significantly,
they were not asked whether they wanted to become Muslims, but whether they would “become
Turks?”3 These women would also be forced to repress other expressions of their connection to a
non-Turkish past, including the use of languages other than Turkish and the enactment of specific
practices. They also had to discard their given (Christian) names and take up Turkish names. For
such women and children, any discussion of their prior lives would be topics prohibited in both the
public and private domains. Therefore, the silencing and repression of one’s language, customs,
religious identity and memories pertaining to their communities which had previously been part
1
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of the Anatolian landscape became one of the ways in which forced assimilations corresponded
with the more direct violence of the massacres. Muslim families that adopted Armenian and Rum
children, or took non-Muslim brides for their sons, became crucial agents in what amounted to a
“centrally organized program of forced assimilation.”4 This silencing is compounded by the fact
that whenever the assimilation of such Armenian and Rum women and children is acknowledged,
the official position of the Turkish state and its organs is that these “Armenian [as well as Assyrian
or Rum] women and children consciously and voluntarily became Muslims and broke off from
other Armenians, Assyrians and Rums.” 5
However, the 2000s saw the survivors of these crimes – i.e. the very victims of forced
assimilation – contest the official representation of the state by “bearing witness” to what had been
previously silenced: The appearance of a new body of literature of private history and personal
testimony of forced Turkification published in Turkish and in the form of biography,6 monological
interview,7 and historical novel8 constituted a watershed in writing about the traumatic legacy
of the atrocities committed across the Anatolian landscape at the very inception of the Turkish
Republic. The present study argues that these recent narratives published by the victims of
forceful assimilation, their daughters and grandchildren must be treated as essential in gaining an
understanding of the dimensions, functions and role of literary production in confronting official
history.9 To this extent, this paper will examine primary sources written in Turkish and published
in the last decade that explore these hidden histories and subsequent discoveries. These are, for
the most part, stories of how an increasing number of Turkish citizens of the third generation have
recently discovered that their grandparents were ethnically Armenian or Rum, and were forcibly
converted to Islam and made to embrace “Turkishness” in order to avoid persecution. This issue
was one that was silenced until not so long ago in Turkey, and historians working on the topic of
the Armenian Genocide or mass persecution of Rums often discovered (and in fact, still do) that
data is either inaccessible or lost. This is why, to quote from Fethiye Çetin, who published one
of the first accounts relating the story of her own (Armenian) grandmother, “it is essential to tell
these stories […] we need to hear the stories of our grandparents and families.”10 By drawing on
first-hand accounts, I herewith argue that the impact of the Turkification of non-Muslim Anatolian
women and children has had significant repercussions across generations, and that the recent
trend of publishing memoirs which tell the stories of that process highlights a decision to act in
public, whereby a profoundly personal act takes up its place within a distinctly social framework,
the framework of collective action.
Moreover, this significant gap in the literature which overlooks the impact of Turkification also
downplays the fundamentally gendered aspect of the massacres of the Armenian, Assyrian and
Pontic Rum populations of the Ottoman Empire.11 Historians such as Roger Smith, Claudia Card
4
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Erhan Başyurt, Ermeni Evlatlıklar. Saklı Kalmış Hayatlar [Armenian Foster Children: Hidden Lives] (Istanbul: Karakulu, 2006).
Such claims pertaining to the so-called voluntary conversion of Armenian and Rum women and children – as well as
other minorities groups – fail to understand that voluntary conversion was in fact forced assimilation; and constituted
one dimension of the genocidal design directed at non-Muslim minority groups across Anatolia.
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and Armen Marsoobian have convincingly argued that males and females have often been affected
by genocide in quite different ways, and that focusing on aspects such as gender is important if one
seeks to fully understand the modes, motives, dynamics, and consequences of genocide and other
mass crimes.12
Due to the traumatic nature of the experience they relate, the present discussion also treats the
works under study here as literatures of trauma.13 Therefore, the question of whether traumatic
memory is inherited – and if it is, how it is framed – is a particularly pertinent one. According to
the Oxford English Dictionary, trauma (in the non-physical sense) is a “psychic injury, especially
one caused by emotional shock the memory of which is repressed and remains unhealed.”14 As
Kathryn Robson points out, “trauma defies our attempts to comprehend and to assimilate it,” and
makes “truth-telling” particularly challenging, if not impossible; for how is it possible to give voice
to something that breaks through the mind’s coping strategies?15 It is in this context that scholars
such as Cathy Caruth have argued that trauma is almost invariably “spoken in a language that
is somehow literary.”16 However, in cases where witnesses and victims of forceful assimilation
have been silenced, the family becomes an important site for memory, where women take on a
particularly pivotal role (although not an exclusive one) in determining the nature of communicative
memory. As the present paper argues, it is not a coincidence that it is close family-members who
have recorded and published the accounts of witnesses and victims of forced Turkification. In a
country like Turkey, acts of collective commemoration are usually directed at remembering the War
of Independence (1919-1922), or sites such as Gallipoli as loci for collective mourning. Expressions
of atrocities committed against Armenians, Rums and other minorities groups are certainly not
suitable material for state-building mythologies. However, the recent upsurge of testimonies
that address these atrocities, and the very fact that these works have generally elicited positive
responses from readers across the country (and for the most part have not been subjected to direct
censorship), suggest that there are important changes taking place in how certain members of
society wish to readdress the atrocities of 1913-1916 and possibly, modify how the inception of the
Republic is remembered collectively as a nation.
Narrating “The Tragedy of Hidden Identities”:17 A New Genre in Turkish Literature
In 2004, Fethiye Çetin, a Turkish lawyer and human rights activist, published Anneannem (My
Grandmother). This is the story of how, at the age of twenty-five, Fethiye Çetin discovers that her
grandmother is Armenian; that her name is not Seher but Heranuş, and that she was not born in
the Turkish village of Çermikli, but in the Armenian village Havav near the city of Elazığ in Eastern
Anatolia. After an entire lifetime of silence and repression of the memories that pertain to her
Armenian childhood, Çetin’s grandmother reveals to her granddaughter in 1979 the details of her
Armenian identity, the family she lost during the forced deportations of 1915-1916, and how the
social and cultural bulwarks which had sustained her community were destroyed by the policies
Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Taner Akçam, From
Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide, (London: Zed Books, 2004); Ayhan Aktar, “Debating
the Armenian Massacres in the Last Ottoman Parliament, November – December 1918,” History Workshop Journal,
64, Autumn (2007), 240-70; Uğur Ümit Üngör and Mehmet Polatel, Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure
of Armenian Property, (London: Continuum, 2011).
12
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ed. Claudia Card and Armen T. Marsoobian (Cambridge: Malden, 2007), 10–11.
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“Trauma,” OED Online. September 2016, Oxford University Press, accessed 27 November 27, 2016, http://www.oed.
com/view/Entry/205242?redirectedFrom=trauma.
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Kathryn Robson, Writing Wounds: The Inscription of Trauma in post-1968 French Women’s Life-Writing (New York: Rodopi,
2004), 13.
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Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.
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of the Committee of Union Progress (CUP) in power at the time. Over the course of the months and
years, Çetin’s grandmother gradually and increasingly opens up to her about her childhood, talking
about her real parents, her Christian upbringing and Armenian schooling, as well as how she was
forcibly taken from her family and “rescued” from death by a Turkish-speaking Muslim military
officer and taken in by a Muslim couple who had no children of their own. As a consequence, at
the age of nine Heranuş becomes Seher; learns to speak Turkish, becomes a Muslim and eventually
assumes a Turkish identity. What initially motivates Heranuş to share the details of the past with
her granddaughter is her wish that Fethiye Çetin track down her lost relatives who survived the
deportations and massacres in 1915-1916 and moved to America.
However, for Çetin, the discovery of her grandmother’s Armenian identity and the violent
nature of her break from that past is not an easy one to come to grips with. Her grandmother’s
account of the events leading up to her separation from her family and subsequent conversion to
Islam include vivid descriptions of the violence and cruelty that Armenians had to endure during
the deportation. Çetin describes how, once her grandmother started recounting her memories of
childhood, she faced a crisis in her own perceptions of who she was, and experienced a sudden
break in her conceptualization of Turkish society: In her own words, “most of what I thought I knew
until that day was in fact wrong […] all my values were being shattered by what I was hearing.”18
She also expresses the overwhelming sense of shame she suddenly felt when she thought back on
of how she had spent her entire school years reading nationalistic poems during school assemblies:
“Next to the images that I played vividly in my mind – i.e. a crowd waiting to be deported in the
courtyard of a church, children torn apart from their parents, the eyes of dead children staring at
me – I remembered the nationalistic poems I read during every state festival. Next to the unblinking
eyes of the dead, there I stood, reading poems of the nation’s glorious past.”19 My Grandmother is
therefore not only the story of Heranuş and her reconnection with a past which had been denied
to her for the most of her life, but also an account of how her act of remembrance and coming out
leads to the reconstruction of Fethiye Çetin’s identity and a fundamental questioning of the official
rhetoric of the Turkish state and its inception.
Almost immediately after the publication of Anneannem in 2004, a wave of other similar works
appeared in the Turkish press: To name just a few, Tehcir Çocukları: Nenem Ermeniysmiş (The Children
of the Deportations: My Grandmother was an Armenian) was published by İrfan Palalı in 2005; Hayatta
Kalanlar (Those who Survived) by Kemal Yalçın in 2006; Korku Benim Sahibim (Fear is my Master) by
Filiz Özdem in 2007; and Kara Kefen: Müslümanlaştırılımış Ermeni Kadınların Dramı (Black Shroud: The
Stories of Islamified Armenian Women) by Gülçiçek Günel Tekin in 2008. Fethiye Çetin then published
a second account, Torunlar (Grandchildren) in 2008 for which she interviewed other women of the
third generation: Çetin relates how these other women experienced and came to terms with their
discovery that their grandmothers were Armenian or Rum. All these works approach the subject
of how Armenian and Rum women recount their experiences of the forced deportations, mass
persecutions and subsequent marriage to Turkish-speaking Muslim men, or their adoption by
Muslim families. They also address how their children and grandchildren deal with the confession
that their grandmothers are in fact not who/what they always claimed to be. These works also
have in common that almost all these acts of remembrance are being carried out by women, and
that these testimonies are almost exclusively passed on to daughters and granddaughters. Such
accounts highlight how women’s experiences of genocide differed from those of men in terms of
forms of victimization and their consequences.20 They also illustrate how women consequently
took on the role of passing on their stories, whereby the cultural performances of testimonies of the
18
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past transcended the boundaries of the family unit and took up their place amongst the archives of
memory that fill the vacuum of chapters in history that have not been written or have no platform.
I approach the questions I raise in the introduction through the consideration of the works I
mention above. In addition, I refer to one other work, Yorgos Andredis’ Tamama: Pontos’un Yitik
Kızı (Tamama: Pontos’ Lost Daughter) which was published earlier than Çetin’s Anneannem, in 1993.
This work initially appeared in Greek, and was then translated into Turkish in the same year. Here,
Andreadis tells the story of a Pontic Greek girl who took shelter in the home of a Turkish family
after being deported from her home in 1914, at the age of seven. In November 1914 Tamama’s entire
village is evacuated from Espiye (near Trabzon) and made to march westwards as the Russians
invade the Eastern parts of the Black Sea Region. Both of Tamama’s parents, her brother and her
uncle die of typhus and harsh winter conditions on the road. By the time they reach Sivas, some
two hundred kilometers from Espiye, the majority of the population of the village has perished
because of the harsh conditions of the deportation.21 In Sivas, Tamama is taken in by Mustafa Oktay,
a Turkish military officer, who lives with his sixteen year old daughter Ayşe. Tamama ‘becomes’
Raife, learns Turkish and converts to Islam; the Pontic Greek orphan is erased from history to
be replaced by Raife, a Turkish speaking, Muslim Turk. Like Çetin’s grandmother, the fictional
Tamama wishes to reconnect with her surviving family members in her old age (following a stroke)
which is what makes her speak to her nieces and nephews about her past, and thus the quest to
locate distant relatives begins.
Significant is that, for Andreadis, the fictional story of Tamama is grounded in memories
of a distant landscape he calls his ancestral homeland. Elsewhere, in a semi-biographical work,
Pontos’taki Evim [My House in Pontos] published in 2005, Andreadis has stated that although he
was born and raised in Greece, and does not set eyes on Anatolia until he is in his mid-twenties, he
identifies more as an Anatolian refugee than as Greek. Andreadis’ family was moved from Anatolia
to Greece during the Population Exchange between Turkey and Greece in 1923.22 Andreadis spends
the first eighteen years of his life labeled a refugee from a place he is now a stranger to, but in the
meanwhile grows up with the vivid descriptions narrated to him by his grandmother Afroditi of
the life his parents and grandparents led and the grand houses they once owned in that distant
land, Pontos.23 The stories his grandmother tells him of Pontos are so deeply engraved in his mind
that upon his return to his family’s homeland (near the present-day city of Trabzon) he recognizes
that a casino now stands on the spot the Aya Grigoriu Church once occupied. He knows that
the square opposite the school his grandmother Afroditi has described countless times was once
called “Gavur Meydanı” (The Square of the Infidels).24 What Yorgos labels a return is in fact his
first visit to Trabzon. However, he is familiar with his homeland in very tangible ways, and this
is a familiarity that comes solely from communicative memory, i.e. personal interaction with his
grandmother by means of verbal communication. Interestingly, the house and the land from which
this family was “forcefully made to leave” before he is born is what he most identifies with; much
more so than his home in Greece, where his family are treated as second class citizens, living in
barracks on an unnamed street with other Anatolian refugees.25 Like Tamama, Yorgos too is a lost
child of that landscape.
Tamama was published in 1993, and awarded the prestigious Abdi İpekçi Prize in Literature
in the same year. Although it speaks openly about the harsh conditions of the deportations, how
people were abandoned by Turkish soldiers to die, and how the old and weak were murdered on
the side of the roads, Yorgos Andreadis’ work elicited mostly positive responses, and its readers
demanded that other such works which engaged with the tragedy of the deportations be produced.
However, it was only some ten years after the publication of Tamama, when Çetin’s Anneannem
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appeared in 2004 that a plethora of similar works would follow, engaging the human tragedy of
the 1913-1916 deportations and murders through personal narratives like never before in Turkey.
Significantly, these works were no longer fiction grounded in reality, but the voices of men and
women relating stories “as it once was.”
Individual Narrative as Collective Politics and Collective Trauma
The question of whether personal narrative can work as collective (and redemptive) politics is a
critical and contentious issue within literary, testimonial and wider cross-cultural examinations
of genocide and mass persecution.26 For example, certain scholars and critics of Holocaust fiction
“express distrust of literary devices in narratives” and have argued that literary narrative can only
serve to distract from the “harsh realities of the ghettos, the concentration camps, and death.”27
These scholars have argued that the use of literary devices in narratives, such as the use of metaphor
in personal narratives, can only serve to distract from the horror of the events witnessed.28 In this
context, Alvin Rosenfeld has insisted on the central problem of language in narrating the brutality
and inhumanity of the Holocaust, which forever surpassed the ability of language to represent
it: “There are no metaphors for Auschwitz, just as Auschwitz is not a metaphor for anything else.
Why is that the case? Because the flames were real flames, the ashes only ashes, the smoke always
and only smoke.”29 However, testimonial writings and the personal narrative have increasingly
entered the realm of mainstream literary and historical discussion, and have found a platform in
many contexts of mass persecution and genocide. For example, Yvonne Unnold who writes on the
Latin American testimonio has argued that given that “truth and reality forms a central element [in
the personal narrative] and since this genre aims at […] serving as a sociopolitical tool,” it is able to
attach authenticity value to its representations of history.30
In this backdrop, I believe that the nature and timing of the publication of the works under
scrutiny is significant in understanding their purpose and how these were conditioned by states
of minds outside their own. These works are much more than the private stories of individual
women; in each context the act of publishing these personal narratives represents a decision to
act in public, where, due to the lack of any official recognition of these tragedies, they assume a
similar role public memorials would have taken on under normal circumstances. War memorials
are “places where people grieved, both individually and collectively.”31 But what happens if there
are no memorials to visit to mourn, no public spaces that emphasize the losses endured and if the
framing of memory relevant to these events through language is denied to the witnesses of the
crimes? Although the voice that speaks in personal narratives asserts the individuality of a certain
experience, and imposes personal feelings and responses to the events in question,32 narratives
collectively produce a new genre altogether: They confirm what one another say and create space
where dialogue can take place between different agents. The different agents in question in this case
would be the victims, their family members, civil society, and the Turkish state. Personal memory
becomes testimony, whereby communicative memory ultimately redefines cultural memory.
Why was it that it was only in the mid-2000s that these works finally found a platform? Debates
on the Turkish state’s responsibility of the Armenian Genocide and its refusal to recognize that
these crimes took place have been on the political agenda for a long time, both on the national and
international level. Writers, journalists and priests in Turkey have been arrested for recognizing
the Armenian, Rum and Assyrian Genocides for over three decades and continue to be penalized
for writing on these topics. However, it is certainly possible to refer to a “memory boom” that has
26

I would like to thank one of the reviewers of this article who drew my attention to this very central issue, and for
making very useful suggestions where this question was concerned.

27

Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 45.

28

Elizabeth Scheiber, “Figurative Language in Delbo’s Auschwitz et Après,” Comparative Literature and Culture 11, no. 1
(2009), 3.

29

Alvin H Rosenfeld, A Double Dying: Reflections of Holocaust Literature (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 11.

30

Unnold, Representing the Unpresentable, 45.

31

Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 79.

32

Hynes, Personal Narratives, 206.

©2016

Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.3

Reading Narratives of Forced Turkification in Twenty-First Century Turkey

31

taken place in the last decade, almost a century on from the atrocities of 1913-1916. One possible
answer to “why now” is that there is finally enough distance between then and the present for
the audience to treat these as belonging to an era that does not affect any of their living relatives
or acquaintances. These issues can be discussed for the first time without holding responsible
anyone in living memory. By the 2000s, those directly responsible for these crimes as well as their
immediate family were no longer alive.
Second, communicative memory is after all, temporal memory that disappears after the
person carrying out the act of remembrance dies.33 Those witnesses who are involved in memory
work do not necessarily rehearse past events in order to provide interpretations of these atrocities
and the historical process they happened in; they do so in order to “struggle with grief, to fill the
silence, to offer something symbolic for the dead.”34 The 2000s also coincided with the death of
the last of these agents of remembrance who possessed communicative memory. However, once
this information is transmitted to others and those born in generations after them, communicative
memory becomes cultural memory.35 Cultural memory is not fixed – and neither is the voice of
the narrator in memoirs – however, these testimonies become carriers of cultural (if not collective)
memory because they are the inventions of individuals within a group coming together in acts of
remembrance: They record, publish, read and discuss in the public arena. Each agent takes on a
different role: the grandmother narrates, the granddaughter records what she hears, a publisher
prints the work and others come together to read and discuss content. Sometimes, the state acts,
arrests or publically denounces the accounts in question. Significantly however, the content of
memory takes on a collective and therefore political meaning. The family may be the largest space
situated between the individual and state, but the act of publishing these personal accounts moves
these memories beyond the family, out of the shadows and into the public domain.
Cultural trauma occurs when members of a collectivity “feel they have been subjected to a
horrendous event that affects their group consciousness ineradicably, marking their memories
forever and changing their future identity in fundamental ways.”36 The essential point here is the
concept of changing future identity, which is inextricably linked to how memory work is carried
out after the so-called traumatic events take place. For example, in Those who Survived, Kemal
Yalçın records the interviews he held with survivors of the Armenian and Rum Genocides. In
one instance, one assimilated Armenian woman describes how, before the 1915 massacres when
aggression and discrimination against non-Muslims in Eastern Anatolia were on the rise, she
witnessed her brother, Agop, being dragged out of their house by a group of Turkish men and
beaten up in the village square for everyone else to witness and watch. Agop had supposedly
stolen a turkey from the nearby village: “I looked around to see whether any of our neighbors
would help […] but everyone watched as my brother was beaten half to death for no apparent
reason. We were helpless as a few people from the crowd screamed “infidels, you hide buckets of
gold but still steal without shame!”37 She then describes how this event was the “beginning of the
end”; that the bonds that had held Armenians and the Turks together in a sense of communality
had been severed forever by way of the act of witnessing this single violent event, for both the
bystanders and victims alike. By attributing such symbolic meaning to the memory of the violence
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of that day, this personal narrative highlights how traumatic memory is a metaphor for what is in
fact a language of mourning. Personal narratives touch on traumatic events that could perhaps best
be described as being commemorative acts that go back in time to reaffirm one’s human values,
and acquire some sense of redemption: This is the expression of traumatic memory.
Collective trauma on the other hand, occurs when the basic tissues of a groups’ social ties are
fundamentally impaired, resulting in the destruction of a sense of communality, damaging the
bonds that attach people together.38 This is perhaps one of the most striking subject matters that
binds each of these personal narratives: The witnessing and experiencing of the violence towards
non-Muslim groups who had lived in communities side by side with Turks and Kurds for over
centuries left a permanent mark on the survivors of these crimes, as well as its perpetrators (even
if they were guilty of passively observing).
In Çetin’s Torunlar (Grandchildren) – which consists of a series of recorded interviews – a
Turkish woman, Sima describes her surprise at discovering that there were students in her class
called Tanya, Arto and Rafi. Her parents had enrolled her at a school in Istanbul after they moved
there from a small village in Western Anatolia: “I thought they must be very European. I had
been completely unaware that there were Jews and Armenians from Anatolia […] I was therefore
shocked to learn that my maternal grandmother’s mother had been Armenian, from a village in
the East of Turkey where there were entire villages of non-Muslims.”39 Once she approaches her
father’s family about the 1915 deputations and massacres, she notices how, although “no one
denied that these were tragic events,” there was resistance to talk about the vacated houses of
hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Rums, and how these properties and lands had been
seized by their Turkish neighbors. Sima comments on how “no one is prepared to say ‘I seized such
and such property and became rich,’ it is always ‘others’ who have committed such acts […] but
you can see and sense their guilt.”40
The question of guilt as wrapped up in cultural trauma is an interesting one. Friedlander
discusses how the feeling of guilt among Germans in post-World War II Germany was transformed
over time: When German and Jewish contemporaries of the Nazi period –
Contemporary adults, adolescents or children, even the children of these groups – are
considered, what was traumatic for the one group was obviously not traumatic for the other.
For Jews of whatever age, the fundamental traumatic situation was and is the Shoah; for
Germans, it was national defeat (including flight from the Russians and loss of sovereignty)
following upon national exhilaration. To that, however, a sequel must be added, regardless
of its psychological definition.41

The sequel is that over time, increasing information becomes available to Germans and the
international community, and the question becomes one of dealing with the stain of genocide as
well as the potential shame and guilt that comes with the obligation of recognizing these crimes.
This seems applicable to the Turkish case. For example, when Yorgos Andreadis describes
his visit to his ancestral home Trabzon for the first time in 1970s, he writes of an encounter with
a group of young men, more or less his own age, who approach him to ask where he is from in
a mixture of English, Turkish and Greek (once he shares with them that he was born in Greece).
In response, he points emphatically to the ground and declares: “From here.”42 Reportedly, a few
of the men do not seem to understand the significance of this response, whereas the rest of the
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group “looked uncomfortably to the ground and did not know what to say.”43 Denial is inextricably
linked to feeling of guilt and collective trauma, where the perpetrators and/or passive observers,
as well as the generations that were born after them bear the marks of the violent way in which
social ties of communities were fundamentally impaired. Another example is Sude, the protagonist
in Fear is my Master – which is the story of Filiz Özdem, who finds out that her grandfather was
in fact Armenian following his death – and who declares “my [paternal] grandmother did not
wish for me to look for answers about my [maternal] grandfather, because she knew what I would
find would cause embarrassment.”44 Both her mother (who discovers her own father’s Armenian
identity at the same time as Sude) and Sude realize that Sude’s grandfather must have had no
choice but to marry his wife (their mother/grandmother), and denied the right to talk about the
circumstances under which he had accepted these terms. Sude is not told that this is the case, but
assumes that it must have been so. In a similar narrative, Burhan Aydın, whose mother Feride – an
Armenian woman “rescued” by a Turkish man in 1915 who then becomes her husband – states the
following:
I think that because my mother did not want to remember those horrific times she never
spoke of what had happened. It’s likely that my mother witnessed the murders of her
parents, as well as her brothers and sisters and escaped to the mountains. Why else would
a young woman hide up in the mountains all by herself? […] I grew up with very little
knowledge relating to my mother’s family.45

Although she has no evidence to support this, Burhan Aydın comes to the conclusion that her
mother must have witnessed the murder of her family after finding out that her grandmother had
been found alone in the mountains. Significant here is how in the absence of memory, Filiz Özdem
and Burhan Aydın make new memories to fill that void, framing events in the way they think it
must have happened.
The consequences of collective trauma in the backdrop of the arguments of this essay are
twofold: First, by denying the reality of others’ suffering and suppressing expressions of those
memories, the Turkish nation was able not only to diffuse its own responsibility for this suffering
but also projected the responsibility of its own suffering on others.46 In other words, the refusal
to take any accountability over the question of the Armenian, Assyrian and Greek deaths has
provided the Turkish state with a homogenizing discourse: The Turkish people cannot be – and is
not – responsible for the deaths of the other, i.e. Armenian and Greeks. This not only enables state
discourse to separate the two camps of Turks and non-Turks sharply into a definitive them and us,
but also rallies undivided support over one single issue. As Selim Deringil has highlighted, “there
is no other issue in Turkey today, other than that of the question of an Armenian Genocide, which
manages to rally the entire Turkish nation behind it.”47 Therefore, the “Armenian question” and the
state’s denial to accept any responsibility in either Armenian, Assyrian or Greek suffering becomes
a nodal point in the process of the homogenization of the Turkish people-as-one.
The second issue at hand is the question of how the concealment of vast numbers of Armenians,
Assyrians and Rums who took on Turkish identities, and the inability to speak of these atrocities
resulted in the transmittance of a fractured perception of self across generations. One passage in
the Fear is my Master highlights how Sude faces a crisis in her sense of identity because she feels
that she no longer knows who her grandparents’ really were, and that her maternal ancestors are
“forever lost” to her:
No one knows their names, and no one calls their names… Who knows what attributes they
have passed on to me? Perhaps the way I flick my hair to the side and how I sleep at night
43
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with my left knee hug tight resembles the mannerisms of some dead person whose name
I do not know. Perhaps my clumsy walk and the way I fall in love is like someone I do not
know […] to whom am I indebted for my patience?48

The passage I quoted earlier from Çetin’s My Grandmother also signals a similar sort of crisis. Çetin
feels that “most of what I thought I knew until that day was in fact wrong […] all my values were
being shattered by what I was hearing.”49 Both Çetin and Sude feel disconnected from their ‘former’
selves; memory and identity are, after all, fundamentally bound to one another. Each individual
remembers as part of a social group and our memories are almost always rehearsed in the past “in
reference to the individual memories of other people; that is, those persons who are significant at
different levels for that individual.”50 What happens when the validity of such rehearsed memories
is challenged by an alternative set of realities that one has no access to? Sude and Fethiye Çetin,
as well many other men and women in these narratives, feel that they have been deceived by the
memories they have previously formed.
However, in Sude’s case there is no chance of her forming new memories, (unless she fills in
the gaps by inventing new ones) because her grandfather is dead and there are very few people she
can talk to about who he was and what had happened to him. When Sude expresses her wish to
find out more about her maternal grandfather’s history, her paternal grandmother declares: “Why
has this foolish girl become infatuated with her family’s maternal side, why does she question the
past so? If she wishes to inquire on family history, she can do this by looking in to her father’s side
of the family!”51 However, Sude feels as if “a branch of the family tree is broken; I wish to learn more
of that broken branch.”52 Sude needs to make new memories; and Çetin feels that she has betrayed
her grandmother and herself by taking part in “false” collective acts of remembrance by reading
nationalistic poems in Turkish; whereas Nazlı, whose account was recorded by Gülçiçek Günel
Tekin, expresses huge regret at never probing her own grandmother to recount her memories.
Nazlı knew of her grandmother’s “Armenian past”, yet did not understand the significance of what
this meant until after her death. As a consequence, Nazlı never finds out what her grandmother’s
real name was. She states that “I have asked others who knew her […] would you believe it? No
one knew. I don’t know what my own grandmother’s name is […] I feel incredible regret.”53 These
women’s legacy to their children and grandchildren seems to be a sense of collective trauma. In
other words, they are faced with a form of shock when they realize that their communities no
longer exist as an effective source of support, and that a significant part of the self has disappeared
upon the discovery that many of their rehearsed memories shared within their communities no
longer represent their family history and by extension, their selves. This ultimately means that
many of their exchanges of information, values and memories – be it at school, at work, or amongst
members of their Turkish family – no longer contribute to their present selves.
In the case of all the narratives under scrutiny in this essay, the memory work being carried is
very much intertwined with what Emmanuel Silvan calls “grief work”;54 in that all these memories
pertain to a past that is particularly painful and fraught with death and loss. Why, then, did these
women choose to overcome the silence that they have so dutifully kept throughout the years? Why
do their children and grandchildren choose to repeat the stories that they have been told? Two
separate themes connect these memoirs and could help explain the reason behind their coming
out. The first is the fear of being forgotten and/or forgetting, as well as the wish to reconnect with
relatives that may still be alive. In My Grandmother, Çetin’s grandmother initially shares her secret
only to ask that her granddaughter track down members of her family in America. However, once
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Çetin is able to get in touch with Heranuş’s brother in New York, Heranuş declares that she has no
desire to speak or see her brother, or other members of her family. Her assertion that “Who am I to
them? They have long forgotten me”55 is only challenged when Çetin informs her that Heranuş’s
brother has named his daughter after his lost sister: He has named her Heranuş. Upon hearing this
news, Heranuş weeps, uttering “so they have not forgotten me after all.”56 Çetin remarks on how
for the very first time in her life, she heard her grandmother sing to herself on that very day.57 In
Tamama, Andreadis describes how Tamama starts asking for her relatives and speaking Greek on
her deathbed, obliging Ayşe – her Turkish sister – to inform her own son (who we are told is like a
son to Tamama who never married) that his godmother is in fact Rum. In both cases, these women
would probably have chosen to keep the silence which was essential in ensuring that that they
avoid discrimination, stigma or even worse,58 had it not been the need to reconnect with the past
by seeing and speaking to members of the families of their former selves.
The other reason why these stories are passed on is the wish to make known to a general
public that these atrocities took place. One other narrator in Kara Kefen, Taner –whose mother was
Armenian – asserts that “We never could understand her. We never asked her why she wept.
[…] Now that I know the fate that befell her, I want others to know what we never asked her.”59
Yorgos, through Tamama, expresses his wish that everyone know that “what befell [them] was so
catastrophic that a seven year-old was willing to abandon her only living relative, a sister, for a single
slice of bread.”60 Therefore, it seems that the act of narrating serves both the purpose of rebuilding
ties as well as that of socio-political testimony. The effort of collective individual testimony, as
is the case in Çetin’s Grandchildren, Tekin’s Black Shroud, and Kemal Yalçın’s Those who Survived
demonstrates how survivors and their children and grandchildren become witnesses, linking the
private and the public. However, note that although the direct victims of these atrocities take on
the role of witnesses by narrating these stories, the need to publish these accounts is one that is felt
most acutely by the third generation. This kind of memory work takes on a particularly significant
meaning as they serve the purpose of resurrecting an otherwise vanishing universe that has so far
not been given a place in Turkish collective memory. Whether these testimonies, and the memory
of genocide and suffering they transmit become part of collective memory in Turkey is not possible
to determine just yet, but these works are certainly being read, circulated and discussed.61 They
have also encouraged others with similar stories and testimonies across the country to appear on
television, write in newspapers, journals and give speeches in schools and universities. I maintain
that these personal accounts have been effective in providing a public space in which victims as
well as citizens of the Turkish Republic are coming together to mourn the crimes committed at the
very inception of the Republic. They also serve to unsettle the official definition of “fixed” Turkish
identity, which has thus far systematically excluded other ethnic expressions from partaking in the
making of the nation.
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Conclusion
To what extent can these forms of memory, recorded as personal narrative and then published for
a greater audience outside that of the immediate family, be integrated into history writing, if at all?
Catherine Merridale comments on how historians, in their focus on the “destruction of social memory
and how it is linked with starker instances of censorship and denial” in countries such as Soviet
Russia – and for the purpose of this essay – Turkey, have overlooked how private and personal stories
have often been preserved.62 Although a refusal to speak publically about Turkish atrocities committed
against non-Muslim minorities in Anatolia, dubbed by some as silence, has been the predominant
trend in Turkey, the last decade has ushered in certain changes. The upsurge of memoirs written
by granddaughters and grandsons of the victims, as well as Armenian, Rum and Turkish writers who
have sought out other carriers of memory to record their narratives, have resulted in the publication
of a wide-range of works dealing exclusively with the memories of survivors of these crimes.
The Turkish state has gone to great lengths to deny any responsibility for the mass killings of
non-Muslim minorities across the Anatolian landscape, and has repeatedly refused to recognize the
Armenian Genocide.63 It has also denied access to or destroyed the material basis for any meaningful
debate or discussion on how approximately one fifth of the civilian population of Anatolia perished
during World War I, and has by extension attempted to destroy the social memory that pertains to
these events. Moreover, in the absence of any formal recognition of the dead,64 those who survived
were denied the social recognition of the violent and unnatural character of these deaths. Such
recognition must be seen as a crucial stage in the process of coming to terms with loss individually
and as members of a society as a whole.65 The lack of archival material accessible to the general
public – and to some extent, historians– has created a vacuum in the historical explanation of the
persecution and elimination of Armenian, Assyrian and Rum minorities. Until archival material
can be used more freely by members of the public, this vacuum can therefore only be filled with
the memory of those who bore witness to these events, and whose testimony can be transmitted to
a broader audience in the form of literary testimony.
Let us pause and consider Primo Levi’s works on the Holocaust, such as If This is a Man or The
Black Hole of Auschwitz. As a writer and communicator of how he survived Auschwitz and how he
then tried to come to terms with surviving when so many other millions had not, he did what so
many others had not been able to: He bore witness to an event that millions of others could never
do, and became a carrier of memory. Levi’s role has been likened to a self-imposed responsibility
to write, so that humankind is reminded of the Holocaust and such crimes never repeat themselves
again.66 Whether or not Levi was successful in ensuring that a crime as horrific and large-scale as
the Holocaust never occurs again is beyond the scope of this essay. However, his personal accounts
have certainly worked towards recognition of the horrific nature of the violence that was inflicted
on the Jewish people and has become an important part of cultural memory and imagination
pertaining to the Second World War.
Following the publication of Anneannem in 2004, a number of Turkish newspapers promoted this
work by reporting extensively on its content matter. By writing about Anneanem, many journalists
discovered that it was possible to talk about the death marches, and the human misery and cost of
62
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the mass persecutions which took place in Anatolia during the World War through Çetin’s narrative
and through Heranuş’s words. For example, Celal Başlangıç, writing for Radikal, wrote of the death
marches Heranuş witnessed; about the “truth that had been hidden for decades” and concluded
the article with the sub-heading “Please forgive us.”67 Such declarations in the media were made
possible – perhaps for the first time – with the publication of Anneannem, which was followed
by publication of other similar testimonies. Yeni Şafak, a newspaper close to the government,
responded to Başlangıç’s article, and criticized his piece. Here Alper Görmüş questioned how
genuine Heranuş/Seher could have been in her desire to reconnect with her family: “With whom
did Seher Hanım wish to resume relations at the end of her long ninety-five year life? [...] When
these supposed events took place her father was in America looking to start a business anyway,
[are we to believe] that this woeful story is borne of her longing for two long lost brothers?”68
Significant here is that regardless of either outlet’s stance on this contentious subject, the publication
of personal narratives and testimonies ignited a public discussion concerning the accounts of
the witnesses. Moreover, that these witnesses were not historians, politicians, representatives of
foreign states or human rights activists, but ordinary Turkish citizens humanized the debate as
never before. This, then, brings us to the role individual testimony plays, especially when similar
works are published collectively whereby they acquire a platform via which these survivors
and their stories finally attain some sort of sanction and recognition from society. The survivor
and their families need to assert their identity through public testimony69 whereby they invoke
from their audience the respect, empathy and compassion that has so long been denied them.
The present paper has also attempted to illustrate how mainstream literature on the Armenian
and Rum massacres has been gendered, often overlooking how men and women have been exposed
to different forms of violence: It is not a coincidence that all the victims-turned-witnesses that have
carried out the memory work in question have been grandmothers, and that they have chosen to
interact with their daughters and granddaughters (much more so than their sons and grandsons)
by means of verbal communication. The positive reactions these personal accounts elicited from
readers across Turkey, and the fact that books such as My Grandmother, Grandchildren, Those who
Survived and Black Shroud have all been reprinted and rerun several times, is testimony that the
memory work being carried out by the witnesses of the Anatolian persecutions goes beyond the
level of the individual. The silence which has been kept for so long is now finally, albeit gradually,
being broken: To what success is yet to be seen.
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Abstract: This article describes the construction of a historical GIS (HGIS) of the Armenian genocide and its
application to study how the genocide unfolded spatially and temporally using stage models proposed by Gregory
Stanton. The Kazarian manuscript provided a daily record of events related to the genocide during 1914-1923 and
served as a primary source. Models outlining and describing the stages of genocide provide a structured and vetted
approach to studying the spatial and temporal aspects of the genocidal process, especially genocide by attrition.
This article links HGIS to a qualitative, historical source and describes the uncertainties that arise when mapping
historical events. While the genocide literature is abundant in areas related to theory and practice, examples of
explicitly spatial analyses are lacking. Our contribution aims at filling this gap.
Keywords: Armenian genocide, genocide stages, genocide by attrition, geographies of genocide, Historical GIS
Introduction
The term genocide describes destructive actions undertaken with the purposeful intent to destroy a
specific group of people based on some perceived difference – usually racial or religious. Although
this definition excludes cultural and political genocide, it serves as a starting point to describe
processes designed to annihilate a group of people. Indeed, genocide pioneer Raphael Lemkin
himself advocated for recognition of the importance of culture to the heritage of nations and called
for international protection of cultures as well as peoples.1 Lemkin asserted that genocidal processes
not only destroy groups of people, but also eradicate cultural markers, such as the languages, place
names, and signs and symbols of the targeted group.2 While Lemkin’s broad views concerning the
nature of genocide were not instantiated into international law, recently there has been a renewed
scholarly interest in studying genocides as broader phenomena and shedding light on obscured
or hidden genocidal histories.3 One of these previously obscured, yet relatively massive genocides,
the Armenian genocide, serves as the focus of this research. In the early twentieth century over one
million Armenians were killed, along with tens of thousands of Christian Greeks and Assyrians in
present-day Turkey.4 In this study, we use the theory of the stages of genocide outlined by Stanton5
to explore what spatial and temporal patterns emerge from the Armenian Genocide as narrated in
what is known as the Kazarian Manuscript.6
Rosenberg argues that the link between genocide processes and perpetrator acts needs to guide
research to expand further the field of genocide studies and possibly aid in the prevention of mass
killings.7 In her study, Rosenberg focuses on the under-theorized concept of genocide by attrition,
defined as a slow process of annihilation which relies primarily on indirect methods of destruction.
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In contrast to outright mass extermination, genocide by attrition allows a more passive role for
perpetrators, who place victims into circumstances whereby disease, harsh climates, starvation,
and dehydration cause massive casualties.8 Examples of activities that produce genocide through
attritive processes include the enactment of discriminatory laws, policies, sanctions, and property
confiscations aimed at isolating a segment of the population. Further, ambiguities in these laws
and policies often confer broad discretion to mid-level perpetrators, who, stoked by discriminatory
animi, wield such power to disastrous effect in pursuing the overarching goal of annihilation.
A theoretical approach to studying the inner workings of genocide as a process is more easily
conceptualized by defining stages that capture the progression of events that produce genocide.9
Geography can contribute to the understanding of genocide processes in several ways,10
including through a spatial analytical approach, which we adopt in our research. Some genocide
research focuses on why mass murder occurs or on the detection and prevention of genocide,
rather than how genocide progresses across territories.11 Shaw, among others, urges a restructuring
of genocide studies toward a focus on the structures or processes that produce genocidal outcomes,
rather than the subjectivity of perpetrators.12 In other work,13 we assign perpetrators to a macro,
meso, or micro level of participation14 at geographic scales ranging from the national to the regional,
to the province, district, and ultimately, village. The geography of genocide involves a myriad of
power struggles and acts of resistance, as well as killings, aimed at achieving the ultimate objective
of creating a utopia in place, for example, a nation to cause or facilitate violence in order to achieve
a homogenous state. By analyzing genocidal processes through the lens of geographic scale, we
hope to understand how perpetrators implemented genocide spatially and in stages in the pursuit
of the development of a homogenous social order idealized by the Turkish government.
In our model, perpetrator roles fall into one of three levels15 at a plurality of scales. The
macro-level includes government policy and decision-making processes at the national scale that
ultimately lead to the destruction of a targeted population. The meso-level, or mid-level, includes
active participation in the interpretation and enforcement of policies, procedures, and dictates at
the regional, province, district, and village scales by organized groups such as, in the Armenian
case, bands of government-sanctioned civilians known as chetes, often made up of Kurds.16 The
micro-level involves individuals at the local or village scale that react violently towards individuals
identified as the “other,” in genocidal rhetoric, including at times friends and neighbors. By
combining these perpetrator levels and geographic scales in the context of a stage model of
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genocide, the processes of genocide at varying spatial and temporal scales may be brought into
sharper focus.
The technical and intellectual foundation for this application is derived from developments
within the disciplines of geography and geographic information science (GIScience), including
the emergence of historical geographical information systems (HGIS). Cole and Graham argue
that prior to recent scholarship in geography, academics neglected spatial research and analysis
of the Holocaust.17 We see a similar blank spot in scholarly geographic literature concerning the
Armenian genocide. From this starting point, we aim to address this gap in the literature by
adapting the stage model of genocide to produce a spatial analysis of the Armenian genocide.
We seek to highlight the potential for—and the difficulties with—multi-disciplinary projects
between HGIS and genocide studies. In recent scholarship, geographers have used applications
and techniques to explore modern genocide including GIS, remote sensing, and virtual globes.
Examples of genocide research using GIScience include Yale’s Genocide Studies Program using
remote sensing in Darfur,18 Madden and Ross’s work combining GIS with personal narratives to
describe the mass atrocities in Uganda,19 Verpoorten’s work on excess mortality in Rwanda,20 and
recent scholarship on the spatiality of the Holocaust.21 These developments parallel a trend toward
incorporating qualitative source material into the traditionally quantitative methods of GIS that
continues to grow within geography and GIScience.22 These examples help guide our methods and
techniques for exploring the use of HGIS and personal narratives in the field of genocide studies.
Genocide Stages as Structure
Given the limited existing literature on the spatial processes involved in the production of
genocide, our methodology relies on the defined and structured stages of genocide. Writing in
the context of the Holocaust, Fein outlines five distinct stages as they relate to victims, which
she argues occur sequentially: definition or identification, deprivation of rights and freedoms,
segregation from the rest of the population, isolation, and finally, concentration.23 These five stages,
Fein argues, preceded the actual mass extermination of the Holocaust. For a more articulated
and satisfactory model (Table 1), we turned to the work of Gregory Stanton.24 Based on years
of analysis of mass killings, including the Holocaust and other genocides, Stanton frames the
progression of genocidal perpetration according to eight clearly defined stages: classification,
symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and
denial.25 In subsequent work, Stanton extends these original eight stages to include two additional
ones—discrimination and persecution—bringing the total to ten discrete stages.26 Similar to Fein’s
model, Stanton argues that early stages occur before later stages; for instance, classification and
17
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symbolization precede the preparation and extermination stages. However, Stanton also argues that
all stages operate at various levels continuously throughout the duration of mass killing processes.
We found this argument, and the ten-stage model, convincing and therefore rely on Stanton’s ten
stages of genocide to describe the progression and escalation of hostilities toward Armenians as
perpetrated in and around present-day Turkey during the years 1914 to 1923. More specifically,
our objective is to gain insight into the Armenian genocide by employing a spatial analytical
perspective. During this period, the Turkish government implemented plans for the removal and
destruction of ethnic minorities who remained within their borders following the rise of Turkish
nationalism.
Stages of the Armenian Genocide
The beginning stages of genocide include the identification of a minority, however defined, that
is perceived as being somehow different from the dominant group. Genocides thus begin with a
classification (stage 1) phase, during which an us versus them mentality plays upon and amplifies
preexisting social differences between the majority and minority groups (Table 1). When the slogan,
“Turkey for Turks” began being used, this deceptively simplistic statement placed non-Turk ethnic
groups squarely outside the accepted and dominant group. This call for a homogenous Turkey
served to escalate violence toward various target groups perceived as being non-Turks.
The next stage stems from this classification process (stage 2) and consists of the exaggeration
of stereotypes and the provocation of fear through symbols and propaganda. The Turks described
Armenians and other targeted minority groups as internal enemies of the nation, characterizing
them as unreliable, and prone to violence in order to stir fear and mistrust among their neighbors.
Discrimination (stage 3) involves restrictions, often enforced through the enactment of prejudicial
laws, designed to curtail the freedoms and liberties of the identified group. This stage includes
illegal searches, seizures, and confiscations, as well as boycotts and closures of businesses. Local
Turks targeted Armenian businesses for looting and burning, and seized Armenian schools and
churches for garrisoning Turkish troops. Such discriminatory acts are then justified through
the dehumanization (stage 4) of the targeted group who, using propaganda and symbols, is
characterized as sub-human vermin who are sources of disease. The dehumanization stage
is a crucial segue in the escalation of violence because it helps assuage the guilt of individual
perpetrators, who would likely otherwise be reticent to persecute and murder people who were
once neighbors and friends. These four stages target, identify, and marginalize a group of people
in anticipation of ridding society of them.
The next three stages focus on policy and preparation from the top-down. Organization
(stage 5) functions as a means for the state (or other authority structure) to issue genocidal
orders – explicit or implied – to militias and other groups. In the Turkish context, the government
ordered certain villages and districts be cleared of Armenians, but did not specify how, leaving the
details to bands of armed militia. This ambiguity in instruction also provided a means of denying
culpability after the fact if needed. Polarization (stage 6) serves to divide victim groups labelled as
pariahs from society, through extremist activities, hate speeches, and continued propaganda. In
the Turkish context, this stage involved the instilling of fear in the large moderate Turk population
that otherwise likely opposed the targeting of their friends and neighbors. Preparation (stage 7)
involves the planned and physical separation of victims, both from each other and from the general
population. This stage outlines the processes involving the organized and methodical means of
destruction of a group of identified victims. It includes the compiling of lists of individuals to
arrest, routes for the movement of people, and planned methods of extermination.
The next two stages involve an escalation of physical violence against the targeted victim
group. Persecution (stage 8) involves the intentional mistreatment of the targeted demographic.
We consider this stage to routinely involve the production of genocide by attrition and in Turkey,
this involved the spread of starvation, dehydration, illness, and disease amongst Armenians and
other targeted social groups, that accompanied beatings and forced marches. This stage aids in the
process of extermination (stage 9). Extermination describes the rapid and intentional mass murder
of victims or, in a sense, the creation of spaces and places absent of the perceived other. Table 1
outlines Stanton’s ten stages and includes a definition for each stage.
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Table 1. Stanton’s ten-stage model with definitions (Stanton 1998, 2013).

Sources and Methods
Geographical Sources
We searched numerous map collections, including those of the Library of Congress and the
Perry Castañeda Library at the University of Texas, for a map of Turkey dating between the mid1910s and the mid-1920s that was suitable for digitization, with accuracy and completeness levels
appropriate for our purposes. Our search proved fruitless for the years 1910 to 1920, but we were
able to locate suitable maps from before 1900 and after 1930. Figure 1 shows the administrative
boundaries of the Ottoman Empire in 1899 according to a map from the Library of Congress
collection.27 We used this map to compare the historical and current boundaries of Turkey.
For the period 1914 to 1923, we relied on Armenian genocide literature as a secondary source
to aid us in establishing the boundaries of the areas most affected by the genocide; however, even
within this relatively limited literature, we discovered disagreements in the location of provincial
boundaries. For example, Hewsen’s authoritative historical atlas of Armenia explicitly acknowledges
vagueness and inaccuracies where data were missing or were incomplete.28 Hovannisian’s work
includes a map of historic Armenian homelands, but its boundaries are difficult to read and at
times tentatively placed, and the map itself only shows the eastern provinces.29 Akçam’s book
on the Armenian genocide does not include maps,30 but a 2006 monograph by the same author
opens with a map by Ara Sarafian from the Gomidas Institute; however, as with other maps, the
boundaries appear uncertainly drawn.31 The Armenian National Institute’s maps illustrating the
Armenian genocide are by far the most detailed, but they primarily show the eastern provinces,
and again with a certain degree of uncertainty.32 Melkonian describes historical Armenia, from
27

R. Huber, “Empire Ottoman: Division Administrative,” Library of Congress, 1899, accessed October 10, 2015, https://
lccn.loc.gov/2007633930.
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29
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31
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Co., 2006).
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Figure 1. Ottoman Empire Administrative Divisions (1899).

Tbilisi to Erevan, as holding a population of 1.1 million Armenians, which coincides with
sources claiming that the eastern provinces of Turkey contained the highest concentration of this
population.33 In comparison, in his memoir, el-Ghusein claims that the number of Armenians
living in the entire Ottoman Empire did not exceed 1.9 million.34 These examples highlight the
uncertainty and ambiguity of sources related to the provincial boundaries of the Ottoman Empire
and the Armenian population in present-day Turkey at the time.
Due to the scarcity of primary geographic sources for the years 1914 to 1923 and the lack
of agreement amongst secondary sources, we combined maps created after the fact with readily
available contemporary GIS datasets. Taking advantage of free downloadable files from DIVAGIS,35 we then built a GIS of the entire region that includes modern-day Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and
surrounding countries. In the end, we created our own base map for use in the HGIS, acknowledging
a degree of uncertainty in the location of provincial boundaries where appropriate (Figure 2). Our
reconstruction is based on modern-day GIS layers of the region, maps from the literature, and
maps from the pre-genocidal era, such as the 1899 map from the Library of Congress collection
referenced above. In our reconstruction, we placed an emphasis on ensuring that villages referred
to in the Kazarian manuscript fell within the correct province.36
Data Sources
Making use of a rich collection of qualitative sources such as memoirs, oral histories, interviews, and
diaries, adds another dimension of detail to quantitative research of the type commonly associated
with GIS.37 In this case study, we use the historical manuscript written by Haigazn K. Kazarian
http://www.armenian-genocide.org/map-full.html.
33
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Figure 2. Map a. shows the modern borders for Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Map b. shows the modern province
boundaries for Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Map c. shows the 1914 province boundaries for Turkey and the base map for
our case study.

which covers the years 1914 to 1923 as a source to study the spatio-temporal patterns of the stages of
the Armenian genocide.38 Kazarian worked as a journalist in Constantinople during the Armenian
genocide and, later, served under the British with access to Turkish government documents. In its
original form, the manuscript consists of two main components: dates and narrative descriptions
of events recorded for each date. Kazarian recorded his perception and interpretation of events
based on newspaper articles; government edicts, decrees, and speeches; and personal accounts
from people returning to Constantinople from the countryside. The Armenian National Institute
in Washington, D.C. stands firmly behind the validity of the Kazarian manuscript as a reliable
source39 as do the Armenian Genocide Resource Center of Northern California and the University of
Minnesota Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, which both make the manuscript available
as a teaching resource. Kazarian himself wrote extensively on the Armenian experience in Turkey,
and scholars continue to reference him in their research.40
For our work, we began by entering the web version of the translated manuscript into
Microsoft Excel. We then added a geographical dimension by assigning the events described in
the narrative to one or more of six distinct geographical scales—village, district, province, region,
national, and global. We also assigned each event to a perpetrator level of participation at the
Geographer 67, no. 4 (2015), 541-554.
38
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micro, macro, and meso levels as explained earlier in the article.41 Finally, we added latitude and
longitude coordinates to the villages mentioned in the database and assigned the events described
in the manuscript to the appropriate genocide stage according to Stanton’s formulation (Figure
3). Once we began doing this, however, it quickly became apparent that rarely could an event be
encapsulated using only one stage; in fact, some events required as many as six stages for adequate
description. This, of course, confirms Stanton’s point that multiple stages occur concurrently
within a broad chronological narrative. Further complicating our work, some events included
more than one village, province, district, etc.; we handled this problem by creating one entry in the
dataset for each location mentioned during the description of a certain event. For example, some
events started at one location, traveled through a second one, and ended up somewhere else. In this
instance, we created three entries for one single event, each listing its location in the appropriate
geographical scale. Some entries described events that occurred simultaneously in two or more
locations; we handled these types of events in the same manner just described. We did experience
a relative degree of uncertainty with the data, as is usually the case with historical documents
used to create geographical databases.42 For example, if an event was described at the district,
regional, or province scale, we treated it as affecting the district, region, or province as a whole,
since specific locations were not available. This mode of analysis applies to the national scale as
well. If an event occurred on a national scale, then we treated it as if it occurred uniformly across
Turkey. We acknowledge the shortcoming of this technique but felt the contribution outweighed
the uncertainty and relative inaccuracy.

Figure 3. Transformation of the Kazarian manuscript into the GIS databases.

Analysis and Geovisualization
To gain a deeper understanding of the stages of the Armenian genocide, we grouped them
into three phases – A, B, and C: where we categorized phase A to include classification (stage
1), symbolization (stage 2), discrimination (stage 3), and dehumanization (stage 4). This phase
serves to create, identify, and isolate the perceived other. Phase B includes organization (stage 5),
polarization (stage 6), and preparation (stage 7), and works to define phase A and implement phase
C. Phase C consists of both persecution (stage 8) and extermination (stage 9), which results in the
destruction of the perceived other. We then graphed these phases by perpetrator level (Figure 4),
41
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noting a clear spike during 1915. This was to be expected as 1915 is the generally accepted beginning
year of the Armenian genocide, however, we found activity at all three levels beginning in 1914
(Figure 4 and Table 2). If other genocides follow suit, it is possible to look for early indicators of
genocide processes in anticipation of preventing the mass murder of targeted groups.

Figure 4. Graph of phase A, B, and C by macro, meso, and micro levels for year (1914-1923).

Table 2. Data by Phases.

For the first nine stages at all six scales, we accumulated 2243 total events (Table 3). As stated
earlier, we assigned up to six stages per event. For example, on October 17, 1914, the entry reads,
“bands of chetes begin looting, violating women and children, and large-scale murdering in
Erzerum province.”43 We assigned discrimination (stage 3), dehumanization (stage 4), organization
(stage 5), preparation (stage 7), persecution (stage 8), and extermination (stage 9) to this single event
that occurred at the province scale. This entry describes looting (stages 3 and 8), with the Armenian
population singled out for harassment and persecution, as well as the violation of women and
children (stages 4 and 8), which also served to dehumanize and persecute the victims. Organized
and government-sanctioned bands of chetes perpetrated the violence (stage 5) in preparation
(stage 7) for an escalation of violence that resulted in extermination (stage 9). This description of
events corroborates el-Ghusein’s description of witnessing women and children lying, dead or
dying, along the road between Urfa and Erzerum.44 This early entry indicates multiple stages of
genocidal processes working together in synthesis during a single event. In other words, we record
extermination, a later stage in the model, by a meso-level perpetrator at the province scale, early in
the Armenian genocide.
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Table 3. Stage Data by Scale.

At the village scale, we accumulated 1339 events that equated to 59.7 percent of the total
number of events recorded. The high percentage of events at the village scale indicates that
genocidal processes targeting and identifying victim groups was especially prevalent at this level.
At the district scale, the percentage falls to a mere 3.43 percent of the total events indicating that this
was a less important geographical scale, with comparably low rates at the regional (2.68 percent)
and global (5.3 percent) scale. However, both the provincial (12.17 percent) and national (16.72
percent) levels record a substantial number of events. Of note, in this analysis as well as others,
genocide appears to jump or skip geographical scales.45 Next, we take a closer look at the first nine
stages across all scales.
Classification (stage 1) makes up 20.15 percent of the total events and comes in as second only
to organization in the Kazarian manuscript. One example of a stage 1 entry at the village scale is that
dated October 10, 1914 which reads: “In Zeitun, all the Armenian notables are called to a meeting;
about three score attend and are immediately arrested.”46 We also assigned discrimination (stage
3), organization (stage 5), and persecution (stage 8) to this entry showing how stages can form a
symbiotic, mutually reinforcing relationship in the production of genocide. Because these stages
intertwine so closely, we cannot disentangle them easily. We also see that macro-level perpetrators
provide orders to meso-level perpetrators who carry out their instructions at the village scale.
This entanglement of scales and perpetrators is typical of genocidal processes and also occurred
frequently during the Holocaust.47
Symbolization (stage 2) makes up a little over 1 percent of total events, which is in stark
contrast to the Holocaust, an event in which Nazi propaganda played a key role.48 In the Armenian
case, even the minimal amount of symbolization produced was more insinuated than blatant. For
example, on September 30, 1914, Kazarian’s entry reads: “The government distributes arms to the
Muslim residents of the town of Keghi in Erzerum province on the excuse that the Armenians
there were unreliable.”49 Here, we also assigned organization (stage 5), polarization (stage 6), and
preparation (stage 7) to this entry. Early on (again, this is before 1915) in the genocide process,
we see macro-level perpetrators (the government) arming and inciting micro-level perpetrators
(individuals) at the village scale.
Discrimination (stage 3) accounts for about 5 percent of the total events across all scales.
On February 21, 1915, the entry reads: “An attack by chetes on the village of Purk near ShabinKarahisar results in looting, murder, rape.”50 Additionally, we assigned dehumanization (stage
45
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4), organization (stage 5), persecution (stage 8), and extermination (stage 9) to this entry. With this
event, we observed macro-level and meso-level perpetrators operating at the village level. The
meso-level militias also functioned with impunity given to them by the government.
Dehumanization (stage 4) makes up a little over 1.5 percent of the total events and includes
rape, torture, and hangings that served to demoralize victims and lessen them as human beings in
the eyes of the general population. On April 3, 1915, the entry reads: “(Easter week) mass arrests and
a search for weapons are carried out in Marash and Hadjin, with the seizure of all arms, including
household knives; numerous rapes during the house searches are reported.”51 Because this event
mentions two villages, we count it twice in the database – once for the village of Marash and
once for the village of Hadjin. In addition to dehumanization (stage 4), we assigned classification
(stage 1), discrimination (stage 3), organization (stage 5), and persecution (stage 8) to the event.
Interestingly, the perpetrators of these actions are not clearly identified, and could either be the
national military (macro-level), chetes militias (meso-level), or the local police and citizens (microlevel). As we see from this example, it is possible for all three perpetrator levels to operate at the
village scale.
Figures 5a – 5d illustrate these first four stages at the village scale. The symbol size represents
frequency, thus the larger the symbol, the more occurrences of that stage at that location.
Classification occurs across all provinces, but especially in the eastern provinces as expected.
However, both symbolization and dehumanization occur primarily in the eastern provinces and
do not extend to the rest of the country. Discrimination occurs in the eastern provinces with some
diffusion to the other provinces.
Organization (stage 5) makes up over a quarter of the total events at 28.18 percent. As expected,
this stage shows a clear and active pattern of government (macro-level) involvement in the overall
process of genocide, including in the capitol city of Constantinople. The stage includes arrests,
custody, deportations, and the intent to annihilate carried out by any or all of the perpetrator
levels. For example, the entry for June 3, 1915 states: “Ayub Bey, an arch-assassin, leaves Adana
for Aleppo in connection with organizing massacres.”52 Based on the entry, we also assigned
polarization (stage 6) and preparation (stage 7) to the event. This stage is where processes of
genocide by attrition become most prominent and intent is ambiguous at best. Without explicit
orders from the top, lower level perpetrators interpret these orders as they saw fit. Deportation
alone does not imply murder; however, when perpetrators interpret deportation to mean long,
hard marches through severe climates and hundreds of miles with no food, water, or supplies, then
large-scale death naturally is produced.
Polarization (stage 6) makes up only about two percent of the total events. One example of
polarization includes this entry from January 5, 1915:
The Turkish government publicly charges that Armenian bakers in the army bakeries of
Sivas were poisoning the bread of the Turkish forces; the bakers are cruelly beaten, despite
the fact that a group of doctors proves the charge to be false by examining the bread and
even eating it; as this marks an attempt on the part of the government to incite massacre, the
government does not rescind the charge.53

We also assigned classification (stage 1), symbolization (stage 2), organization (stage 5), and
persecution (stage 8) to this entry. At the village scale, we see an assertion of macro-level control in
an attempt to incite violence against a targeted group by all levels of perpetrators.
Preparation (stage 7) makes up almost 12 percent of the total events. This stage includes any
event that indicates the potential destruction of the Armenians. For instance, January 12, 1915 reads:
“Ahmed Muammer, the governor-general of Sivas province, orders the destruction of Tavra-Koy
and other strategically located villages around the city of Sivas to make future defense impossible
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Figure 5. a. Stage 1; b. Stage 2; c. Stage 3; d. Stage 4.

for the Armenians; inside the city of Sivas strategically located buildings were requisitioned.”54
We assigned organization (stage 5) and persecution (stage 8) to this event as well. Again, we see
the government’s top-down production of genocidal processes carried out at the village scale.
This event also provides an example of ambiguity. We do not know the exact villages included
in addition to Tavra-Koy and Sivas. Consequently, we do not include them in our database or
analysis.
Persecution (stage 8) makes up about 15.5 percent of the total events. This stage includes any
indication of escalation of violence, especially physical violence, against the victims as opposed
to material and property damage and destruction. On May 10, 1915, the entry reads: “The
Armenian refugees from Zeitun found in Marash, who had previously been spared deportation,
are removed to the Syrian Desert.”55 We also included classification (stage 1), organization (stage
5), preparation (stage 7), and extermination (stage 9). Although this entry does not specifically
mention murder, this offers another poignant example of genocide by attrition. The insinuation
here is that most Armenians will not survive the deportation process to the harsh Syrian desert;
thus, their numbers will be greatly reduced upon arrival, whereupon the survivors were promptly
executed. Morgenthau describes scenes of victims dead or dying from violence, starvation, and
exhaustion along the road in his memoir.56 He argues that Turkish policy specifically provided for
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extermination disguised as deportation, with death through attrition culling the number of victims
along the way.
Figures 6a – 6d visualize the dispersion of stages 5 through 8. Organization, preparation,
and persecution display dispersed locations across the country indicating that these stages play
a pivotal role in the processes of genocide as a whole. Polarization though is concentrated in the
eastern provinces where most Armenians lived.57
57

Melkonian, Javakhk: Historical Outline.

Figure 6. a. Stage 5 Organization; b. Stage 6 Polarization; c. Stage 7 Preparation; d. Stage 8.

Lastly, extermination (stage 9) places third in the overall percentage with 15.5 percent of total
events. On March 1, 1916, the entry reads: “The Interior Ministry is informed from Aleppo that the
Armenians who fled from Mardin had been killed.”58 We also assigned classification (stage 1) and
organization (stage 5) to this entry. This event illustrates the depth of government involvement at
all scales, but especially at the village scale. Figure 7 shows the dispersion of extermination at the
village scale. Extermination is a widespread stage and illustrates the intensity of the killing across
the country.

58
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Figure 7. Stage 9 Extermination.

Discussion
In this article, we examine the spatio-temporal patterns of the Armenian genocide by stages. This
allows us to conduct a structured investigation of the event and informs our understanding of
possible clustering and diffusion processes that occurred during the genocide. This approach
is designed to complement previous analyses organized around subjects such as the number of
deaths by location, population, demographics, or the effects of specific polices. Moreover, these
types of analyses are not conducive to the type of holistic approach we are interested in applying
to the Armenian genocide.
The stage model of genocide offers several advantages. First, stages are a coherent method for
describing the progression of genocide and allows for the exploration of large datasets of the type
described in our case study. These stages help us organize and categorize the steps undertaken to
destroy a targeted section of the population intentionally. Second, analysis by stages permits us
to consider the genocide in its entirety from start to finish, unlike the recording of death statistics
by location, which offers only a glimpse of the larger destruction of victim groups that took place
dynamically over significant periods of time. By deconstructing genocide into smaller, quantifiable
stages, we gain a unique view when compared to the whole-event perspective. In addition, this
dissection is vital because it still allows us to present genocide as a complex process and to account
for the dynamics of genocide by attrition. Our approach permits a perspective where the intent to
kill, expressed or implied, is as fundamental to the process of genocide as the firing squad. We are
thus able to examine where and when genocide by attrition processes start and how they diffuse
across the country. We also assess the varying roles of perpetrators from the macro to micro levels,
while still acknowledging the general progression of genocidal stages as events unfold. Third,
there is no precedent in the literature for using a stage model in spatial analyses of genocide, but
there have been calls for a deeper understanding of the structure and processes of genocide events.
While each genocide is unique, there are fundamental similarities that allowed for the construction
of general models. By deconstructing the whole event into stages based on location, we can open
a dialog about how the processes are catalyzed, how they progress, and perhaps, what interrupts
or disrupts them.
Our analysis shows clearly that all stages operate at varying levels throughout a genocide event.
We saw clear examples of extermination early in 1914 while still seeing signs of classification much
later in the genocide. Stanton’s argument that his proposed stages interact and overlap dynamically
then holds true, and we can argue there is no sequence of stages, but rather intensity levels that
vary to construct genocidal processes. Within this context, it is clear that the stage of organization
plays a quite significant role, thus exemplifying the key role that government participation plays
in genocidal processes and the recurring theme of top-down authority structures bringing about
genocide. Furthermore, in the Armenian case we witness the vital roles mid-level and meso-level
perpetrators play in carrying out the genocidal directives of a central government. Seemingly, it
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takes the effective cooperation of all three perpetrator levels to implement and see through the
extermination of a select group of people, with perpetration at the village or local geographical
scale being especially key.
When assigning stages to events, we noticed that some events described in the Kazarian
manuscript did not easily conform to Stanton’s model. Cultural genocide appears very frequently
in the events described, yet we lacked a stage to describe them. For instance, we see examples of
Armenian monasteries burned, crosses destroyed and replaced by crescents, Turkish emigrants
replacing Armenian villagers in ancestral homes, and forced Islamization.59 El-Ghusein describes
Turkish emigrants from Roumelia moving into Zeitun to replace the Armenians,60 and there is
also the widespread case of Armenian orphans turned over to Turkish families. All of these events
contribute to the erasure of a culture from the landscape, and their effects persist long after actual
killing events cease. Therefore, we advocate the addition of a stage to the current ten-stage model,
encompassing and capturing events designed to destroy the culture of victim groups in order to
describe more fully the Armenian genocide.
We found other events that Kazarian described that no stage adequately captured, including the
roles of bystanders and roles of victims that the literature argues are under-represented and understudied.61 Within the manuscript, we see victims encouraging cooperation with the demands and
abuses, and we see dissent and violence perpetrated against the Turks.62 For example, el-Ghusein
describes a scene at Urfa where the Armenians refused to surrender their weapons and resisted
arrest by killing several of the soldiers.63 Balakian further corroborates participation by bystanders,
such as United States Ambassador Morgenthau, and acknowledges resistance by Armenian victims
in Zeitun.64 Perhaps a set of victim indicators could help with the anticipation of the escalation of
violence toward mass murder and genocide.
Bystanders on the global scale play a very active role in Kazarian’s manuscript, especially with
World War I as the backdrop to the Armenian genocide. We see examples of German attempts at
controlling the carnage as well as ambassadors and soldiers reporting atrocities to their superiors,
although Morgenthau reports that the Germans did little to stop the killing, at times even actively
encouraging the maltreatment of Armenians.65 Instances of newspaper reports and aid from the
global community to Turkey are also mentioned in Kazarian’s manuscript.66 Overall, the global
community appeared critical of the Turks’ treatment of Armenians and other minority groups;
however, the Turkish government largely ignored such protestations and continued to proceed
with their genocidal actions.
Conclusion
This article employs a mixed methods approach by combining HGIS quantitative tools and a
qualitative historical manuscript to augment the current literature on genocide and mass murder
events. This approach helps bridge a divide in the quantitative-versus-qualitative narrative by
benefiting from the strengths of each while attempting to minimize their weaknesses. Geographers
and historians benefit from the emergence of HGIS and, through a multidisciplinary approach,
gain a better understanding of genocidal events—such as the Holocaust67—through the integration
of a spatial component to explore and expand causal relationships.68 This project presents a
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geographer’s method to a comingled geohumanities topic using GIScience techniques to study
the validity of a stage-based approach to genocide when describing the processes and structures
of genocidal events. We approach HGIS projects with full awareness of our presuppositions, and
are determined to allow the empirical spatial data to guide our analytical process, regardless of
whether the results align with or contradict our preexisting understandings of the Armenian
genocide.
Our examination of the Armenian genocide is based on the Kazarian manuscript69 and our
extraction of geospatial information from this personal narrative is framed according to Stanton’s
stage model of genocide.70 The mixed-method approach to a spatial understanding of the Armenian
genocide contributes to the literature in more than one way. Kwan and Ding argue that GIS
techniques serve to validate the information garnered from qualitative sources such as historical
documents and manuscripts.71 Our visualization of stage events during the Armenian genocide
substantiates evidence in the literature demonstrating that Turkish efforts concentrated the brunt
of their efforts to eliminate the Armenian population within the eastern portion of Turkey. We also
observed widely diffused processes at work, in particular the stage of organization (stage 5), which
was prevalent across scale and perpetrator-levels.
A process-based understanding of genocide helps guide our research, as encouraged by
Rosenberg, especially the concept of genocide by attrition.72 In our study, we found evidence of
genocide by attrition in Kazarian’s manuscript: the process of issuing government orders to clear
an area, for example, lends itself to a means of deniability at the macro-level through interpretation
by mid-level or meso-level perpetrators who allow disease, distance, dehydration, starvation, and
harsh environments to exterminate their victims. Genocide by attrition thus provides a framework
that helps us identify intent where denial abounds.73
In this article, we illustrate one method of exploring genocide in conjunction with HGIS by
using a case study. Case studies typically examine one incident or example of an event at a certain
time. In the social sciences, researchers use case studies often and extensively, and we argue that
case studies are becoming an increasingly useful tool in multi-disciplinary research.74 However,
case studies do present their own set of disadvantages: for example, drawing definitive conclusions
from a single case study is difficult, if not often impossible. But, as Yin argues, a single case study
can add to the literature by challenging, extending, or confirming theoretical assumptions.75 Case
studies provide a reliable and valid method of studying phenomena, and they offer an alternative
to a group focus, or in our case, a whole-event focus.76
Using a case study in HGIS is predicated upon the availability of large datasets and is a long,
complicated, and often tedious process. The datasets, however large they might be, are necessarily
incomplete and contains an unavoidable element of uncertainty and inaccuracy, with the
associated problems of drawing specific conclusions from them. For this reason, we recommend
using geographic datasets of historical events, such as the Armenian genocide, to make general
observations about a specific event: HGIS is for the identification of spatio-temporal patterns rather
than the localized knowledge of a single fact. We, therefore, argue that a handful of errors does not
change the overall patterns observed in our analysis of the Armenian genocide as recorded in the
Kazarian manuscript; rather, the results of the analysis provide a framework within which single
facts can be placed with the objective of examining how individual events relate to other events,
both temporally (see Figure 4) and spatially (see Figures 5, 6, and 7). The Kazarian manuscript
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69

Kazarian, A Chronology.

70

See Stanton, “The Eight Stages of Genocide”; Stanton, “The Ten Stages of Genocide.”

71

Mei-Po Kwan and Guoxiang Ding, “ Geo-Narrative: Extending Geographic Information Systems for Narrative Analysis
in Qualitative and Mixed-Method Research,” Professional Geographer 60, no. 4 (2008), 443-465.

72

Rosenberg, “Genocide is a Process.”

73

See Fein, “Genocide by Attrition”; Rosenberg, “Genocide is a Process.”

74

See e.g. Knowles, Cole and Giordano, Geographies of the Holocaust.

75

Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2013).

76

Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2006), 219-245.

©2016

Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.3

Spatiality of the Stages of Genocide

55

provides a glimpse into 1914 Turkey through the eyes of an Armenian journalist that documented
events he read or heard about; as such, it can be employed both as documentary material and as a
case study that allows us the usefulness of genocide stage models.
Stage-based models break down genocide events into processes or phases in an attempt
to move towards eventual prevention. Shaw argues for a focus on this structure for genocide
research.77 In this study, we observed notable acts of violence that occurred before the historically
recognized start of the Armenian genocide in 1915. By monitoring pre-cursor events in places atrisk for genocide and reacting without hesitation, prevention may become feasible.78 Furthermore,
by combining perpetrator-level activities with Stanton’s stage-based model of genocide we
concluded that the village scale was the most significant scale for the diffused processes involved
in the removal and destruction of minority ethnic groups in Turkey. Most importantly, we found
that all three perpetrator-levels worked across multiple geographic scales to carry out the genocide
event. Each perpetrator thus played a crucial role in the overall process toward the common goal
of creating a homogenous state.
As with other HGIS projects, uncertainty and ambiguity pervades our historical data and
sources.79 However, we believe that despite this lack of certainty, certain general spatial and
temporal conclusions can be drawn concerning the Armenian genocide. These conclusions relate
to the visualization and spatial relationships between processes involved in this genocide, relevant
locations, and the period of time during which it took place.80 Through HGIS, we compiled historic
source material into geospatial databases that are expandable, verifiable, and sharable for further
research possibilities. In this article, we have not analyzed the full scale of the forced migration
events that took place during the Armenian genocide due to length constraints. In future work,
however, we plan on delving into a deeper analysis of this mass forced migration including the
flow of migration along routes through the desert and the various effects of this migration on
the victims. We intend to further explore the role of genocide by attrition through these forced
marches using witness testimony to further corroborate the Kazarian manuscript and verify areas
of uncertainty or ambiguity within the current dataset. We argue that collaboration is an essential
part of successful HGIS projects and advocate for more multi-disciplinary research to foster an
exchange of ideas and techniques.
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Abstract: This article compares sentencing of those convicted of participation in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
With over one million people facing trial, Rwanda constitutes the world’s most comprehensive case of criminal
accountability after genocide and presents an important case study of punishing genocide. Criminal courts at three
different levels— international, domestic, and local—sought justice in the aftermath of the violence. In order to
compare punishment at each level, we analyze an unprecedented database of sentences given by the ICTR, the
Rwandan domestic courts, and Rwanda’s Gacaca courts. The analysis demonstrates that sentencing varied across
the three levels—ranging from limited time in prison to death sentences. We likewise find that sentencing at the
domestic courts appears to have been comparatively more serious than sentencing at the ICTR and at the Gacaca
courts, which calls into question the consistency of sentences across levels of justice and should be explored in future
research.
Keywords: punishment, genocide, Rwanda, ICTR, Gacaca, sentencing, transitional justice
Introduction
On April 6, 1994, unknown assailants assassinated Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana by
shooting down his plane. The plane crash and the resulting assassination served as what many
experts term the “genocidal spark,” and extreme violence subsequently unfolded across the
country. The violence largely subsided by mid-July, when the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front
brought an end to the genocide. Within just a few months, between 500,000 and one million people
had been killed, hundreds of thousands of people had been victims of sexual violence, and millions
were displaced. While political elites within the Hutu-dominated government orchestrated and led
this violence, many civilians also took part in the genocide. By some estimates, several hundred
thousand Rwandan civilians participated in the killings,1 and an even greater number participated
in the destruction of property.2
In the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda and the international community grappled with
how to bring suspected perpetrators to justice. In November 1994, the United Nations Security
Council issued a resolution creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in
order to try those responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Due to
limited resources and a very limited mandate, however, the ICTR was unable to prosecute the
hundreds of thousands of people suspected of involvement in the genocide. Instead, the Tribunal
tried only a limited number of relatively high-ranking individuals, such as representatives of the
government or powerful clergy and business elites. This highly selective focus meant that the new
government of Rwanda was left with hundreds of thousands of suspected génocidaires within the
country. After deliberation, the Rwandan government decided to try these individuals through
two separate court systems: 1) the existing domestic court system, which was progressively meant
to try suspected participants who had relatively high levels of responsibility, and 2) a local court
1
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system called Inkiko Gacaca, which was given authority to try the majority of participants in local
trials throughout the country.
This article compares sentencing of those convicted of genocide and other crimes at these
three different judicial systems—the ICTR, the Rwandan domestic courts, and the Rwandan
Gacaca courts. With approximately one million people facing trial, Rwanda arguably constitutes
the world’s most comprehensive case of criminal accountability after genocide. It thus presents
an important case study of punishment following genocide. Yet, to our knowledge, few studies
compare these three court systems,3 and no studies examine sentencing laws and practices across
the three systems.
In what follows, we assess sentencing laws and practices at the ICTR, the Rwandan domestic
courts, and the Gacaca courts through the analysis of an original, unprecedented database. We
begin by briefly introducing the three court systems and outlining their development over time.
We then describe the database, its limitations, and the descriptive analysis we employ to compare
sentencing. Next, we provide an overview of the sentencing laws at the ICTR and in Rwanda,
including the factors that were considered during sentencing according to positive law and case
law. Finally, we compare the severity of sentences given by the three justice mechanisms.
This analysis demonstrates that sentencing varied across the three levels—ranging from
limited time in prison to death sentences and indicating that those convicted of genocide are
not necessarily subjected to similar or severe sentences. We likewise find that sentencing at the
domestic courts was comparatively more serious than sentencing at the ICTR and at the Gacaca
courts, suggesting that those deemed most responsible and tried at the ICTR were not subjected
to the most severe penalties. This calls into question the consistency of sentencing of genociderelated crimes across the three levels of justice. Finally, we find that sentencing laws and practices
for genocide-related crimes in Rwanda became less retributive over time, which we link to highly
interconnected principled (e.g., reconciliation) and pragmatic (e.g., overcrowded prisons) reasons.
Three Levels of Justice After Genocide
People accused of committing crimes during the 1994 genocide and the 1990-1994 civil war in
Rwanda were prosecuted, tried, and sentenced at three levels of justice: (i) the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); (ii) the domestic courts in Rwanda; and (iii) the local Gacaca
courts.4 We begin by reviewing each of these court systems.
3
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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
A fraction of those deemed most responsible for the violence were tried at the ICTR. The ICTR was
established by the United Nations Security Council on November 8, 1994,5 in order to “put an end to
[genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian
law]; […] bring to justice [those] responsible […] and […] contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”6 Its jurisdiction was limited to crimes
committed in Rwanda and neighboring states between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994.
Despite initially supporting the establishment of an international tribunal, Rwanda voted
against the Security Council Resolution establishing the ICTR, citing four main reasons: the ICTR’s
restrictive temporal jurisdiction (i.e., not including events that occurred before 1994); its location
outside of Rwanda and related lack of opportunity for Rwanda to influence the functioning of the
Tribunal and the selection of its officials; the fact that sentences would be served outside of Rwanda;
and, finally, the exclusion of the death penalty as a possible sentence.7 Nevertheless, the Tribunal
was established in Arusha, Tanzania, and issued its first indictment on November 22, 1995.8 The
first judgment at the ICTR, and the first conviction for genocide ever issued by an international
court, was delivered on September 2, 1998. Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former teacher, school inspector,
and mayor of Taba commune, was sentenced to life imprisonment for his participation in killings
and acts of sexual violence during the genocide.9
In total, 53 judges from various countries served at the ICTR, either in one of the three trial
chambers or in the appeals chamber. Judges were selected by the UN General Assembly from lists
submitted by the Security Council for a term of four years and were eligible for re-election.10 More
than three quarters of the ICTR judges were men, and most judges were from Africa (34 percent)
and Europe (34 percent).
The ICTR was operational for over twenty years and closed its doors on December 14,
2015, after delivering its last verdict in the Butare case against six defendants, including Pauline
Nyiramasuhuko, the former Minister for Family Welfare and the Advancement of Women and
the only woman convicted of genocide at the ICTR.11 In total, the ICTR indicted 90 individuals
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and/or genocide.12 It prosecuted government ministers,
regional and local politicians, military leaders, and members of the Interahamwe militia that was
active during the genocide. A number of prominent businessmen, clergymen, and representatives
of media that spread hate propaganda were also indicted. In total, 73 individuals were tried
and received a verdict;13 and of these, 14 were acquitted and 59 were convicted. Almost all ICTR
RPF have been tried by the domestic courts. Specifically, fewer than 40 RPF soldiers were tried in domestic courts,
and most received comparatively lenient sentences. The Gacaca courts did not try any members of the RPF, as the
laws governing the courts omitted reference to war crimes, which made clear that Gacaca was not to try RPF crimes
(Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Justice after Genocide, 20 Years On (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2014), 12). A
limited number of individuals were also tried by courts on the basis of universal jurisdiction in several European
countries and Canada.
5
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under those transferred to serve a sentence and again under those who have already served their sentence).

13

The remaining 17 defendants had their cases referred to domestic courts in France or Rwanda, had their indictments
withdrawn, or never received a final judgment due to death or remaining at large. For a more detailed discussion
of those indicted by the ICTR, see Barbora Hola, Alette Smeulers, “ICTR and Rwanda – Facts and Figures,” in Elgar
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convicts—52 out of 59 (88 percent)—were found guilty of genocide, and all were convicted of
participation in killings and other offenses against persons.14
Domestic Courts in Rwanda
The domestic courts trying génocidaires in Rwanda were part of a pre-existing court system
that had been operational long before the genocide occurred. As the crime of genocide did not
exist within Rwanda’s criminal code, however, Rwanda enacted a law, known as Organic Law
08/96, to regulate genocide-related prosecutions.15 The Organic Law (OL) established Specialized
Chambers within the existing domestic courts to try genocide-related crimes.16 The Specialized
Chambers were given jurisdiction over genocide and crimes against humanity committed since
October 1, 1990 (as well as offenses set out in the Penal Code committed “in connection with the
events surrounding the genocide and crimes against humanity”).17
The OL initially categorized offenders into four categories. Category 1 suspects included
planners and organizers of the genocide, those who committed crimes through a position of state
authority, notorious murderers who killed with a particular zeal and cruelty, and perpetrators
of sexual violence. Category 2 encompassed those who participated in killings, while Category
3 included those who committed other forms of physical violence. Finally, Category 4 suspects
included those who participated in crimes against property, although subsequent OLs dealing
with genocide-related trials modified the groups falling under each category. Most notably, the OL
16/2004—which also governed functioning of the Gacaca courts—reduced the number of categories
to three.18 Category 2 and 3 defendants—those who participated in crimes against persons—were
merged into one category (Category 2), and those who committed offenses against property became
Category 3.19 Punishments were to be commensurate with the crime committed, such that those in
Category 1 were to receive harsher punishments than those in Category 2.
Despite the new laws, the Rwandan judicial system was in ruins in the aftermath of the
genocide, as it lacked qualified personnel and material infrastructure.20 Tens of thousands of
genocide suspects were detained in prisons and improvised detention facilities with deplorable
conditions and little access to basic hygiene, food, or healthcare.21 By 1998, an estimated 120,000
inmates accused of genocide-related crimes were awaiting trial in the overcrowded prisons.22
However, the pace of justice was slow. Many nongovernmental organizations lamented the initial
Companion to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), eds. Alette Smeulers and Annemarie de Brouwer,
(Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2016, forthcoming).
14

In total, nine defendants pleaded guilty and confessed to their crimes. Among the seven individuals who were not
found guilty of genocide, four pleaded guilty to charges of crimes against humanity, and three others were convicted
of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Note that every individual convicted by the ICTR who was found guilty
of war crimes was also found guilty of either genocide or crimes against humanity.

15

Organic Law (OL) 08/96 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes
against Humanity Committed since October 1, 1990, adopted on August 30, 1996.

16

Art. 19 OL 08/96.

17

Art. 1 OL 08/96.

18

OL 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with
Prosecuting and Trying Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity, Committed
between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, adopted on June 19, 2004.

19

The OL 08/96 established a precedent for subsequent specific laws, which were issued for the sole purpose of dealing
with perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity committed between October 1, 1990, and December
31, 1994. This was purposefully a broader jurisdiction than the ICTR in order to try those involved in planning the
genocide as well as those involved in attacks after the genocide was declared over in July 1994. The OL 08/96 also
included reference to war crimes and the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians. As noted above,
however, war crimes (and especially those allegedly committed by the RPF) were prosecuted in Rwanda only
to a very limited extent. The 2004 OL, which simultaneously regulated prosecutions of genocide at the domestic
courts and at the Gacaca courts, specifically ommitted any reference to war crimes and the Geneva Conventions and
consequently excluded trials of RPF crimes.

20

Cf. Human Rights Watch: Law and Reality. Progress in Judicial Reform in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008),
12.

21

Carina Tertsakian, Le Chateau, The Lives of Prisoners in Rwanda (London: Arves Bookes, 2008), 34.

22

Jones, The Courts of Genocide, 83.
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genocide prosecutions’ low standards, including a lack of fundamental fair trial guarantees,
corruption, and poor implementation of the right to defense.23
Substantial changes were implemented over time, culminating in the 2004 judicial sector reform.
The Specialized Chambers that had been created to try genocide-related crimes were abolished in
2000, and the national courts where the chambers had been located were given the authority to
try genocide cases.24 Specifically, following the 2004 judicial reform, fifteen courts had jurisdiction
over genocide-related crimes: the Supreme Court, five High Courts, and nine Higher Instance
Courts (as of 2008, the number of Higher Instance Courts—now called Intermediate Courts—had
increased to twelve). The decisions of the Higher Instance/Intermediate Courts could be appealed
to the High Courts, and under certain circumstances, a request for review could even be lodged
at the Supreme Court. Arguably, the standards applied in genocide-related trials improved as a
consequence of these reforms.25
As official court statistics regarding the initial genocide prosecutions are unavailable, it is
difficult to provide an accurate overview of cases tried by the domestic courts. According to Martin
Ngoga—the Deputy Prosecutor General of Rwanda at the time—approximately 4,122 individuals
were judged by the end of 2001.26 Jones reports that an additional 2,335 individuals were tried in
2002 and 2003,27 and the United Nations suggests that the Rwandan domestic courts had tried
over 10,000 individuals by mid-2006.28 In 2005, the vast majority of genocide-related cases were
transferred to the Gacaca courts, however, and the domestic courts only retained jurisdiction over
Category 1 cases.29 Consequently, as of 2005, the number of the cases tried by the domestic courts
dropped to no more than a few hundred.
Gacaca Courts in Rwanda
Finally, as noted above, cases were also tried in localized Gacaca courts due to the enormity of the
caseload of suspected perpetrators. Gacaca courts date back to before Rwanda was colonized.30
Gacaca means “grass” in Kinyarwanda, and, as the name implies, traditional hearings took
place outside in school yards, empty market places, and other public spaces within Rwandan
communities. Respected men presided over these hearings,31 which typically dealt with petty
crimes and emphasized restitution and community reconciliation.32 After the genocide, however,
the institution changed significantly.33 The new courts—called Inkiko Gacaca (shortened hereinafter
23

Cf. Mark Drumbl, “Rule of Law amid Lawlessness: Counselling the Accused in Rwanda’s Domestic Genocide Trials,”
29 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 29 (1998), 550; Human Rights Watch, Rwanda Justice after Genocide 20 Years On, 6;
International Crisis Group, Five Years after the Genocide in Rwanda: Justice in Question ( ICG Report Rwanda No. 1, April
7, 1999), 15.

24

Art. 96 OL 40/2000 Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime
of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, adopted on
January 26, 2001.

25

Cf. Organic Law 07/2004 Determining the Organization, Functioning and Jurisdiction of Courts in Republic of Rwanda,
adopted on February 1, 2004; Jones, The Courts of Genocide, 93-93.

26

Martin Ngoga, Rwanda 10 Years After the Genocide: Creating Conditions for Justice and Reconciliation. Prosecutor’s
Colloqium, November 25-27, 2004, accessed March 30, 2016, doi: http://ictr-archive09.library.cornell.edu/ENGLISH/
colloquium04/rwanda.html.

27

Jones, The Courts of Genocide, 88.

28

UN Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide and the United Nations, Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda.
Background Note (2012), accessed April 1, 2016, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgjustice.
shtml>.

29

In 2008, the vast majority of Category 1 cases were transferred to Gacaca courts, and only those deemed the most
responsible for the violence were to be tried at domestic courts.

30

Paul Christoph Bornkamm, Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Between Retribution and Reparation, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2012), 33.

31

Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 52.

32

The Gacaca courts became an officially sanctioned court system for common crimes in the 1940s.

33

As detailed by the Government, the Gacaca courts had five key objectives. These include the following: (1) identifying
the truth about what happened during the genocide; (2) increasing the speed of ongoing trials; (3) fighting a culture

©2016

Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.3

64

Hola and Nyseth Brehm

to Gacaca)—had direct links to the state, which mandated their creation through the same Organic
Laws that are noted above.
Per Organic Law, Rwandans elected lay members of their communities to preside over
the Gacaca courts as judges known as inyangamugayo, which loosely translates to “trustworthy
person” or “person of integrity.” Legal training was not required to serve in this capacity. Rather,
inyangamugayo had to be 21 years old, could not have prior criminal convictions or have participated
in the genocide, and could not have held a position of authority within the government at the
time of election.34 More than 250,000 men and women were chosen through a series of community
elections and were subsequently briefly trained.
Gacaca courts were operational at both the cell (akagari) and sector (umurenge) levels of Rwandan
geographic administration. Courts at the cell level were responsible for trying people who were
accused of Category 3 crimes (i.e., crimes against property), while courts at the sector level were
responsible for Categories 1 (as of 2008) and 2 as well as appeals. In total, there were 9,013 cell courts,
1,545 sector courts, and 1,545 courts of appeal.35 Each level of court consisted of a general assembly,
a bench of judges, a president, and a coordinating committee.36 Community participation was a
duty,37 and members of the community were expected to attend all trials, which typically occurred
on a weekly basis. These Gacaca court trials took place in communities throughout Rwanda until
June 2012, when the courts closed. According to the official report of the National Service of Gacaca
Courts, the Gacaca courts prosecuted 1,003,227 individuals in 1,958,634 cases during this time.38
Methodology
To assess punishment laws and practices at the ICTR, the Rwandan domestic courts, and the Gacaca
courts, we rely upon content analysis of the positive law and case law as well as descriptive analyses
of the severity of trial sentences given by the courts. We begin by providing an overview of the laws
governing sentencing. This legal analysis draws upon the ICTR Statute, its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, the ICTR case law, and the Rwanda’s Organic Laws, which governed both the domestic
court trials for genocide as well as the Gacaca court trials.
After briefly analyzing judges’ sentencing discretion per law, including whether judges were
instructed to take any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances into account when determining
sentences, we turn to a comparison of the sentences given in each of the three court systems.
This comparison relies upon descriptive statistics of the sentencing outcomes at each level, and
we restrict our analysis to defendants who committed comparable crimes. Given the position of
authority and the relative involvement of many of the defendants at the ICTR, they would have
all been classified as Category 1 defendants in Rwanda. Therefore, we first provide a comparison
of sentences issued by the ICTR, sentences issued by domestic courts in Category 1 cases, and
sentences issued by the Gacaca courts in Category 1 cases. As we detail below, the domestic courts
also tried Category 2 defendants,39 and we thus also compare Category 2 sentences in the domestic
courts and in the Gacaca courts.
of impunity; (4) contributing to the national unity and reconciliation process; and, (5) demonstrating the capacity of
the Rwandan people to resolve their problems (National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, Report on the Activities of the
Gacaca Courts, 2012).
34

Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, “Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,” 336.

35

National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions, Report on the Activities of the Gacaca Courts, 5.

36

Lawyers did not participate in the trials, ostensibly to avoid adversarial proceedings, and there were no prosecutorial
teams.

37

Art. 29, OL 16/2004.

38

Nyseth Brehm, Uggen, and Gasanabo, “Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,” 336.

39

Again, after the establishment of Gacaca, the OL provided the domestic courts with jurisdiction to deal only with
Category 1 cases, and all other cases were to be transferred to Gacaca. Surprisingly, however, the majority of cases we
collected at domestic courst decided after 2005 concerned Category 2 defendants. In some instances, judges dismissed
the cases on this basis; in other instances, however, they proceeded to rule on the case irrespective of the fact that the
case was classifed as Category 2. As such, it is possible that some of these indivdiuals were classifed as Category 1 by
the Gacaca and transferred to the ordinary courts, which re-categorized these defendants as Category 2 but proceeded
with trials notwithstanding.
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To compare across these three jurisdictions, we focus on trial judgments, meaning we do
not take appeal decisions into account. Although the Gacaca data include appeals trials (which
constituted 14 percent of all trials held by the courts), it is not possible to match first trials with
subsequent appeals with certainty at this point in time.40 Thus, we compare first trials across the
three jurisdictions in order to achieve the most consistent comparison possible. This accords well
with the data collected at the domestic courts, which were mostly trial judgments, and allows
us to assess sentences given at the same instance in the judicial process rather than comparing a
first sentence in Gacaca against an appeals judgment in the domestic courts or the ICTR. Beyond
this, sentencing primarily occurred during the trial phase at each of the three jurisdictions; and
as a minority of convicted individuals sought appeals,41 taking appeals into account would also
necessitate an analysis of the factors that determined a successful appeal, which is beyond the
scope of this article.
While a person could only appear once at the ICTR or in the domestic courts, someone could
have multiple trials in the Gacaca courts. For instance, if a person was accused of a Category 1
crime and a Category 2 crime, he or she was tried in two separate cases. Similarly, if people were
accused of crimes in more than one sector, they were tried in separate cases in each sector. While
it is possible to collapse cases across people (results available upon request from the second
author, Hollie Nyseth Brehm), Gacaca courts typically did not engage one another but rather made
sentencing decisions separately. Because of this, we analyze each person’s distinct trial separately
rather than combining sentences. For instance, if someone was sentenced to 19 years in one court
and 17 years in another, they would appear twice in the dataset, as this most accurately captures
sentencing decisions.
Data
To assess punishments given by the ICTR, we coded and analyzed all trial chamber judgments
issued by the ICTR during its mandate. These judgments are published in English on the Tribunal’s
website. We distinguish between life imprisonment sentences (the maximum) and determinate
sentences, which we further divided into 6 categories: 1-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years,
21-25 years, and more than 26 years. In total, the ICTR trial chambers convicted and handed out
sentences to 64 individuals.42
The case files used to analyze the practices of domestic courts in Rwanda were collected during
fieldwork in Rwanda in 2014 and 2015. As genocide-related cases are archived in physical copies
at the respective courts that decided each case, we visited each of these courts and sought access to
its archive.43 However, the case files at individual courts were often missing44 or incomplete. Some,
40

Many of the individuals who appealed the judgment had multiple trials, and abbreviated Gacaca records did not note
which appeal corresponded to which judgment, unfortunately.

41

At the ICTR, however, over 80 percent of trial judgments (60 cases) were appealed. In less than half of these appeals (29
individuals, or 48.3 percent), the Appeals Chamber confirmed the decision of trial judges, and there was no change
in the overall verdict (conviction or acquittal) or sentence length. In 27 instances (45 percent), the Appeals Chamber
modified the trial verdict to the benefit of the defendant by either lowering the sentence (22 cases) or acquitting the
individual (5 cases). In four cases (6.7 percent), the suspects received a higher penalty upon appeal.

42

Five individuals (Justin Mugenzi, Prosper Mugiraneza, Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Francois-Xavier Nzuwonemeye and
Protais Zigiranyirazo) were, however, subsequently acquitted on appeal. See Prosecutor v Justin Mugenzi and Prosper
Mugiraneza, Appeals Chamber Judgment, February 4, 2013, ICTR-99-50-A; Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana,
Francois-Xavier Nzuwonemeye and Innocent Sagahutu, Appeals Chamber Judgment, February 11, 2014, ICTR-00-56-A;
Prosecutor v. Protais Zigiranyirazo, Appeals Chamber Judgment, November 16, 2009, ICTR-01-73-A.

43

In order to secure maximal comparability of the data, the fieldwork initially aimed to collect only cases decided by
Rwandan domestic courts after the establishment of Gacaca in 2005, as sentencing at both Gacaca and domestic courts
was governed by the same OLs. We obtained access to cases involving 353 of the individuals tried between 2005 and
2014.

44

According to the Supreme Court’s annual reports, the domestic courts decided cases involving 567 individuals in the
period between 2005 and 2012. (See The Republic of Rwanda: Supreme Court: RAPORO, Y’IBIKORWA BY’URWEGO
RW’UBUCAMANZA, 2004-2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013, on file with authors.) The difference in the reported and
collected cases decided by domestic courts as of 2005 could be ascribed to over-reporting in the official statistics and/
or weak archiving practices. Thus, given the difficulty in obtaining complete records, we decided to modify our
strategy and began collecting all genocide-related cases made available to us, irrespective of the year of the verdict.
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for example, contained only an appeal or a review judgment without a first instance decision or
only the trial judgment without any subsequent decisions. We have, nonetheless, collected and
coded all judgments that were made available to us. This means that we seldom gained access
to all documents mapping the complete trajectory of all individuals through the justice system
(i.e., indictment, trial judgment, appeals judgment, and eventual review), though the majority of
the documents collected were trial judgments. In total, we collected and coded cases concerning
651 individuals tried between 1995 and 2014. In addition, we coded all judgments published by
Avocats Sans Frontiéres concerning the cases of 528 individuals decided between 1997 and 2005.
We have thus collected case files concerning 1,179 individuals tried at domestic courts. Out of these,
we have analyzed 871 individual verdicts issued by first instance courts. For the remaining 308
individuals, we collected only the appeals or review judgments; they are consequently excluded
from our analysis in order to facilitate comparison with Gacaca data.
With respect to Gacaca judgments, we draw upon official records that were kept by the National
Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions. This unit was the administrative arm of the Gacaca courts, and they
compiled records from all trials, including the complete judgment for each case. Millions of these
records were kept in official notebooks, which are currently being archived in Kigali. This process
will take years, though Gacaca employees also transferred abbreviated forms of court records into
thousands of Excel files that contain information about all individuals accused of participating in
the genocide, including but not limited to whether they were found guilty, the punishment, and
the category of crime. We obtained the Excel files for each administrative region within Rwanda.
These abbreviated court records from 10,558 courts45 were then compiled into a single database
of Gacaca files. For our analysis, this includes 63,828 cases with a guilty verdict in Category 1 and
254,806 cases with a guilty verdict in Category 2.46 Note that we do not include those convicted of
crimes against property (Category 3 as of 2004 according to the OL 16/2004 as amended), as these
crimes differ substantially from the crimes that were to be tried at the ICTR and in the domestic
courts.
The data on the Rwandan domestic trials and on the Rwandan Gacaca court trials are unique,
as we are part of the only research team that has gained access to and compiled these data.47 That
said, several caveats must be discussed prior to our analysis. First, some have suggested that the
government of Rwanda has a particular interest in controlling or manipulating information about
genocide perpetrators, which could influence data on both the domestic courts and the Gacaca
courts. We have seen no evidence to suggest that any of the data we analyzed were subject to such
manipulation; we obtained these data in a disorganized state and assembled our datasets from
scratch. Nonetheless, like other court systems, court systems in Rwanda—and, specifically, the
Gacaca courts—were also subject to corruption.48 For example, communities sometimes discovered
that the judges they had elected to preside over Gacaca court trials had participated in the violence,
and revenge or petty arguments may have motivated some of the cases.49 We do not doubt that
these and other concerns are valid, but they are also unlikely to compromise the large-scale analysis
of sentences.
Finally, less than 0.5 percent of Gacaca cases resulting in a guilty verdict did not include the
sentence or included a nonsensical sentence and are thus excluded. Missing data for the domestic
courts are of larger concern. Again, as opposed to the ICTR and the Gacaca courts, there is no
centralized database of genocide-related cases decided by the domestic courts. Compared to official

45

This number excludes appeals courts, which are not considered in this analysis.

46

As explained above, the data from the Gacaca courts are person-cases. Thus, if four people were involved in a crime,
they would each be listed once for that crime, totaling four cases even if those cases were tried concurrently.
Additionally, if one person committed two different crimes, he or she appears twice in the database. As the courts did
not take other crimes committed into account when deciding sentences in discrete cases, we would keep both cases in
this example in the database in order to most accurately examine the sentences that were given across all cases.

47

To be clear, some of the Gacaca court judgments were published online and have been used to assess participation in the
genocide. However, only a fraction of the judgments were made available in this manner.
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Coel Kirkby, “Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: A Preliminary Critique,” Journal of African Law 50, no. 2 (2006), 111.

49

Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, 119.
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statistics and numbers reported by scholars described above, the data collected from the Rwandan
domestic courts present a limited picture of the proceedings, especially for pre-2005 prosecutions.
However, given the state of judicial archives in Rwanda, it will arguably never be possible to
conduct a systematic and conclusive empirical review of all genocide-related cases decided by the
domestic courts. To our knowledge, our database is the most comprehensive dataset on genociderelated prosecutions ever compiled and analyzed, though these limitations must be kept in mind
when examining the data.
Sentencing Laws at the ICTR and in Rwanda
Before assessing these data, we begin with an analysis of the sentencing laws. The two most
important legal documents governing the functioning of the ICTR were its Statute, which was
appended to UNSC Resolution 955, and the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), which
was adopted on June 29, 1995, and regularly amended afterward.50 The Statute and the RPE,
however, contain only very basic guidelines regarding sentencing. Article 23 of the ICTR Statute
limits available sentences to imprisonment. When determining the penalty, judges were instructed
to take into account factors such as the gravity of the offense and the individual circumstances of
the convicted person. The Statute does not define what the assessment of gravity entails or which
individual circumstances could be considered relevant, however. The Statute also instructed judges
to consider the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda,51 though no
sentencing tariff is provided for crimes under the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
The RPE likewise provides limited clarification regarding how sentences should be determined.
Specifically, Rule 101 limits the range of applicable sentences, with a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. Judges were also instructed to take into account any aggravating and/or mitigating
circumstances when determining sentences. However, no list of aggravating and mitigating
factors is provided. Only two potential mitigating factors—“superior orders”52 and “substantial
cooperation with the Prosecutor”53—are explicitly mentioned. Consequently, the ICTR judges had
much sentencing discretion.
Despite this broad maneuvering space for sentence determination, judges developed a
relatively consistent approach to sentencing in case law over time. In fact, a common set of general
sentencing principles and individual sentencing factors was emphasised by the ICTR judges across
all cases.54 The starting point of sentence determination and the litmus test for sentence severity
was, according to the ICTR judges, the gravity of the offence.55 In this respect, the principles of
proportionality, totality, and gradation were the governing criteria: a penalty was to reflect the
totality of the crimes committed by a person and be proportionate to the gravity of his or her
crimes while taking into account his or her position in the overall conflict and role in the particular
crimes. For the purposes of sentencing, gravity was primarily determined in concreto by examining
the particular circumstances of the case.56 In most cases, the concept of gravity was interpreted as
50

The last amendment listed in the Rules was adopted on May 13, 2015. See ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
Adopted on June 29, 1995, as amended, accessed June 19, 2016, doi: http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legallibrary/150513-rpe-en-fr.pdf.
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Art. 23(1) ICTR Statute. The ICTR judges ruled, however, that national practices should serve solely as a point of
reference and should not be treated as binding. Cf. Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, November 28, 2007, ICTR-99-52, para. 1063. As discussed below, however, the sentencing approach of the
ICTR and within Rwanda seemed to be based on comparable tenets, which might be the result of the ICTR judges
implicitly taking inspiration from Rwandan laws.

52

Art. 6(4) ICTR Statute.

53

Rule 101(B)(i) RPE.
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Cf. Barbora Hola, International Sentencing—“Game of Russian Roulette” or Consistent Practice? (Oisterwijk: BOXPress,
2012), 209; Silvia D’Ascoli, Sentencing in International Criminal Law, The UN Ad Hoc Tribunals and Future Perspectives for
the ICC, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).
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Cf. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Appeals Chamber Judgment, November 23, 2001, ICTR-96-4-A, para. 413; Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, Appeals Chamber Judgment, May 26, 2006, ICTR-96-3, para. 591.
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Over time, the ICTR judges seem to have rejected the notion of abstract hierarchy between individual categories of
international crimes. In early jurisprudence, genocide was denoted as the crime of crimes, and judges argued that
for the purposes of sentencing, genocide as a category of international crime was considered more serious than
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encompassing two aspects: (i) the magnitude of harm caused by the offender as represented for
example by the scale of the crime, the number of victims, and the extent of victims’ suffering; and
(ii) the form and degree of the accused’s participation in the crime (in other words, the offender’s
culpability).57
After evaluating the gravity of crimes, the ICTR judges further individualized the sentence
by assessing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Only those circumstances directly related
to the charged offences and to the offenders when they committed the offence were accepted in
aggravation.58 Conversely, mitigating factors did not need to relate directly to the offences, and
judges typically discussed the offender’s personal circumstances, including but not limited to
his or her character, family circumstances, or behavior prior to the genocide.59 Over the years,
the Tribunal accepted a wide range of factors in aggravation/mitigation of a sentence.60 The most
common aggravating factor cited by ICTR judges was the abuse of a position of authority, leadership,
influence, or trust,61 while assistance to victims was cited most frequently in mitigation.62
As most of the crimes tried at the ICTR were very serious and often entailed the deaths of
hundreds or thousands of victims—and as all would have likely resulted in the severest sentences
in domestic jurisdictions—the ICTR judges seemed to differentiate between serious criminal acts
and even more serious criminal acts. This differentiation was primarily conducted by applying
the principle of gradation, which involved the evaluation of the defendants’ culpability as
manifested by their position in the state hierarchy and the role that they played in particular
crimes. The severest sentence of life imprisonment was consequently reserved for the most serious
offenders,63 such as those who planned, led, or ordered atrocities and those who committed crimes
with particular zeal or sadism. Accordingly, judges often reiterated that offenders receiving the
most severe sentences previously held senior positions of authority, such as ministers in the
government.64
As opposed to the almost unfettered sentencing discretion at the ICTR, the Rwandan OLs
limited the sentencing discretion of judges at the domestic courts and inyangamugayo at the Gacaca
courts to a considerable extent. As noted above, as of 2000, the OLs uniformly regulated genociderelated prosecutions at both the Rwandan domestic courts and the Gacaca courts. The laws contain
fixed mandatory sentences and narrow sentencing tariffs with a very limited margin of appreciation
provided for judges to take into account the particularities of each case.
The first genocide prosecution law, the OL 08/96, introduced the categorization of genocide
suspects and gradation in sentence severity depending on the defendant’s category.65 Per this
war crimes. (Cf. Prosecutor v. Serushago, Judgment, February 5, 1999, ICTR-98-39, para.13; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda,
Judgment, December 6, 1999, ICTR-96-3, para. 451; Prosecutor v. Musema, Judgment, January 27, 2000, ICTR-96-13,
para. 981; Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Judgment, September 4, 1998, ICTR-97-23, para. 14). Over time, however, the judges
emphasized that there is no hierarchy among individual categories of international crimes and that all crimes under
their jurisdiction represented very serious violations of international humanitarian law. Cf. Prosecutor v. Renzaho,
Judgment, July 14, 2009, ICTR-97-31-T, para. 817; Prosecutor v. Elizaphan & Gérard Ntakirutimana, Judgment, February
21, 2003, ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17, para. 776; Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Appeals Chamber Judgment, October 20, 2010,
ICTR-2001-70, para. 260.
57

For a more elaborate discussion of the concept of gravity, see Hola, International Sentencing, 47-56.

58

For a short list of accepted aggravating factors, see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Judgment, June 24, 2011,
ICTR-98-42-T, para. 6193, 6194.

59

Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Judgment, July 15, 2004, ICTR-01-71, para. 502.

60

For a complete list, see Hola, International Sentencing, 77-82.

61

Ibid., at 165.

62

It should not be assumed, however, that assistance to victims was always accepted in mitigation. Indeed, judges often
rejected defendants’ requests for sentence mitigation on these grounds. In particular, selective assistance to victims
did not necessarily result in sentence mitigation. In some ICTR judgments, the Trial Chambers refused to accept this
factor in mitigation or have even indicated that it could have aggravated a sentence. Prosecutor v. Bikindi, Judgment,
December 2, 2008, ICTR-01-72, para. 457; Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Appeals Chamber Judgment, September 12, 2006,
ICTR-2000-55A, para. 540.

63

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, Judgment, December 3, 2003, ICTR-99-52, para. 1097.

64

Prosecutor v. Setako, Judgment, February 25, 2010, ICTR-04-81, para. 500.

65

OL 08/96 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Cenocide or Crimes Against
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law, Category 1 defendants (those seen as particularly responsible or cruel) were liable to the
death penalty with no possibility of sentence reduction or mitigation.66 The mandatory sentence
for Category 2 offenders (those who participated in killings) was life imprisonment. Category 3
suspects (including those who participated in acts causing personal injuries short of death) were to
be given penalties stipulated for similar offences by the Penal Code of Rwanda. Finally, Category 4
suspects (those who committed offenses against property) were not to be subjected to incarceration
and were instead to pay reparations. OL 08/96 also stipulated a possibility for Category 2 and 3
defendants to confess and plead guilty, which, if accepted by the court, would lead to a significant
reduction in their sentence. For example, a Category 2 defendant who pled guilty could be given
either 7 to 11 years (if the guilty plea took place prior to prosecution)67 or 12 to 15 years (if the
defendant confessed during the trial, illustrating that time of confession was also to be taken into
account).68
This first genocide prosecution law set the scene for the subsequent developments in
sentencing structures for convicted génocidaires in Rwanda. In 2000, the most important changes
were introduced by the OL creating the Gacaca courts.69 Due to the new court system, a majority
of genocide cases (all cases concerning Category 2, 3, and 4 defendants) were to be transferred
to Gacaca.70 The OL on Gacaca was subsequently amended several times,71 most substantially in
200472, 200773 and 2008.74 In essence, however, the strict regulation of sentencing remained; there
were mandatory sentences depending on offender categorization, and very limited discretion was
provided to the judges.
As noted above, the subsequent OLs modified the groups falling under each category and, as
of 2004, re-categorized genocide suspects into three categories by combing Categories 2 and 3. In
addition, the severity of the mandatory sentences was progressively reduced in the years following
OL 08/96. Category 1 defendants also became eligible for sentence reduction if they confessed, and
the traditional sanction of incarceration was offset by alternative sanctioning mechanisms such as
community service (Travail d’Intérêt Général, known as TIG) or suspended sentences. As of 2000,
Category 2 defendants who were accused of killing and confessed and Category 3 defendants
convicted of injuring a person were to serve only half of the pronounced sentence in prison, and the
rest was to be commuted to community service.75 Rwanda also formally abolished the death penalty
in 2007 and substituted it with a sentence of life imprisonment or life imprisonment with special
Humanity Committed since October 1, 1990, adopted on August 30, 1996.
66

Ibid., Art. 14.

67

Ibid., Art. 15.

68

Ibid., Art. 16. The Rwandan government introduced the notion of confession and the possibility of a significant
reduction in sentences tied to confession in order to motivate the tens of thousands of defendants who were
detained in overcrowded prisons and ad-hoc detention centers to come forward, confess their crimes, and assist the
government in easing prison overcrowding and reducing the backlog of genocide-related cases.

69

OL 40/2000 Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organizing Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of
Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, adopted on
January 26, 2001.

70

Again, in 2008, the majority of Category 1 defendants were transferred to Gacaca jurisdictions, leaving the domestic
courts to try only planners and organizers as well as leaders at the national and prefecture (region) level.

71

For example, OL 33/2001, which was adopted in 2001, modified OL 40/2000.

72

OL 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with
Prosecuting and Trying Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity, Committed
Between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994, adopted on June 19, 2004.

73

OL 10/2007 of 01/03/2007 Modifying and Complementing Organic Law 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the
Organization, Competence and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying Perpetrators of
the Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity, Committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31,
1994 as Modified and Complemented to Date, adopted on March 1, 2007.

74

OL 13/2008 Modifying and Complementing OL 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence and
Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and
Other Crimes against Humanity, Committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 as Modified and
Complemented to Date, adopted on May 19, 2008.

75

Cf. Art. 69, 70 OL 40/2000; or 73 ,78, and 80 of the OL 16/2004, as amended.
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provisions.76 Effectively, however, the death penalty had already been abolished in 1998. While
the death penalty was stipulated in the OL and regularly given as a sentence in the Specialized
Chambers, as we further address below, there is only record of 22 individuals who were executed
in April 1998.
These changes, including the progressive introduction of less retributive sanctions, could be
explained by the fact that the Rwandan government also emphasized other non-retributive goals
of transitional justice with the introduction of the Gacaca courts. These goals included but are
not limited to the involvement of the broader population in dealing with the past, truth finding,
reconciliation, societal reconstruction, and reintegration of defendants. In addition to these
principled reasons, highly interconnected practical considerations such as a backlog of cases at
the Specialized Chambers, overcrowded prisons, or having a large proportion of the adult Hutu
male population in detention could arguably also explain the progressive changes in punishment
structures.
Table 1 outlines the sentencing structures for Rwandan domestic courts and Gacaca courts as
amended and modified in 2008 after the adoption of OL 13/2008.77 The rows indicate the category
of a defendant according to the OL, and the columns are further divided based on sentences
stipulated (i) for adult defendants who did not confess (Column 1); (ii) for adult defendants who
confessed (Column 2); and (iii) for minors at the time of genocide, again depending on whether
they confessed (Column 3). The categorization of defendants determined not only the sentence
severity but also whether a case was handled by the Gacaca courts (Cat. 1 C, D, and E, Cat. 2, and
Cat. 3) or tried at ordinary courts (Cat. 1 A and B).
Similar to the first OL on genocide-related prosecutions, suspected génocidaires were placed
into categories that corresponded to mandatory sentences or sentence ranges. The categorization
depended on the defendant’s role in the crime, whether the defendant held a position of authority,
and the type of offense. Category 1 defendants (broadly those organizing atrocities, those in
positions of authority, and perpetrators of sexual violence) were to receive the most severe sentences.
The remaining Category 2 and 3 offenders were divided depending on whether the crimes they
participated in were targeting people (Category 2) or property (Category 3), with a clear decrease
in sentence severity depending on the type of crime committed. Each category also includes
accomplices, who were defined as individuals who had provided any form of assistance to commit
offenses specified in each category.78 The OL leaves the individual terms further undefined and
thus provides those implementing the laws with relatively broad discretion on whom to classify
as an organizer and on the meaning of terms such as “notorious murderer.” Indeed, according
to OL 16/2004, the Gacaca courts were competent to categorize offenders and to compile lists of
offenders for each Category.79 As the categorization of an offender was meant to be tied to sentence
severity, this discretion suggests that the legal straightjacket imposed by the OLs was not as tight
as it might have originally seemed, at least when it comes to sentencing. Judges and inyangamugayo
were able to circumvent limitations on their sentencing discretion by exercising greater discretion
in the offender categorization stage or by re-categorizing cases.
76

77

OL 31/2007 Relating to the Abolition of the Death Penalty. In the cases where the death penalty had been pronounced
before the adoption of OL 31/2007, and in all legal texts containing the death penalty as a punishment, life
imprisonment or life imprisonment with special provisions was substituted for the death penalty (Art. 3, Art. 6).
Given that crimes against humanity and genocide are subject to life imprisonment with special provisions (Art.
5, para. 3), those sentenced the death penalty likely had their sentence changed to life imprisonment with special
provisions.
OL 13/2008 Modifying and Complementing OL 16/2004 of 19/6/2004 Establishing the Organization, Competence and
Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying Perpetrators of the Crime of Genocide and
Other Crimes against Humanity, Committed between October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994 as Modified and
Complemented to Date, adopted on May 19, 2008.

78

Art. 53 OL 16/2004.

79

Art. 34 OL 16/2004, Ibid. The list of Category 1 suspects was published by the Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court
periodically since OL 08/96. Initially, the information regarding who to put on the list of suspects was forwarded by
local administrative and judicial authorities (see Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, Genocide in Rwanda
(New York: Human Rights Watch, Second Edition, 1998), 751). After the Gacaca courts began, the information was
forwarded by the Gacaca courts.
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Table 1. Offender Categorization and Sentencing Structure in the Rwandan OL16/2004 (as Amended by OL 10/2007
and OL 13/2008, with numbers indicating stipulated sentences in years in prison).

CONFESSION*

Offender Categorization

NO
CONFESSION Before
Being
Listed**

After
Being
Listed

MINOR
(at the time of crimes)
No
Confession

Confession
Before After
Being Being
Listed Listed

CAT. 1 A) Planners/organizers Life in prison
B) National/prefectural with special
leaders
provisions
C) Inciters/supervisors/
ringleaders
D) Sub-prefectural/
commune leaders
E) Perpetrators of
sexual violence

20-24

25-30

10-20

6.5-7.5

8-9

CAT. 2 A) Notorious
30 years in
murderers
prison or life
B) Torture
C) Dehumanizing dead
body

20-25

25-29

10-15

6-7

6.5-7.5

7-12

12-15

4.5-5.5

2.5-3.5

4-5

1-3

3-5

2.5-3.5

0.5-1.5

1.5-2.5

D) Killers
E) Injury with intent
to kill

25-30

F) Injury with no intent 5-7
to kill
CAT. 3 A) Property offences

Reparation*** Reparation

Reparation

* To have a confession accepted, a defendant had to provide a detailed account of the crime that included eventual witnesses,
victims, and the damage caused; identify his or her co-perpetrators; and apologize to the victims or their families. If the confession
did not adhere to these stringent requirements, it could be rejected. The defendant would then be sentenced as if he or she did
not confess (see Article 54 of OL 16/2004). In addition, the moment of confession—specifically whether a defendant confessed
before being put on the list of suspects or only afterward—mattered for sentence severity.
** According to the OL 16/2004 (Article 34), the Gacaca courts at the cell level were responsible for compiling and categorizing
lists of suspects responsible for crimes committed within their cells. Those put on Category 3 lists were then tried by the same cell
level Gacaca court. Lists of Category 2 suspects were to be forwarded to sector level Gacaca courts, and lists of Category 1 suspect
were to be forwarded to the Public Prosecution.
*** Note that there were numerous types of sanctions linked to Category 3 offenses, though we do not include these sanctions—
which mostly involved paying fines to victims and/or their families—here because Category 3 is not part of our analysis.

Beyond the offender categorization, the severity of mandatory sentences stipulated in the OL
was also largely dependent on two types of mitigating excuses80 that could have led to a considerable
sentence reduction: (i) confession and guilty plea;81 and (ii) minor age of a defendant at the time
80

Sam Rugege and Aime M. Karimunda, “Domestic Prosecution of International Crimes: The Case of Rwanda,” in Africa
and the International Criminal Court, ed. Gerhard Werle et al. (The Hague: International Criminal Justice Series 1, T.M.C.
Asser Press, 2014), 90.

81

Art. 72, 73 OL 16/2004 as amended.
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of the genocide (offenders between 14 and 18 years82 old were considered minors).83 Judges in
domestic courts and in Gacaca courts were also able to adjust a sentence within the predetermined
ranges if mitigating or aggravating circumstances were present.84 The OL does not provide a
list of relevant mitigating circumstances and left it to the discretion of judges to accept relevant
mitigating circumstances, however.85 In contrast, the OL explicitly stipulates the following factors
as aggravating: (i) a position of authority at the level of a cell or a sector;86 and (ii) the combination
of multiple offenses falling within the same category committed by a defendant.87 In such cases, judges
were directed to hand out the most severe penalty envisaged within the defendant’s category.88
Overall, this overview demonstrates that at the ICTR and in Rwanda, it was the culpability
of the offender that was to primarily influence sentence severity. Culpability was to be assessed
based on the position of authority (those exercising state authority were to be considered the most
culpable), the particular role in the offenses committed (organizers, planners, and leaders of the
massacres were to be considered the most culpable), and the manner of execution (those who
committed crimes with a particular cruelty and zeal were to be considered most culpable). The
type of underlying offence and its gravity arguably was to influence the sentence severity only
secondarily. In addition, a significant mitigating factor for genocide-related sentences, especially
in Rwandan law, was a confession. This was justified by the fact that punishment of genocide
was meant not only to condemn the crimes and those responsible but also to fulfill other societal
functions such as truth finding or promoting reconciliation.
Sentencing Practices/Outcomes at the ICTR and in Rwanda
In order to compare sentencing of genocide, it is not sufficient to analyze the law itself. Rather, it is
also vital to understand how the laws were implemented in practice by judges and inyangamugayo.
Put another way, the laws we have reviewed do not necessarily dictate practice, and judges and
inyangamugayo—especially those in more decentralized courts—may have departed from these
sentencing guidelines. Consequently, this section contrasts the severity of sentences issued at
the ICTR, the domestic courts, and the Gacaca courts. We first focus on the most serious cases—
Category 1 trials in domestic courts, Category 1 trials in the Gacaca courts, and those tried the ICTR.
We then compare Category 2 trials at the domestic courts and at Gacaca.
ICTR and Category 1 Offenders at Domestic Courts and Gacaca Courts
Table 2 provides an overview of case outcomes in each jurisdiction based on the data that we
described above. As seen in the table, the conviction rates at the ICTR, domestic Rwandan courts,
and Rwandan Gacaca courts were relatively similar. Approximately 71 percent of initial ICTR trials
ended with a guilty verdict, as compared to 76 percent of domestic court trials and 75 percent of
Gacaca trials of Category 1 suspects. The remaining cases were acquitted or, in the case of the ICTR
and the domestic courts, dismissed, transferred, or never held. Gacaca trials were unique in that
defendants were tried in absence if they were unable to be present; in these cases, judges were
able to take community testimony into account in their judgments. In the subsequent analysis, we
examine only those who were convicted, and we present our findings in percentages in order to
facilitate comparison across jurisdictions.
82

Those who were less than 14 at the time of the genocide were not to be prosecuted but were to be sent to training camps
instead (Organic Law 13/2008).

83

Art. 78 OL 16/2004 as amended.

84

Art. 81 OL 16/2004 as amended.

85

Rugege and Karimunda, Domestic Prosecution of International Crimes, 90-91. The authors also provide examples of
situations where judges accepted remorse or cooperation with the court as mitigating circumstances. In addition, the
Manuel Explicatif sur la loi organique portant creation des jurisdictions Gacaca also lists possible mitigating circumstances
for Gacaca judges, such as vulnerability of a defendant, undue influence, or saving lives.

86

Art. 52 OL 16/2004 as amended.

87

Art. 77 OL 16/2004 as amended.

88

In contrast to the ICTR, where incarceration was the only possible sentence, the OLs in Rwanda also stipulate an
additional penalty, which is the withdrawal of civic rights. The extent and duration of withdrawal was to depend on
the category of the offender. Art. 76 OL 16/2004 as amended.
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Table 2. Convictions and Acquittals at the ICTR and in Rwandan Domestic and Gacaca Court Trials.

Convicted

Acquitted

Dismissed/Transferred/At Large

%

Number

%

Number

%

Number

ICTR

71.1

64

10.0

9

18.9

17

Domestic Courts*

76.0

662

15.8

138

8.2

71

Gacaca Category 1

75.4

63,828

24.6

20,757

NA/Unknown

NA/Unknown

* While the domestic courts were meant to try Category 1 offenders, Category 2 and 3 offenders were also tried in these courts. In
this table, we include all trials with first instance verdicts. However, in Table 2, we restrict the data presented to Category 1 trials
and also analyze Category 2 trials below.

As seen in Table 3, despite the relative parity in the conviction rates across jurisdictions,
sentences varied widely. The median sentence at the ICTR was 25 years, followed by 14 years
in the domestic courts’ Category 1 trials and 19 years in the Gacaca courts’ Category 1 trials. The
fact that the ICTR’s median sentence length is the highest is to be expected, as this court tried
those who played comparatively larger roles in the violence. That said, the Gacaca courts’ median
sentence is 5 years longer than the median sentence in the domestic courts. While this suggests that
determinate sentencing at the Gacaca courts was harsher than sentencing at the domestic courts,
this number must be analyzed alongside the sentences for life in prison and the death penalty. As
with determinate sentences, the ICTR had the highest percentage of life sentences: 42.2 percent
of all cases tried at the ICTR resulted in a life sentence. This is contrasted against 12.2 percent in
domestic courts and 16.5 percent in Gacaca, though an additional 66.0 percent of cases for Category
1 offenders in the domestic courts resulted in the death penalty. To be clear, the vast majority of
these cases were eventually converted into life sentences, though we report them as the death
penalty in Table 3 to comport with our focus on initial verdicts.
Table 3. General Sentencing Outcomes in the ICTR and in Rwanda*

Median
Sentence

Range

Determinate
Sentence (DS)

Life
Sentence

Death
Penalty

TIG**

Years

Years

%

%

%

%

ICTR

25

6 to 35

57.8

42.2

NA

NA

Domestic Category 1

14

2 to 30

21.8

12.2

66.0

-

Gacaca Category 1

19

1 to 30

83.5

16.5

NA

13.1

* We have data on 147 Category 1 trials from the domestic courts, which are shown here. The remaining trials were Category 2
trials, which are not included here but which we further explain below.
** Judges and inyangamugayo in both domestic courts and Gacaca courts were instructed according to Art. 73 OL16/2004 to
convert half of a pronounced determinate sentence to community service (TIG) for Category 2 offenders who confessed or
who participated in physical violence without the intent to kill. It seems that a similar practice was also adopted for Category 1
offenders at Gacaca courts, though we do not have data regarding conversion of prison sentences to TIG in the domestic courts.

Consequently, the proportion of indeterminate sentences in the domestic courts is much
higher than those in the ICTR or the Gacaca courts. This is partially due to the fact that most of
these verdicts included in our database were handed out in the earlier years of the justice process,
when the OL 08/96 governed genocide prosecutions. The OL 08/96 stipulated the death sentence
as the mandatory sentence for all Category 1 defendants. The subsequent laws, however, provided
judges with a possibility to hand out either life imprisonment or a death sentence for Category
1 offenders who did not plead guilty and reduced determinate sentences for those who pleaded
guilty, as shown in Table 1.89
89

See, e.g., Art. 68 OL 40/2000, Art. 72 16/2004.
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Restricting our analysis to determinate sentences, Figure 1 depicts the sentence lengths in
each of the three jurisdictions. Specifically, the figure illustrates the percentages of determinate
sentences falling between 1-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20, 21-25 years, and 26 years and
above. The majority of those convicted at the ICTR and at Gacaca courts received determinate
sentences, compared to only 32 defendants (22 percent) tried at the domestic courts included in our
sample. Given the very limited number of these cases, these data must be interpreted with caution.

Figure 1. Determinate Sentence Lengths at the ICTR and in Rwandan Domestic and Gacaca Courts (sentences in
years).

As seen in the figure, a small percentage of prison sentences given by the Gacaca courts and by
the domestic courts were less than five years, while no sentences at the ICTR were this low. More
than 10 percent of trials with determinate sentences given by both the ICTR and the Gacaca courts
were between 6 and 10 years in prison, though the domestic courts had very few sentences in this
range. The Rwandan domestic courts cases in our sample had the highest percentage of Category
1 trials—over 71 percent—resulting in a prison sentence between 11 and 15 years. In contrast, the
highest percentage of those who received determinate sentences at the ICTR (29.7 percent) and at
Gacaca (30.5 percent) were given relatively severe sentences (26 or more years in prison).
As of 2000, only Category 1 defendants who pleaded guilty or who were minors at the time
of genocide were eligible for determinate sentences in Rwanda. In our sample of domestic court
cases, 30 defendants confessed and two were minors at the time of the genocide. Additionally, all
30 defendants who pleaded guilty did so before being included on the list of genocide suspects and
thus before the prosecution started. We do not have data on the proportion of people who confessed
in the Gacaca courts, though we anticipate that the number of confessions was comparatively
much higher in Gacaca courts given the public setting, the emphasis placed on conversation, and
pre-trial sensitization efforts. That being said, the results suggest that the majority of Category 1
defendants at the Gacaca courts may have pleaded guilty only after being included on the list of
genocide suspects, which would thus result in 25-30 years imprisonment if inyangamugayo followed
the OLs.
In contrast, the ICTR judges regularly handed out relatively severe determinate sentences to
those who did not plead guilty. Life imprisonment, as the maximum sentence, was reserved only
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for the most serious offenders90 convicted of crimes of the most heinous nature.91 This suggests that
the ICTR judges may have been comparing those tried at the Tribunal against each other (rather
than against all who participated in the genocide) and thus may have differentiated sentence length
depending on culpability relative to other ICTR defendants.
Notably, Figure 1 also illustrates that judges in domestic courts and inyangamugayo in the
Gacaca courts deviated from sentencing guidelines. Per the OLs, Category 1 defendants (who
were not minors) could receive a sentence between 20 years and life in prison.92 The majority of
determinate sentences for Category 1 crimes in our database, however, fall below 20 years, with
many sentences at not even half the length dictated by law. It is impossible to determine the reasons
for this divergence, as judges in Rwanda hardly presented any sentence-related reasoning in their
judgments. Rugege and Karimunda observe a similar trend in their qualitative analysis of early
genocide-related cases decided at domestic courts, noting that “Rwandan judges were too lenient
in handling cases of genocide […] and in some cases the discretion [of judges] was either misused
or even abused in meting out overly lenient sentences…”93
Category 2 Offenders at Domestic Courts and Gacaca
Although we focus on Category 1 crimes in order to facilitate comparison between the ICTR, the
domestic courts, and the Gacaca courts, we conclude by briefly analyzing Category 2 sentences in
the domestic courts and in the Gacaca courts.94 We have data on 509 Category 2 trials with guilty
verdicts in the domestic courts and 254,806 Category 2 trials with guilty verdicts in the Gacaca
courts. The outcomes of these trials are shown in Table 4.
Almost 96 percent of Category 2 guilty verdicts in the Gacaca courts came with a determinate
prison sentence, while only 56 percent of those in the domestic courts did. In line with this, over 42
percent of Category 2 cases with guilty verdicts at the domestic courts resulted in a life sentence,
compared to only 2 percent of Gacaca court Category 2 cases. Gacaca courts did have a slightly
higher median sentence length, though a full one-third of these sentences were commuted into a
community service (Travail d’Interet General, or TIG). Taken together, this suggests that the Gacaca
courts were comparatively more lenient with Category 2 sentencing. However, the more severe
sentences at domestic courts may also be explained by legislative changes in the OLs, a progressive
reduction of sentence severity over time, and the fact that the majority of Category 2 defendants in
our domestic courts database were tried before the enactment of the OL 16/2004. Instead, almost 78
percent of the Category 2 cases tried at domestic courts in our sample were adjudicated under OL
08/96, which stipulated a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment if a defendant did not confess.95
In 2004, the OL 16/2004 provided for determinate sentences ranging from 5 to 30 years for Category
2 offenders (again depending on confession and their age).
In 2007, due to the inclusion of three sub-categories that were initially classified as Category 1 in
Category 2 (i.e., notorious murderers, those who committed torture, and those who committed acts
dehumanizing dead bodies), life imprisonment as an alternative to 30 years of imprisonment was
again reintroduced as a possibility for Category 2 defendants in these subcategories. Consequently,
due to these legislative changes entailing modification of the categories and prescribed sentences,
we cannot conclusively say that Gacaca courts were more lenient than domestic courts, though
future analyses of sentences over time will be able to address such questions.
90

Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze, Judgment, December 3, 2003, ICTR-99-52, para. 1097.

91

Prosecutor v. Elizaphan & Gérard Ntakirutimana, Judgment, February 21, 2003, ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17, para. 773.

92

Art. 72 OL 16/2004 as modified by OL 13/2008. According to the OL 40/2000 (the law which preceded the 2004 OL), the
minimum sentence for Category 1 defendants was 25 years.

93

Rugege and Karimunda, Domestic Prosecution of International Crimes, 91, 92.

94

As noted above, the OL 08/96 initially divided all defendants into four categories. This was changed in 2004 when the
OL 16/2004 combined Category 2 (those who participated in killings and those who caused injuries but acted with
the intent to kill) and Category 3 (those who caused injuries and did not have the intent to kill) into a joint Category 2
encompassing all those who participated in offences against persons. Since our database also includes cases of Category
3 defendants decided under the OL 8/96, we have also included these in our analysis, though they would be Category 2
defendants under the final classification scheme. Thus, these cases are referred to as Category 2 in this article.

95

Art. 14 OL 08/96.

©2016

Genocide Studies and Prevention 10, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.3

76

Hola and Nyseth Brehm

Table 4. Category 2 Sentencing Outcomes in Rwandan Domestic and Gacaca Courts.

Median
Sentence

Range

Determinate
Life
Sentence (DS) Sentence

Death
Penalty

Other
Sentence*

TIG

Years

Years

%

%

%

%

%

Domestic
Category 2

13

1-30

56.4

42.4

0.8

0.4

-

Gacaca
Category 2

15

3 months
- 30 years

95.8

2.0

NA

2.2

32.7

* Other sentences typically included paying victims or victims’ families for property that was stolen.

Figure 2. Category 2 Determinate Sentence Lengths in Domestic and Gacaca Courts (sentences in years).

Figure 2 illustrates determinate sentences for Category 2 guilty verdicts at the domestic
courts and Category 2 guilty verdicts at the Gacaca courts. For both court systems, the distribution
of determinate sentences is relatively similar. In fact, the domestic courts and Gacaca courts
mirror each other in the proportion of determinate sentences that were 10 years or less, which
were generally reserved for those who were convicted for causing an injury without intent to
kill. As with Category 1 crimes, the domestic courts had a comparatively higher percentage of
determinate sentences—over 46 percent—in the 11 to 15 year range. By contrast, Gacaca courts had
higher percentages of sentences over 15 years, though there is also great similarity in the general
distribution of sentences. While these differences might be related to the prevalence and timing
of confessions, they may also indicate that Gacaca judges favored the imposition of determinate
sentences over life imprisonment, even for those defendants who did not confess. This hypothesis
would, however, require additional research, as we are unable to assess it on the basis of
our data.
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This section has demonstrated that at all three levels of jurisdiction, judges employed a large
variety of sentences to punish those convicted of genocide. Genocide—“the crime of crimes”—was
certainly not punished with only the most severe sentences, which many would assume. Even
though it is impossible to make conclusive claims due to the limitations of our data, it would seem
that the most severe sentences were handed out at domestic courts in Rwanda. This, however, might
also be explained by the fact that most of cases in our sample tried at domestic courts were decided
under the OL 08/96, which dictated mandatory death sentences for Category 1 defendants and life
imprisonment for Category 2 offenders who did not confess. Over time, the laws progressively
introduced more lenient sentences for both groups, which was likely geared toward encouraging
confessions. Unfortunately, we cannot evaluate whether an increasing number of defendants took
advantage of these sentence reductions and pleaded guilty. However, given the intense sensitization
campaigns and societal pressures on detainees to confess, we might also expect that to be the case.
Conclusion
This article aimed to compare sentencing laws and practices of those convicted of participation in the
1994 genocide in Rwanda. As over a million individuals were tried, the aftermath of the Rwandan
genocide constitutes the most comprehensive case of criminal justice after atrocity. Three levels of
criminal courts—an international, a domestic, and a localized—adjudicated genocide-related crimes,
which makes the Rwandan case unique and a worthy case study of judicial responses to genocide.
We have shown that the sentencing of genocide developed into a rather sophisticated system
internationally and domestically. At the ICTR, judges exercised much sentencing discretion and
developed a sentencing approach relying on several factors to determine punishments. Apart from
the seriousness of the crimes underlying convictions, the ICTR judges used the culpability of the
defendants to distinguish the most serious offenders for the purposes of sentencing. The level
of culpability was assessed by examining whether and how the defendant exercised authority
and the role and degree of his/her involvement in atrocities. In Rwanda, the OLs governing the
genocide-related trials introduced rather detailed sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentences.
Offenders were divided into categories primarily depending on their level of culpability. Similar
to the ICTR, the level of culpability was determined by the level of authority and the degree of
the defendant’s involvement in atrocities. The severity of mandatory sentences stipulated in the
laws was gradated depending on the categorization of the defendant, which in turn depended on
his/her level of culpability. Additionally, both domestic and Gacaca courts gave significant weight
to those who confessed and apologized for their crimes, resulting in reduced sentences. In this
sense, punishment for genocide in Rwanda did not only serve a retributive purpose, which was the
main sentencing aim according to the ICTR judges96; it also incorporated other transitional justice
goals, including truth-telling, reintegration of the offenders into their communities, and societal
reconciliation according to the governing laws.
This article is also the first of its kind to compare sentencing practices across the three
jurisdictional levels. Based on an unprecedented database, we have provided an overview of
sentencing outcomes at the ICTR, Rwandan domestic courts, and the Gacaca courts. Due to the
limitations of our data, we were only able to present basic descriptive statistics, and the results
must be interpreted with caution. Again, while we gained access to the entire population of cases
decided at the Gacaca courts and the ICTR, the domestic court cases were very difficult to collect,
and the data are consequently rather limited. Keeping these limitations in mind, the analysis
nonetheless demonstrated that sentences for genocide ranged from the most lenient to the most
severe punishment within each of these court systems. It was certainly not the case that all of those
found guilty were subjected to the most severe sentences.
Additionally, our results indicate that the domestic courts in Rwanda handed out more severe
punishments compared to sentences issued at the ICTR and at the Gacaca courts. The vast majority
96

See, for example, the most recent empirical study of the ICTY and ICTR sentencing, where the authors argue that the
ICTY and ICTR sentences are exclusively predicted by factors relating to gravity and aggravating factors. Joseph
W. Doherty and Richard H. Steinberg, “Punishment and Policy in International Criminal Sentencing: An Empirical
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of cases at the domestic courts in our database were tried under the first OL 08/96 governing
genocide prosecutions, which mandated very severe sentences. In this respect, sanctions envisaged
for genocide-related crimes stipulated in the OL and applied by judges in Rwanda became less
and less retributive over time. One of the reasons for this fade of retributivism might be the
fact that next to eradicating the culture of impunity, Rwanda increasingly emphasized societal
reconstruction, reconciliation, and the reintegration of perpetrators. These goals also explicitly
governed the functioning of the Gacaca courts. In addition to these principled reasons, however,
very pragmatic considerations—such as extremely overcrowded prisons, a backlog of genocide
cases, and the economic and social repercussions of having a majority of the adult Hutu male
population incarcerated—also likely contributed to these developments. The initial retributive
sentiments underlying the first genocide laws combined with the fact that our domestic courts
database includes predominantly early cases could thus be an explanation for relatively more
severe sentences at domestic courts.
Notwithstanding, our results provide the first empirically-based indication that sentences
issued at the ICTR seem to have been more lenient compared to those issued by domestic court
in Rwanda. Since the ICTR tried those deemed most responsible for the most serious crimes
committed during the genocide, this finding is largely counter-intuitive. In the early years of the
ICTR’s existence, many scholars speculated about the dangers of sentencing disparities between
the ICTR and domestic courts97 and criticized the ICTR’s initial sentencing as unfairly lenient. Our
study is the first of its kind to provide an empirical foundation for these claims by systematically
evaluating sentencing practices across the entire mandate of the Tribunal. Future research
should further explore consistency of sentences across the three levels of justice and analyze
the development of sentencing practices over time. Our analysis constitutes the first of its kind
attempting to systematically analyze and compare punishment after the genocide in Rwanda and
can serve as the starting point for further discussions and analyses of accountability mechanisms
and punishment after atrocities.
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Introduction and Facts of the Case
Lithuania was incorporated in the USSR under the name “the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic”
in 1944. In 1949, an all-partisan organization fighting for the independence of Lithuania was
formed. From mid-September 1951, Mr. Vasiliauskas had been working as an operation agent of
the MGB, the precursor of the KGB, on the territory of the Lithuanian SSR. On January 2, 1953, Mr.
Vasiliauskas took part in an operation against two Lithuanian partisans of the Movement of the
Struggle for the Freedom of Lithuania, the brothers J.A. and A.A, who were shot and killed in the
Šakiai area in Lithuania. After the January 2, 1953 operation, Mr. Vasiliauskas was promoted to a
senior operational agent and was awarded and decorated at least 24 times in his 25-year service in
the KGB.
In 2001, Vasiliauskas, along with another co-defendant, were charged with the crime of genocide
perpetrated against the pair of Lithuanian partisans as representatives of a political group under
Article 71(2) of the Lithuanian Criminal Code.1 In 2004, the Trial Court in Lithuania convicted
Vasiliauskas for the crime of genocide against political, national and ethnic groups under the newly
amended Article 99 of the Criminal Code of 1998; and he was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment,
suspended on health grounds. On September 21, 2004, the Court of Appeal upheld his conviction
and, on February 22, 2005, the Supreme Court of Lithuania followed suit. The Supreme Court
found that “the 1998 amendments to the Criminal Code established the elements of the crime of
genocide, and included in them acts aimed at physical extermination of some or all of the members
of a social or political group. This characteristic of the crime of genocide remained in Article 99 of
the Criminal Code.”2
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was seized of the issue
of whether under Article 7(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) there was a
sufficiently clear legal basis in the applicable law in 1953 for Vasiliauskas’ conviction in Lithuania.
In particular, the ECtHR was tasked to examine whether the domestic conviction for genocide
matched the offence and could have been foreseen by Vasiliauskas at the time of his participation in
the operation of January 2, 1953, which resulted in the deaths of J.A. and A.A. The ECtHR decided
in favor of Vasiliauskas by nine to eight votes that there was a violation of Article 7 of the ECHR.
Procedure and Claims of the Parties
Article 7(1) of the ECHR contains the nullum crimen sine lege principle, namely that “no one shall
be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed.”
Mr. Vasiliauskas’ main argument was that the wide interpretation of the crime of genocide
applied by the various court instances in Lithuania had no basis in public international law,
in particular his conviction under Article 99 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code. Article 99 of the
Lithuanian Criminal Code of 21 April 1998 defines the crime of genocide as “a person who, seeking
to physically destroy some or all of the members of any national, ethnic, racial, religious, social or
political group, organizes, is in charge of or participates in killing…them…shall be punished by
imprisonment for a term of from five to twenty years or by life imprisonment.” (emphasis added)
The applicant, Mr. Vasiliauskas, claimed that prosecution for the killing of persons belonging to
a political or social group was wider than what the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) allowed for. The applicant also contended that
the genocide clause amended in 1998 was retroactively applied.3 Finally, he asserted that Article
1
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7(2) of the ECHR is not applicable, as his conviction could not be qualified as genocide and, hence,
it could not be qualified as “criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.”
The State representatives emphasized the specific nature of the resistance in Lithuania by
organized military groups of partisans in the 1950s against the Soviet regime. The State asserted
that by 1953 more than 500 000 Lithuanians had been affected by the terror politics of the Soviet
regime by mass killings, deportations or imprisonments.4 The aim of the Soviet regime was “to
destroy the former Lithuanian way of life and to replace it by a new Soviet order comprised of
persons without nationality or ethnicity (homo sovieticus).”5 The murders of J.A. and A.A. could not
only be regarded as murders of two members of a political group, but also as killings of persons
belonging to two protected groups under the Genocide Convention, namely a national and an
ethnic group, as the Soviet regime sought “to annihilate the culture, religion, language, politics
and identity of the Lithuanian nation,” according to the State.6 The State claimed that the acts
of the applicant constituted the criminal offence of genocide under conventional and customary
international law in 1953 and it invoked as evidence UN Resolution 96 (I) of 1946 and the 1948
Genocide Convention to which the USSR was a party in 1953.
The Issue
Mr. Vasiliauskas’ conviction was based on legal provisions that were not in force in 1953 as Lithuania
was not an independent state at that time. Therefore, according to the applicant, such domestic
provisions were applied retroactively, and the ECtHR had to decide whether there was a violation
of Article 7 of the ECHR, unless the Court could find that the applicant’s conviction was based upon
international law as it stood at the relevant time of the commission of the alleged acts of genocide.
The Court’s Assessment
The ECtHR began the analysis of Article 7 of the ECHR by ascertaining that a criminal offence
must be defined in law, which prescribes a penalty, and that the principle must not be extensively
construed to the accused’s detriment. The offence must be clearly defined in national and/or
international law “where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision…
what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable.”7 The principle comprises of two
elements—accessibility and foreseeability. The Court defined its task in the particular case as
examining “whether there was a contemporaneous legal basis for the applicant’s conviction and,
in particular, [whether] the result reached by the Lithuanian courts was compatible with Article 7”
of the ECHR.8
Accessibility
The ECtHR ruled that the domestic convictions of Mr. Vasiliauskas were based on retroactive
applicability of Article 99 of the Criminal Code as the legal provision was not in force in 1953.
Hence, this would constitute a violation under Article 7 of the ECHR, unless the international law
at the time of the commission of the act in 1953 allowed for such conviction.9 The ECtHR examined
the relevant international agreements to which the USSR was a party in 1953. The USSR signed the
Genocide Convention on December 16, 1949 and the Convention came into force on January 12,
1951. Therefore, the Court did not have trouble in finding that the crime of genocide was clearly
recognized as an international crime in 1953, and the prohibition of genocide was “sufficiently
accessible to the applicant.”10
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Foreseeability and “In Part” Interpretation
The crux of the case is whether it was foreseeable under international law in 1953 that the act for
which the applicant was convicted could be qualified as genocide, and whether J.A. and A.A.,
with their prominent positions within the Lithuanian partisan movement, could fall under the
protection of the national and ethnic groups. The ECtHR reiterated the possibility for wider and
narrower interpretation in international and national law of the crime of genocide. The ultimate
test in deciding what interpretation is applicable is the foreseeability element, as established by the
Court in the Jorgić case, for “the scope of the concept of foreseeability depends to a considerable
degree on the content of the instrument in issue, the field it is designed to cover and the number
and status of those to whom it is addressed.”11 The ECtHR also cautioned that there is a particular
obligation on persons in official capacity, such as Vasiliauskas, to proceed with a high degree of
caution when pursuing their occupation.
The ECtHR affirmed that it is legitimate and foreseeable for a successor State, such as Lithuania,
to initiate criminal proceedings against individuals who have committed crimes under the former
regime and “successor courts cannot be criticised for applying and interpreting the legal provisions
in force at the material time during the former regime, but in the light of the principles governing
a State subject to the rule of law and having regard to the core principles on which the Convention
system is built.” 12 This is particularly exigent when the case concerns the right to life, “a supreme
value in the Convention and international hierarchy of human rights and which right Contracting
Parties have a primary Convention obligation to protect along with the obligation on the State to
prosecute war crimes.”13 The Grand Chamber unsurprisingly reached the conclusion that domestic
courts cannot convict the accused on retroactively applied broader interpretation of the crime of
genocide passed later in time; although, domestic authorities are allowed to legislate broader scope
of genocide in general.14 The same reasoning regarding retroactivity was also provided by the
Lithuanian Constitutional Court, which in March 2014 ruled that the retroactive prosecution for
genocide of a political or social group, when the crime was committed prior to the amendments of
the Lithuanian Criminal Code in 1998, was unconstitutional.
Then the ECtHR examined the definition of the crime of genocide as it stood in 1953. Article
II of the Genocide Convention covers four protected groups of persons: national, ethnical, racial
or religious, and does not explicitly refer to social or political groups. The ECtHR looked at the
drafting history of the Convention by citing the ICJ’s Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro
case on the inclusion of the closed list of four specific groups. The ECtHR also invoked the Statutes
of the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC to conclude that “genocide is defined as acts committed to
destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, without reference to political groups.”15
The crime of genocide was clearly recognized under international law in 1953 as evidenced by
the 1946 UNGA Resolution 96(I), the 1948 Genocide Convention which was signed by the USSR
on December 16, 1949 and came into force with the twentieth ratification on January 12, 1951,
along with the ICJ’s 1951 Advisory Opinion which emphasized that “the principles underlying
the Genocide Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on
States, even without any conventional obligation.”16 The ECtHR found that “at the relevant time
the applicant, even with the assistance of a lawyer, could have foreseen that the killing of the
Lithuanian partisans could constitute the offence of genocide of Lithuanian nationals or of ethnic
Lithuanians.”17 Nonetheless, the ECtHR deviated with the finding of the Lithuanian courts that
the Lithuanian partisans constituted a significant part of the national or ethnic group in 1953, thus
excluding J.A. and A.A. of the protection of Article II of the Genocide Convention.
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The main issue was whether the two killings of J.A. and A.A. could be considered to fall
into the protected national and/or ethnic group along with belonging to a political group. The
ECtHR focused on what is meant by the term “acts committed with intent to destroy,...in part,
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” in the elements of the crime of genocide
under Article II of the Genocide Convention. The majority recalibrated its focus to finding whether
before a conviction the demanding proof of specific intent, dolus specialis, is coupled with showing
that the targeted group for destruction in its entirety or in substantial part was met. Based on
the jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR, and ICJ, the ECtHR found that in 1953 it was foreseeable
that the term “in part” contained a substantiality requirement, namely a numerical size of the
targeted part of the group along with the prominence of the targeted individuals within the protected
group. Nonetheless, the ECtHR reached the conclusion that the principles and interpretation in the
cited jurisprudence as regards the prominence part could not have been foreseen by the applicant
in the particular case to be included in the “in part” term in 1953.18 However, could the murders
of the Lithuanian partisans as a significant part of the nation pass the threshold of the impact that
their extermination would have on the survival of the national or ethnic group of Lithuanians as
a whole?
There is no doubt that genocide could be discerned in the annihilation of a vast number of
members of the protected group(s) coupled with the dolus specialis of the perpetrator. Moreover,
the specific genocidal intent could consist of “the desired destruction of a more limited number
of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would have upon the survival of a
group as such.”19 The intention to destroy the group “selectively” is based on the notion that
the numeric size of the targeted part of the group should not be the end of the inquiry in order
to determine the substantive requirement, but “in addition to the numeric size of the targeted
portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful consideration.”20 The intention to destroy
at least a substantial part of a particular group means “a reasonably substantial” rather than a
purely numerically-based “reasonably significant” concept. In this manner, if the evidence of an
intention to destroy a reasonably substantial number relative to the total population of the group
is not met, then the specific intent of the perpetrator “may yet be established by evidence of an
intention to destroy a significant section of the group, such as its leadership.”21 In other words, if
the quantitative criterion is not met, the intention to destroy “in part” may be established by the
qualitative criterion of the significance of the targeted section of the group, such as the leadership
“who by reason of their special qualities of leadership within the group as a whole, are of such
importance that their victimization…would impact upon the survival of the group, as such.”22
Such interpretation for taking into account the prominence of the targeted persons within the
group as a whole was also applied by the ICJ’s 2015 Croatia v. Serbia decision.23 Another example
is the killing of three Bosnian Muslim leaders in Žepa which “was a case of deliberate destruction
of a limited number of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance would have on the
survival of the group as such,” thus emphasizing to all other members of the group their collective
vulnerability and defenselessness.24
The ECtHR accepted the argument of the applicant that the purpose of the MGB’s policies in
Lithuania were aimed at the extermination of the partisans exclusively as “a separate and clearly
identifiable group, characterized by its armed resistance to Soviet power.”25 In this manner the
ECtHR rejected the finding of the domestic courts that the victims came within the definition
of genocide as part of a protected group by analogy as such interpretation is to the applicant’s
18
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detriment and the conviction would be rendered unforeseeable. Hence, the positions of J.A. and
A.A. were rejected to be prominent enough to fall under the protection of Article II of the Genocide
Convention.
Article 7 of the ECHR was interpreted differently in a joint dissenting opinion of Judges Villiger,
Power-Forde, Pinto de Albuquerque and Kuris (Joint Dissenting Opinion). The four dissenting
judges offered a detailed overview of the necessity to incorporate the assessment of the protected
group(s) in light of the particular political, social and cultural context.26 The protected group is to
be assessed on a case-by-case basis by taking into account the objective particulars of the social or
historical context along with the subject perceptions of the perpetrator.27 The Lithuanian courts
found that the sole existence of the partisans was the protection of the Lithuanian nation against
the Soviet regime, which aimed at destroying its whole identity and, as such, the extermination
policies of the Soviet authorities were targeting the nationality-ethnicity aspect.28 It should also
be recalled that the purpose of the policies of the Soviet authorities centered “on the intent to
destroy the fabric of a society through the elimination of its leadership, when accompanied by
other heinous acts, such as mass deportations, could give a strong indication of genocide.”29
The four dissenting judges noted that the partisans could not have survived for more than
10 years as a national movement without the support of the Lithuanian people, and that J.A. and
A.A. were targeted as ethnic Lithuanian partisans due to their prominence in society. The partisan
movement consisted of members who were “simultaneously a significant and emblematic part
of the national group and whose very purpose was the protection of the Lithuanian nation from
destruction by the Soviet regime and that their killing was, therefore, an act of genocide.”30 The
Lithuanian partisans may be considered a significant part of the national group because of their
prominence and emblematic character as a targeted part of the specifically protected group, the
four dissenting judges concluded.31 The partisans were targeted as a distinct, significant part of a
group to be eliminated rather than as mere individuals within the group. Otherwise, why would
the MGB/KGB documents not show any attempt to capture or bring the suspects to court?32 Judge
Power-Forde concluded in her separate dissenting opinion that the approach of the majority in the
case was “excessively formalistic and rather blinkered approach of viewing the partisans solely
through the lens of a ‘political group’ and of ending its analysis there.”33
The foreseeability of the existence of the crime of genocide could include circumstantial evidence
to show the specific intent “such as the physical targeting of the group or of their property; the use
of derogatory language towards members of the targeted group; the weapons employed and the
extent of bodily injury; the methodological way of planning, the systematic manner of killing.”34 It
is important to note that the factual analysis of the Lithuanian Courts was not arbitrary but based
on the archival documents presented before the domestic instances and the acknowledgement
of the Russian Federation in 1991 that the peoples including the Lithuanians were subjected to
repression including genocide under the Soviet era.35 The Dissenting Opinion also invokes the
number of the 20,000 Lithuanian partisans who were killed between 1944 and 1953. The MGB
issued clear instruction in 1953 for extermination as evidenced by the minutes of the MGB from
March 1953, urging that “bandits and nationalist underground should be eradicated” and that “[the
MGB unit’s] goal was to exterminate as quickly and possible the bandits, those who help them and
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their contacts.” 36 It is sufficiently clear that the criminal plan was to exterminate any vestige of
the identification with the national and ethnic belonging of the Lithuanians. The dissenting judges
disagree with the finding of the majority that the applicant could not have known that he risked
being charged with and eventually convicted of genocide in light of his high position in the MGB
at the time of the operation.37
Had Mr. Vasiliauskas sought legal advice as a high operational agent of the MGB whose task
was the extermination of the most resistant part of the Lithuanian nation, “it is likely that he would
have been advised that what he was doing bore the essential characteristics of the crime of genocide
as it stood under international law at the time.”38 The atmosphere of complete impunity that the
MGB agents enjoyed in their operations, evidenced by the lack of any prosecution even under the
acting criminal code of the Russian SFSR for the deprivation of life in the particular case, does
not in any way affect the applicability and binding force of international law and the prohibition
of genocide on the territory of the USSR.39 Coupled with mass deportations, imprisonment and
repressions against the partisans’ families, the cluster of acts against the protected group of the
Lithuanian nation and ethnicity should be considered in its entirety in order to appropriately
interpret the provisions in the Genocide Convention.40 Judge Ziemele in a Separate Dissenting
Opinion provided elaborate analysis of the historical context of the struggle of the Lithuanian
national partisans against the Soviet authorities by concluding that “the extermination of Lithuanian
nationalism was necessary to achieve the subjugation of the Lithuanian people to the Soviet regime
and its ideology.”41
In regards to customary international law, the ECtHR accepted that the scope of the crime
of genocide could be different from the conventional provisions, although opinions are divided
on this subject matter. Special attention was paid to the language of the 1946 UNGA Resolution
96(1) which called to protect “racial, religious, political groups and other groups” from genocide
(emphasis added). The ECtHR provided three references to academic articles, which offer
seemingly conflicting views on whether the customary prohibition of genocide included political
or other groups in 1953. The Court sweepingly concluded that “there is no sufficiently strong basis
for finding that customary international law as it stood in 1953 included ‘political groups’ among
those falling within the definition of genocide” as “the scope of the codified definition of genocide
remained narrower in the 1948 Convention and was retained in all subsequent international law
instruments.”42 Such glossing over customary law is problematic as the ECtHR did not look in
detail at the constitutive elements of customary law, namely state practice and opinio juris. The fact
that the subsequent conventions codified a different scope of the protection does not necessarily
mean that the customary law prohibition must have been identical in 1953. Custom and treaties
are two separate sources of international law and the norms continue to co-exist and retain their
separate existences, even if the relevant clauses are identical in content as stated in ICJ’s Military
and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua case. The ECtHR should have looked into the state practice
as in domestic judicial decisions during the relevant period from 1946 until 1953, as well as
pronouncements of state officials.
By just referring to a few law articles or books, one could not fully entertain the notion that
the ECtHR has effectively served its function as a regional judicial body to find evidence whether
customary law, in regards to the scope of the prohibition of genocide and the corresponding
criminalization, were narrower or wider in 1953 in comparison to Article II of the Genocide
Convention. For example, the ECtHR could have examined the Eichmann case of 1962, where the
Supreme Court of Israel refers directly to UNGA Resolution 96(I) as evidence that the crime of
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genocide was recognized during and after the Second World War. Although there are contemporary
instances of domestic jurisdictions enlarging the scope of the protected group to include social
and political groups, the ECtHR could have elaborated more on the issue as regards the early
period of the prohibition of genocide in late 1940s and early 1950s.43 Hence, it is difficult to discern
how the majority in the particular case reached an opinion different from the established principle
that there is no retroactive application of the substantive law when the conviction in the domestic
courts in part is based on the rules existing at the time of the commission of the act.44
The ECtHR concluded with the non-applicability of Article 7(2) of the ECHR by examining if
the applicant’s acts at the relevant time were criminal according to the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. The ECtHR recalled the original, exceptional purpose of Article
7(2) as being interlinked and interpreted in a concordant manner with Article 7(1) as laid down
in the Tess v. Latvia case. The ECtHR rejected the argument that the rule of non-retroactivity does
not apply if the act was criminal under Article 7(2) as Article 7(1) contains the general rule of the
prohibition of retroactivity and Article 7(2) “is only a contextual clarification of the liability limb of
that rule.”45 Hence, if the applicant’s conviction could not be justified under Article 7(1), it cannot
be justified under Article 7(2) of the ECHR.
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Only after the genocide of 1994 did Rwanda capture the attention of the world that lies beyond
the Great Lakes region of East Central Africa. Even the genocide itself in which up to 1,000,000
Rwandans were slaughtered in just 100 days was ignored by the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC), the United States, France, and Belgium. In the 22 years following the genocide there has
emerged a vast body of literature and film focused on the genocide and its aftermath. Journalists,
filmmakers, and aid-workers have produced thousands of documents concerned with the
genocide. And while academic presses have published scholarly monographs on Rwanda, Johan
Pottier worried in 2002 that filmmakers, journalists, and their kin dominated the conversation but
may not have been in the best position to provide the context that would help to foster a deeper
and more nuanced understanding of the traumas that antedated the genocide, the genocide itself,
and the trauma that ensued long after the killing stopped.1
Randall Fegley’s monograph, A History of Rwandan Identity and Trauma: The Mythmakers’
Victims, is a welcome contribution to enriching our understanding of the depth and complexity
of the genocide. Although the main focus of the book is not the 1994 genocide, his analysis does
provide worthwhile insights that have direct bearing on the trauma of 1994 and the struggles that
plague Rwanda well into the present day. According to Fegley, the “book is not about atrocities,
but rather the Rwandan identity and the internal and external myths that have confined and
directed it,” and he argues that “the mythologies affecting the Rwandan experience have tended to
emphasize deadly, political narratives.” 2 The lens of mythology is crucial to understanding how a
people and a nation see themselves and construct the “Other.” Fegley fruitfully borrows Duncan
Bell’s notion of a “mythscape”—“a discursive realm in which the myths of a nation are forged,
transmitted, negotiated and reconstructed constantly,” and he is correct to point out that myths,
as distinct from historical accounts of the past, are tremendously powerful in the construction of a
national identity.3 And he astutely emphasizes that myths are not necessarily tied to the historical
record; rather, they are often part of an oral tradition told by storytellers who take the liberty of
seeing the past in terms of the present.
In his introductory chapter, in addition to offering a précis of the argument, Fegley offers
a cursory overview of the country. While he is right to claim that the people and land that is
Rwanda have been largely ignored, his four-page description is taken mostly from a U.S. Army
publication from 1986 and the CIA World Fact Book. If the book is intended for a general audience
unacquainted with Central Africa, the description is alarmingly brief and schematic. If the book is
intended for scholars, they will already be familiar with this information.
In Chapter 1 Fegley points out that little is known of the early history of the area that was to
become modern Rwanda and Burundi—countries with similar ethnic and linguistic demographics.
Nevertheless, and as he shows, there is a well-entrenched mythology concerning the origins of
1

Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002).

2

Randall Fegley, A History of Rwandan Identity and Trauma (Landham: Lexington Books, 2016), xiii, xiv.

3

Fegley, History of Rwandan Identity and Trauma, xv; Duncan S.A. Bell, “Mythscape: Memory, Mythology and National
Identity,” British Journal of Sociology 54, March (2003), 63-81.

James J. Snow, “Book Review: A History of Rwandan Identity and Trauma: The Mythmakers’ Victims” Genocide Studies and Prevention
10, 3 (2016): 88-91. ©2016 Genocide Studies and Prevention.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.10.3.1430

Book Review: A History of Rwandan Identity

89

the three ethnic groups: the Hutu majority, the Tutsi minority, and the relatively small group of
Twa. According to the prevailing myth as told in the epic poems of the Ibitekerezo, Twa and Hutu
occupied the area before Tutsi arrived from the north to establish order in the region beginning
in the eleventh century. Gihanga—the “founding” Tutsi king of oral tradition—was venerated in
Rwandan mythology well into the twentieth century, and with it a narrative of Tutsi superiority.
The mythological narrative of Tutsi superiority was further codified during the colonial rule of the
Germans and later the Belgians. With the advent of written history, the hegemony of the narrative
of Tutsi superiority became even stronger with the invention of the Hamitic hypothesis. This
hypothesis, promulgated by among others, Oskar Baumann and Charles Gabriel Seligman, claims
that the Tutsi were descendants of the Hamites, a racially distinct and racially superior Caucasoid
people who, the hypothesis claimed, descended from the north bringing civilization to East Central
Africa.4
In Chapter 2, the longest of the five chapters, Fegley summarizes the complicated history of
the rise of Hutu power beginning with the Belgian deportation of Mwami Yuhi Musinga in 1931
(in effect, marking the end of the Tutsi dynasty) through the 100 days of slaughter in 1994. Most
of what is presented in the first two-thirds of the chapter will be familiar to scholars and students
of the genocide and relies on earlier accounts by scholar, Gérard Prunier and journalist Philip
Gourevitch.5 A discussion of myth, a theme prominent in the introduction and first chapter, is
nearly absent in this chapter. Fegley devotes one paragraph to the publication of the Hutu Manifesto
(1957) which reversed the Hamitic hypothesis and cast the Tutsi as the original foreign invaders
from the north who tyrannized the Hutu. Fegley writes: “A new canon of mythology had replaced
the old.”6
Chapter 3, a relatively brief chapter, describes the aftermath of the genocide following the
victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Army under the leadership of Paul Kagame, and the establishment
of a new government. Kagame became president of Rwanda in 2000. Under Kagame’s leadership,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the gacaca courts tried hundreds of
thousands of perpetrators. Kagame is not without his critics, but he is seen by many as being
instrumental in bringing economic prosperity and a degree of unity and reconciliation to postgenocide Rwanda. While most of the chapter describes Rwanda’s journey toward justice,
reconciliation, and stability, Fegley is right to point out that in the wake of trauma in which the
vast majority of survivors were witness to extreme violence and lost family members, divisive
mythologies are likely to persist. Confronting and redressing these persistent divisive mythologies,
in Fegley’s view, is the responsibility of parents and educators. The pre-colonial and colonial
education system perpetuated and reinforced group stereotypes, first reinforcing the favoring of
Tutsi, and after the Hutu Revolution favoring the Hutu. It speaks volumes that Rwanda did not
teach its own history for 13 years following the genocide; instruction in history began anew in 2007
with a new and carefully negotiated curriculum.
Fegley’s fourth chapter describes in some detail the development of the new curriculum
negotiated by policy makers, educators, and curriculum experts within Rwanda in conjunction
with consultants from the University of California-Berkley. This chapter helps to illuminate the
politics of national curriculum development, a task made especially difficult given Rwanda’s
traumatic past and its quest for national unity.
As would be hoped for and expected, in his concluding chapter, Fegley looks forward,
searching for paths to reconciliation, social harmony, and stability in Rwanda. He briefly compares
Rwandan state-level political initiatives to the initiatives in other countries including countries
that have experienced colonial and post-colonial trauma. In the end, he seems skeptical of the
efficacy of structural political initiatives as the power of mythologies and ideologies that embrace
binaries of self and “Other” are not easily dispelled; too often a group will self-identify as a victim
4
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group. Referencing Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims Become Killers, Fegley claims, “Yesterday’s
desperate victims became today’s convinced perpetrators.”7
Fegley’s final two pages take a most unexpected turn. Here, Fegley introduces the early work
of Stephen Karpmen who introduced the notion of a Drama Triangle in the field of transactional
analysis.8 The Drama Triangle was introduced by Karpmen as a way of characterizing dysfunctional
relationships, and recent work in transactional analysis (here he cites Patricia Morgan9) is designed
to help people break out of dysfunctional personal relationships. He is skeptical of what can
“be accomplished by just sending directives from the top or bringing in foreign experts.”10 It is
somewhat surprising that this claim does not receive more attention. Scott Straus, for example, has
recently shown that “founding narratives” perpetrated by political elites have tremendous power
to both provoke and sustain genocidal violence, and it seems clear that narratives perpetrated by
political elites would be equally powerful in advancing the cause of reconciliation.11 Instead, Fegley
places the onus on “writers, artists, clergy, teachers, storytellers and parents,” who, he claims,
could use Morgan’s framework to help facilitate the development of “reconciliatory narratives
emanating from the grassroots.”12
This is a short book; subtracting pages containing endnotes, the bibliography, and index, it is
just over 100 pages. And it is written in a style that makes it accessible to a general audience with
little familiarity with the land and people of Rwanda, Rwanda’s history, or the genocide and its
aftermath. Despite its brevity, however, its scope is vast. And because of its vast scope, at times
it lacks thematic integrity. While the book purports to be concerned with myths that ground the
Rwandan identity, there are sections of the book that do not connect to this theme in any evident
way. For example, 10 pages at the end of the chapter on the genocide are devoted to a review of
books, articles, reports, and films about the genocide, including a discussion of the controversies
surrounding the film Hotel Rwanda. The chapter on the development of a new history curriculum
post-genocide is replete with details concerning the development of a new curriculum, but does
not fully deliver on the promise of the chapter title, “Creating a Competing Mythology.”
The book contains nearly 500 footnotes—a testament to its breadth—but many of the more
important pieces of scholarship cited are only briefly acknowledged but not discussed in any
detail. Given the brevity of the book, it is regrettable that Fegley does not more carefully engage
this recent scholarship on some of the same themes that are central to his study. Two examples are
worth noting. In the chapter on education Fegley does quote from Elisabeth King’s seminal work,
From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda.13 However, he does not take on one of her central arguments
to the effect that the post-genocide educational system in Rwanda is in important ways continuous
with the colonial system in that it continues to perpetuate the antagonisms she shows to be part
of colonial education. Second, there is emerging a body of scholarship on the complex intersection
of myth and history in relationship to the construction of national identities. While Stefan Berger
writes about this relationship in the case of modern Europe, his analysis of the relationship between
myth and history could well illuminate the difficulties facing Rwanda.14
One final concern, and one alluded to earlier, lies in his introduction of Karpmen and Morgan’s
model for triangulating interactions as a resource for promoting peace and reconciliation. While
he is to be commended for looking well outside the conventional box for resources for promoting
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reconciliation, his proposal, precisely because of it novelty, demands far more than two and a half
pages of explanation.
Overall, while the book offers some important insights into a political situation in Rwanda that
remains fraught, in the end, it does not fully deliver on its promise to reveal and analyze the myths
that have shaped, and continue to shape, the Rwandan national identity.
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The main purpose of this short monograph by Michael Warren Tumolo is to “analyze[s] the
rhetoric of a set of extant public memorial texts.”1 With this as its focus, it is somewhat surprising
that the author nowhere even mentions Aristotle, whose classic work Rhetoric has had an enormous
influence on the development of the art of rhetoric from ancient times to the present. According
to Aristotle, the rhetorician is someone who is always able to see what is possibly persuasive in
every given case,2 and he presents a general theory of the techniques of persuasion to assist the
rhetorician in this, a theory that brings to bear a number of concepts and arguments from his
writings in logic, ethics, and psychology. Aristotle’s work would have been one way to provide
a theoretical framework for the discussion of rhetoric in Tumolo’s book, but the book is notably
thin on theory. For his authority on rhetoric, he relies chiefly on a single article by John Poulakos,
“Towards a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric.”3 Following Poulakos, Tumolo defines rhetoric as
consisting of three aspects: “kairos (opportune moment), propriety, and possibility.”4 An important
question in evaluating this monograph is whether, first, these terms are sufficiently clear to do
analytic work and second, this definition is put to good use by helping the reader better understand
the persuasive intent and effect of a number of public memorial discourses. Put another way, what
is the explanatory gain from viewing the various cases Tumolo discusses (all relating to genocide)
through the lens of rhetoric? As I will suggest, I am not persuaded that we gain much.
The monograph is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces Pulakos’s definition, which
is referenced again in chapters 5 and 6. Given the centrality of the notion of rhetoric to the aims of
this book, and given that this is an introductory chapter that sets the stage for the ones to follow,
one would have expected a serious effort by Tumolo to clarify how he intends us to understand
this key concept. Unfortunately, we do not get much help in this department. If I understand
Tumolo correctly, rhetoric is the art of examining how uncritically accepted patterns of thought
come to take hold of people’s consciousness and how new patterns of thought that deviate from
these come to be accepted in their wake as legitimate or appropriate. So far so good, but it’s only a
start. Perhaps Tumolo does not elaborate because he intends to use the case studies in the following
chapters to flesh out this definition. But there is a problem with this strategy; the case studies
would have to reveal how the various terms in the definition are concretely applied. They would
have to give us answers to such questions as: what constitutes the propriety or appropriateness of
a particular rhetorical discourse? What factors determine whether an occasion for memorialization
is opportune? The reader is left having to tease out answers to these questions from the various
narratives, and while they provide some clues, there is no systematic effort to use them to provide
answers.
Chapter 2 focuses on the Armenian genocide and, in particular, on the fate of a congressional
resolution labeling the actions of the Ottoman Empire during World War I (WWI) as genocide.
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The story here has been told before and the analysis is not novel. Tumolo argues that pragmatic
political considerations having to do with the United States’ use of a military base in Turkey were
allowed to trump a declaration of moral principle. Forgetting the past, in this case, meant referring
to the events of WWI under some other description than genocide. This is an important point that
could have been expanded: one way to forget is not to advert to certain events at all; another is to
advert to them, but by means of mischaracterization.
Chapter 3 reviews the story of Adolf Eichmann’s capture in Argentina and his abduction
to Israel to stand trial for crimes against humanity and the Jewish people. The narrative is wellconstructed, if in broad outlines quite familiar, using original material to document how the trial
created a conflict between, on the one hand, international law which was violated by the abduction
of Eichmann to Israel and, on the other, the moral imperative to create “a didactic moral drama”5
that would teach Jews and the world at large about the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust, then still
largely unknown. The moral imperative prevailed in what Tumolo calls an analogue of jury
nullification. Returning to the overarching theme of remembrance, Tumolo concludes that the trial
“worked to instill a moral obligation to remember.”6 The notion of a duty to remember is taken up
again in chapter 5.
Chapter 4 continues with the Eichmann trial, this time examining the central question to
which Hannah Arendt’s coverage of the trial gave rise. How should Eichmann be remembered?
Was he, as Arendt argued, a thoughtless bureaucrat who merely followed orders without regard
to their consequences? Or was he, as the filmmakers of a 1997 PBS documentary on Eichmann
maintained, a moral monster and rabid anti-Semite? If the former, then anyone is capable of doing
what Eichmann did; if the latter, then it would take a very special person, not just an ordinary
human being, to do it. Tumolo draws attention to these two competing perspectives on Eichmann
but too quickly, in my view, ends up favoring Arendt’s interpretation. Repeating a point made in
the previous chapter (there is, incidentally, considerable repetition in this book), Tumolo argues
that the trial did not just serve justice by making the guilty party pay for his crimes: it also used the
law to educate public opinion and inform collective remembrance. He might have noted as well
that the use of law to shape collective memory through public criminal trials, so clearly evident in
the Eichmann trial, is an increasingly important feature of contemporary memorial practice.
Chapter 5 continues the theme of the Jewish genocide, but this time through the lens of the
President’s Commission on the Holocaust. Tumolo highlights the 1979 Report of the Commission as
a valuable account of the reasons for and methods of preserving memories of past atrocities. Here,
if anywhere, one would expect to find the philosophical meat of the book, but the reader will be
disappointed. The Report sets out to answer three questions: “1. Why Remember? 2. Whom are we
to remember? 3. How are we to remember?”7 The third question is mainly reserved for chapter 6,
and I will say a word about it below. As for the other two questions, Tumolo criticizes the Report’s
answers to both. The Jewish victims of the Nazis are not the only ones whom we are to remember,
he maintains, for there have also been many other victims of bigotry and unjust discrimination, or
worse. Tumolo is also dissatisfied with the Report’s answer to the second question, which to me is
the most philosophically interesting of the three, namely, there is a moral imperative to remember.
What we need, he suggests, is a better understanding of the nature of moral imperatives than
the Report provides. In his view, moral imperatives are not part of the furniture of the natural
world but are human constructions, “created by human actors to help make the human lifeworld intelligible and meaningful as part of social contracts governing human relations.”8 Here,
unfortunately, Tumolo is quite evidently out of his depth, for each part of this sentence—human
life-world, intelligible, meaningful, social contracts—virtually cries out for analysis that is not
provided.
Finally, chapter 6 notes the commitment of the President’s Commission to establishing
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forward-looking programs to prevent recurrence of genocide and not just to engaging in backwardlooking reflection on the wrongs of the past. Ending on a note that can hardly be contested, Tumolo
maintains that “the imperative ‘Never Again!’ must be connected with some program of action for
it to be meaningful.”9
Readers of this journal will find little that is new here. Accounts of the Armenian genocide
and Eichmann’s capture and trial, for example, do not augment what is already widely available
in the literature, and this makes Just Remembering considerably less interesting than it could have
been if less well known cases had been examined. Yet more disappointing, in my view, are some
additional shortcomings. First is the obscurity of the definition of rhetoric, an obscurity that poses
a serious problem for a book that the author claims is devoted to an analysis of the rhetoric of
memorial texts. In fact, however, this claim is misleading, and this is another one of the book’s
problems. For while we are led to believe that an understanding of the rhetoric of memorial texts
will provide new insights into the formation of collective memory, the prominence it is given in
the title and the opening chapter turns out to be unwarranted. The spotlight cast on rhetoric adds
little of substance to the exposition. Finally, there is the book’s failure to draw general lessons about
collective memory, about its “propriety” and moral value, from the case studies discussed here.
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Women and War in Rwanda is a useful addition to the ongoing conversation about the role of
media and the genocide in Rwanda. This book also adds a welcome and key feminist perspective
that is often absent from otherwise impressive scholarship on the genocide in Rwanda.
Using discourse analysis, Women and War in Rwanda examines the BBC narrative (comprised
of two programs, Panorama and Newsnight, and the BBC website) of Rwanda and the east of Congo
and examines “the way in which Rwandan and Congolese women were seen to perform in war and
genocide” between 1994 and 2010.1 This book endeavors to challenge the existing gendered lens
by rejecting an essentialist reading of women’s experiences and reality as uniform. According to
Holmes, this lens perpetuated in part by feminists, depicts African women as passive, agency-less
victims during conflict. First analyzing the imaging of women in Rwanda during and following
the genocide, the book concludes with an analysis of international (comprised of governments,
media, and non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations) depictions of mass rape and
genocide by attrition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (referred to as Congo). Holmes
argues broadly that “mediatized political discourse” about the Great Lakes region of Central Africa
“has been produced and sustained” by an array of political and non-political actors with varying
agendas and that women play a central role, particularly in the gendered international politics of
revisionism.2
The first chapter “Contextualizing media events: war and genocide in Rwanda and the east
of Congo” emphasizes the chronology of events preceding, during, and following the genocide
in Rwanda. A rushed but concise history of the genocide in Rwanda then segues to a history of
the 1996 and 1998 wars in east Congo before returning to Rwanda immediately post-genocide.
Throughout the chapter, Holmes details the events and layers of context that underpin the 1994
genocide in Rwanda and wars in east Congo. It is an ambitious but dense chapter that introduces
many interesting insights but may be difficult to follow for scholars new to Rwanda and the Great
Lakes region.
The second chapter “Rwandan women and war” outlines a theoretical lens grounded in
feminist theory and informed by political science as well as genocide and media studies. This
interdisciplinary lens serves as the foundation, through agreement or disagreement, for Holmes’s
analysis and the author introduces several mini case studies to explain the broader narratives and
“politics of revisionism” in Rwanda and east Congo. The literature that underpins the author’s
analysis is expansive and offers a unique lens for examination of the book’s primary case studies.
Chapter three, “Militarizing women, preparing for genocide: Hutu extremist magazine
Kangura 1990-94,” offers a brief history of the democracy movement in pre-genocide Rwanda
and a case study analysis of Kangura, an extremist publication widely acknowledged by scholars
and Rwandans alike for its role in fomenting genocide in Rwanda. Holmes asserts that Kangura’s
images and publications militarized and imaged Rwandan women according to their ethnicity
and citizenship status. Holmes divides her analysis into three key parts that she supports with
1
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examples from the print periodical: non-citizen Rwandan women (Tutsi), full-citizen Rwandan
women (Hutu), and partial citizen Rwandan women (Hutu but ostracized for political actions).
Holmes details the fate of specific women who embody the last two groups of women which
helped to further illustrate their status and fate in 1994 Rwanda.
The fourth chapter “Newsnight,” examines the role of one BBC television program that offered
political news coverage in 1994 and was considered reputable, “deemed an essential component
of British democracy.”3 Holmes argues that scholars too often focus on media’s influence on
government policy and not the government’s influence on media and news creation. The chapter
first analyzes the frequency and content of Newsnight’s coverage of the genocide in Rwanda, briefly
explores how Newsnight mediatized Rwandan women, and then examines how the various actors
in Rwanda and east Congo maneuvered the media to advance their version of history and “truth.”
This chapter provides necessary historical and political context to the narratives propagated by
BBC programs in both conflicts.
Chapter five “Remembering genocide, forgetting politics: the BBC’s institutional narrative post1994,” examines the push/pull of BBC efforts to document the 1994 genocide and simultaneously
obfuscate the UK’s role and foreign policy decision making during that period. This chapter offers
unique insight into BBC institutional history, examining how the media outlet’s narrative of the
genocide in Rwanda, from Newsnight news features to Panorama documentaries and docu-dramas,
shifted over time and in accordance with the “changing industry environment and political
climate within which the BBC operated from 1994 onwards.”4 It also questions the institutional
independence of the BBC, offering evidence that its programming was influenced by both British
and Rwandan governments.
Chapter six, “‘Living on gold should be a blessing, instead it is a curse’: mass rape in the
Congo,” transitions to the wars in east Congo that followed the end of the genocide in Rwanda
and uses graphic testimony and evidence from various reports, articles, and documentaries to
make the case for the existence of “genocide by attrition” in east Congo and “mass rape” as part
of the process of genocide by attrition.5 Holmes critiques the “western feminist legacy,” human
rights bodies, and the media for asserting that all women are victims in east Congo and all men
are perpetrators. This salient critique exposes a paradigm that leaves little room for an inclusive
discussion and ignores women who perpetrate and men and boys who are victims.
Holmes correctly critiques Newsnight in Chapter six for imaging violence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo as a continuation of the genocide in Rwanda. While the violence in the
east of Congo is connected in part to the 1994 genocide, each conflict has distinct origins, impacts,
and realities, especially for women. At the same time, this book, consciously titled Women and
War in Rwanda, risks a similar imaging issue. The final chapter, dedicated to east Congo due to its
proximity to Rwanda and the spillover of the genocide into Congo, and analyzing the imaging of
women across both conflicts as its weft thread, risks conflating the two conflicts into one.
This book does an excellent job examining the “mediatized political discourses” produced
and sustained by the media and an array of political and non-political actors. As a gender analysis,
it examines the masculinization and feminization of war and genocide, but in several sections
analysis of women in particular seems to be an afterthought, inserted after the initial analysis rather
than at its core. In the first chapter, while women are repeatedly mentioned in topic sentences,
the subsequent paragraphs often transition to an almost entirely male-centric analysis. While this
constitutes a gender analysis that addresses male-centric narratives, it belies the title and expressed
intent of this book. This may be due in part to the existing lacunae in the literature, but such gaps
also provide an opportunity which the author overlooks in this section. In addition, in the fifth
chapter, while brief sections address the feminization of victims and mediatizing genocidal rape
in Rwanda, the emphasis is clearly placed on the broader institutional history of the BBC and its
narrative impact on coverage of Rwanda.
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Overall, for scholars interested in a history and analysis of the BBC’s coverage of Rwanda,
this book is a must-read. And for those interested in a gender analysis of the media and coverage
of women in Rwanda and east Congo, this book serves as a welcome addition to a developing
conversation.
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As I write this review, the Supreme Court Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) announced their verdict upholding large parts of the judgment in
cases 002/01 against Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan, the second and third defendants at this
hybrid tribunal. The first case was against the head of the security prison S-21, Kaing Guek Eav,
known as Duch, and it is him and his trial which stand at the center of this book.
Man or Monster? is aimed at a readership interested in perpetrators of mass violence, transitional
justice processes, and post-violence societies. In essence, the book looks at how transitional justice
processes allow for various ‘articulations’ of the person being tried as a perpetrator and focuses
on the story of Duch. The book serves well not only as a detailed study of these issues, but also
as an introductory piece on the genocide of the Khmer Rouge and particularly the role of S-21,
providing a complementary view to David Chandler’s seminal work on this place from a very
different perspective.1
Hinton describes his book as an ‘ethnodrama’ and it is structured along various roles ascribed
to Duch, and then by various parties to the trials. The book draws on various literary genres in
compiling a work which is artistic and scholarly, readable yet theoretically grounded, empirically
rigorous and engaging yet approachable by people unfamiliar with the case. As the book draws
on various literary forms, Man or Monster? includes an abecedarian on Duch, the Khmer Rouge
and the trial with each line beginning with A, B, C and the next letters of the alphabet; an erasure
drawing on the apology Duch made before the court which has redacted parts of the text to lay
stronger emphasis on Duch’s masking of the violence at S-21; and a cento, a poem that draws on
various contrasting sources.
Furthermore, throughout the book Hinton includes various styles and approaches to provide
a broad and encompassing perspective on the topics being studied. Striking are the first-person
narratives and field journal entries telling of Hinton’s own experiences at the trial and how he
engaged with various actors of the judicial processes. Most prominently, this includes some of the
prominent survivors and Hinton’s experiences while visiting Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum on
many occasions, which S-21 was turned into after the fall of the Khmer Rouge. Tuol Sleng, S-21
and the ECCC, are the two/three locations where most of the book plays out, adeptly reaching out
to tell stories beyond this. The prominent positions of these places allow the reader to be walked
through Tuol Sleng as a museum today, as well as feel what it means to those survivors who were
once imprisoned here, and how they see it now as they peddle their wares and sell their stories on
the grounds.
These accounts are intermingled with trial materials, sometimes verbatim, more often
paraphrased, managing to engage the reader in a way which goes beyond scholarly practice and
transport him or her as a silent witness peering over the shoulder of various actors at the tribunal.
The reader is presented with key points during the trial, including key witnesses, Duch’s apology,
the verdict and appeals, and how the various participants at the court attempt to shape these events
and use them to portray Duch in a certain light.
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S-21 takes a prominent position too, with Hinton providing the reader with details about the
place as it was created, how it was run by Duch, the methods of torturous interrogation which were
used, and how the prison managed to utterly dehumanize anyone who came through its gates.
Accounts of Duch’s life before S-21 are tied into these narratives in an attempt to show continuities
through his life, to include his schooling and his passion as a math teacher, as well as his running of
the M-13 prison camp during the civil war which preceded Democratic Kampuchea, as the country
was called under the Khmer Rouge’s reign. Broader historical explanations of how the Khmer
Rouge regime ruled the country with an iron fist, implemented its genocidal ideology, and purged
thousands of its own cadres are given, but always relating into the S-21 locality, telling the history
of this period in Cambodia from the perspective of this infamous place.
Most prominently though, the book goes beyond a re-telling of Duch’s, S-21’s, or even
Democratic Kampuchea’s history, as it offers reflections on the meanings these places are imbued
with today and how the perception of them differs culturally. Hinton takes this further to consider
also the meaning various objects have for different people, such as a photograph of Chan Kim
Srun, a woman photographed on her admittance to S-21 with her baby on her arm, or even the
chair which these photos were taken on. Another example is a photograph of Duch displayed
at Tuol Sleng, which has had various graffiti smeared on it, and Hinton has placed on the cover
of his book, and how different cultural frames of mind will understand these graffiti in strongly
diverging ways.
In the grand melange of influences in the book, finally, Hinton also puts forward various
theoretical ideas and impulses as these relate to the many and diverse empirical topics already
discussed. It is at once the book’s main strength and weakness that he playfully integrates these
various questions, ideas, and approaches throughout his material, as it leaves the book without a
theoretical foundation as a whole, but provides beacons of insight throughout. From a theoretical
or conceptual point of view, Hinton regularly throws in elucidating ideas which guide and support
the wealth of empirical material he presents, but none provide an overarching framework.
The main ideas which run through the book are first, that of the ‘redactic’ or erasure. Hinton
prompts his readers to think about the ‘articulations’ which are put forth by various actors and
events (including us as readers in our own lives), and how these are redacted, what is left out and
how different elements are backgrounded. He applies this to the “thick frames” of Khmer Rouge
ideology, as well as to articulations of Duch at trial and of his survivors today. I would argue that
any study necessarily reduces the complexity of reality, and Hinton is right in saying that “we must
be wary of the maskings and obfuscations that are always present and that underlie the banality of
everyday thought.”2 This is a useful, albeit slightly banal lens through which to view Duch’s trial.
But the book would not be significantly weakened without the redactic as a frame, and equally it is
an idea which could be applied to any study of human beings in social situations. Hinton’s point is
well made, but it is slightly overlaboured.
Second, the ‘essence’ of who Duch actually is, is grappled with in the title of the book Man
or Monster?, as well as in the title picture (the photograph of Duch with graffiti) are discussed in
great depth throughout the book from various perspectives. Different perspectives can be found in
portrayals in the media, by the prosecution, and through survivor testimony of Duch as a monster.
He saw himself as a cog in the larger machine with little agency, just a man in a difficult situation;
the judges deemed him to be a zealot who “exercised his authority actively, innovating, managing
S-21, recruiting and training staff, participating in arrests, and reporting about and annotating
confessions.”3 Given how any articulation of who Duch is, is necessarily redacted, Hinton
emphasizes the grey zones which appear to have been erased in such dichotomous approaches to
seeing Duch as either man or monster, innocent or guilty. Various articulations emphasize different
elements, thus automatically redacting others: meticulous zeal in fulfilling his obligation to the
party; boastfulness about his torturous interrogation skill; an enthusiastic leader and teacher;
prepared to invest everything for his party; a lack of empathy; differences in interpretation about
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how much sway he held in decisions regarding purges; and who was to be arrested or about how
much he was actively involved in violence. While Duch remains at the center of these discussions,
other actors are also studied, along with their characters, their motivations for their testimony, and
their perspectives on the past and present.
A third recurring topic is that of hybridity or a disjuncture between the local (Cambodians) and
the global (internationals), particularly in their diverging cultural understandings of the different
processes, as well as different interests they have in them. The political Spiel surrounding the ECCC
and its cases are central here, but also at a more fundamental level regarding conceptions of justice,
responsibility, and forgiveness, particularly given the Western liberal view of the world on the one
side and the Cambodian Buddhist perspective on the other. Some of the most interesting points
and arguments new to the literature are in these discussions and it would have served the book
well for these to have been foregrounded a little more.
As such, this book ties into other recent moves within the study of perpetrators of mass
violence which tries to dissolve binary, black-and-white perspectives and highlight the grey zones
and complexity of many actors involved in conflict.4 These works challenge us to contemplate the
possibility that people such as Duch are not monsters, but are in a grey zone in which we ourselves
are also located.
This book will become standard reading for anyone studying the portrayal of perpetrators
during post-conflict justice processes or more specifically the trials at the ECCC, as well as those
interested in the inner workings of S-21 and most certainly the personality of its leader Duch.
In the end, Hinton does not want to provide definitive answers to concrete questions but wants
to demonstrate ellipses, point towards paradoxes, culturally qualify and contextualise, provoke
thought, challenge preconceptions, and raise questions. He achieves this objective fully and the
reader finishes the book with the feeling of being empirically saturated with a wealth of fascinating
details about the trials and its actors, Duch as a man and a monster, S-21 then, and Tuol Sleng
Genocide Museum today. And yet, there remains a question mark of what the core message of
this work is, which is unsettling for an academic book. However, it is a question mark the author
certainly wants hanging over the book and one which challenges us to think deeper and further
challenge our perspectives on this and other cases. To end with a short excerpt from the book,
Man or Monster? is a plea for “‘thoughtfulness,’ a willingness to think critically and remain open to
difference and the real-world complexities that we are inclined, by our existential anxieties and the
banality of everyday thought, to pare down, edit and redact.”5
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